plan: 计划审查修订 + AuthProvider 抽象层设计
- 修复 U1 (Schema): 澄清不使用 Alembic，采用 _SCHEMA_SQL + init_auth_db()， 新增 user_sessions → auth_sessions 一次性数据回填 - 修复 U4 (Routes): whoami 端点添加到中间件白名单并实现自主认证， 明确 get_current_session / load_user / user_to_response 等函数定义 - 新增 AuthProvider 抽象层：Protocol 接口、LocalAuthProvider、StubOIDCProvider 及依赖注入工厂，支持未来对接集团 IdP - 新增 AE-10 (Provider 切换) + AE-11 (审计字段) 验收用例 - 更新 Component Map，添加 AuthProvider 相关组件
This commit is contained in:
chiguyong
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# Fischer AgentKit — 集中鉴权与 Token 持久化 (Requirements)
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**Date:** 2026-06-20
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**Branch:** `feat/centralized-auth-token-persistence`
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**Status:** Draft
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**Scope:** 服务端签发 JWT + 客户端安全持久化 + 服务端 Session 表 + Refresh Token 轮换 + 「记住我」 + 启动态区分
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**Out of scope:** 企业 IdP 对接（OIDC / SAML / LDAP）、多租户、密码强度策略、2FA、SSO 跳转
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**Branch:** `feat/auth-server-token-persistence`（原 `feat/centralized-auth-token-persistence`）
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**Status:** Active — 已合并 AuthProvider 抽象层 scope（2026-06-20 更新）
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**Scope:** 服务端签发 JWT + 客户端安全持久化 + 服务端 Session 表 + Refresh Token 轮换 + 「记住我」 + 启动态区分 + **AuthProvider 抽象层（为未来对接集团 IdP 留扩展点）**
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**Out of scope:** 实现具体企业 IdP 适配（OIDC / SAML / LDAP / 飞书 / 钉钉 / 企微）、多租户、密码强度策略、2FA、SSO 跳转
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---
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@ -42,15 +42,19 @@
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- 支持 **「记住我」**（refresh 7d / 30d）
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- 客户端 access token **预刷新**（剩余 <2min 主动 refresh）
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- 启动时区分 `no_token` / `token_invalid` / `token_valid` 三态
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- 鉴权后端 **可插拔**（AuthProvider 抽象）：当前 Local，未来 OIDC / SAML / LDAP 只需新增 adapter
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- admin 端点 **与认证后端解耦**（统一通过 user_id 操作），未来切换 IdP 不影响 session 管理
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- 审计日志记录登录来源（`auth_provider` 字段），集团接管时可溯源
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### 1.3 设计哲学
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> **服务端权威 + 客户端最小信任 + 加密落盘 + 可观测可治理**
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> **服务端权威 + 客户端最小信任 + 加密落盘 + 可观测可治理 + 认证后端可插拔**
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- **服务端权威**：所有 token 校验、续期、撤销由服务端说了算，客户端不可绕过
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- **客户端最小信任**：客户端不存密码、access token 不持久化（仅内存）、refresh token 进 Keychain
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- **加密落盘**：refresh token 走 OS 级加密（Tauri: macOS Keychain / Windows Credential Manager / Linux Secret Service）
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- **可观测可治理**：admin 能看 / 踢任意 session，集团统一管理的基础设施准备好
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- **认证后端可插拔**：所有用户认证逻辑走 `AuthProvider` Protocol（authenticate / get_user / sync_attributes / revoke_user），当前 `LocalAuthProvider` 封装 SQLite + bcrypt；未来 `OidcAuthProvider` 接管时，路由层、admin API、Session 表都不需要重写
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---
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@ -72,6 +76,9 @@
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| F10 | 客户端 access token 剩余 <2min 主动 refresh | 不依赖 401 触发 |
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| F11 | 启动区分 `no_token` / `token_invalid` / `token_valid` | 错误态有「重试」按钮而不是直接清空 |
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| F12 | 多个 Tauri / Web 客户端可同时登录同一账号 | 互不干扰，独立 session |
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| F13 | 鉴权后端可插拔（AuthProvider 抽象） | 配置切换 `local` ↔ `oidc-stub`，路由/Admin/Session 表零修改 |
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| F14 | admin 端点与认证后端解耦 | 未来切 IdP，admin 看 session 列表 / 踢人功能不变 |
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| F15 | 审计日志记录 `auth_provider` 字段 | 登录来源可溯源（local / oidc / saml） |
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### 2.2 Non-Functional Goals
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@ -88,7 +95,7 @@
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## 3. Non-Goals
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- ❌ **企业 IdP 对接**（OIDC / SAML / LDAP / 飞书 / 钉钉 / 企微）— 下一迭代单独 brainstorm
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- ❌ **实现具体企业 IdP 适配**（OIDC / SAML / LDAP / 飞书 / 钉钉 / 企微）— 下一迭代单独 brainstorm；本次只预留 AuthProvider 抽象层
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- ❌ **多租户 / 集团多组织隔离** — 当前单租户架构不动
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- ❌ **密码强度策略 / 密码过期 / 密码历史** — 单独的 IAM 改造
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- ❌ **2FA / TOTP / WebAuthn / Passkey** — 单独 brainstorm
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@ -155,6 +162,7 @@
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| `revoked` | INTEGER (bool) | — | 是否被踢 |
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| `revoked_reason` | TEXT NULL | — | `user_terminated` / `password_changed` / `admin_revoked` / `reuse_detected` |
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| `previous_session_id` | TEXT NULL | — | refresh 轮换的上一跳（用于审计） |
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| `auth_provider` | TEXT | — | 登录来源：`local` / `oidc-stub` / `saml`（未来扩展） |
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#### 5.1.2 JWT payload 扩展
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@ -320,6 +328,189 @@ apiClient.interceptors.request.use(async (config) => {
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- 客户端版本检查：`Authorization` header 带 `X-Client-Version` header
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- 服务端支持 1 个 minor 版本的旧客户端（~30 天灰度）
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### 5.5 鉴权后端可插拔 — AuthProvider 抽象层
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> **设计动机**：当前用本地 users 表 + bcrypt 校验密码。未来集团对接 OIDC / SAML / LDAP 时，路由层、admin API、Session 表都不应重写。通过 `AuthProvider` Protocol 把"用户存在哪里 / 密码怎么校验 / 属性怎么同步"封装在 adapter 内部。
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#### 5.5.1 AuthProvider Protocol
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```python
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# auth/providers/base.py
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from typing import Protocol
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from ..models import User
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class AuthProvider(Protocol):
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"""所有鉴权后端必须实现的能力。
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路由层只调用以下方法，不感知具体实现是 SQLite / OIDC / LDAP。
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"""
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name: str # 标识当前 provider，写入 session.auth_provider
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async def authenticate(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> User:
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"""校验用户名 + 密码，返回 User 对象。失败抛 InvalidCredentials。"""
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...
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async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: int) -> User | None:
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"""按 id 查 user（admin 端点、session 校验、whoami 都用这个）。"""
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...
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async def sync_user_attributes(self, user_id: int) -> None:
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"""同步用户属性（部门/邮箱/职位等）。
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LocalAuthProvider: no-op
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OidcAuthProvider: 从 IdP 拉最新 profile 写回本地 users 表
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"""
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...
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async def revoke_user(self, user_id: int) -> None:
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"""禁用用户（离职 / 锁定场景）。
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LocalAuthProvider: UPDATE users SET is_active=0
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OidcAuthProvider: 调 IdP 的 disable API（未来）
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"""
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...
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```
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#### 5.5.2 默认实现 LocalAuthProvider
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```python
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# auth/providers/local.py
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class LocalAuthProvider:
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name = "local"
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def __init__(self, db: aiosqlite.Connection):
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self._db = db
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async def authenticate(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> User:
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# 封装现有 routes/auth.py:201-213 的 password 校验逻辑
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row = await self._db.execute(
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"SELECT id, username, password_hash, is_active FROM users WHERE username = ?",
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(username,),
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)
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row = await row.fetchone()
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if not row or not row["is_active"]:
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raise InvalidCredentials("user not found or inactive")
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if not verify_password(password, row["password_hash"]):
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raise InvalidCredentials("invalid password")
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return await load_user(row["id"])
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async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: int) -> User | None:
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return await load_user(user_id)
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async def sync_user_attributes(self, user_id: int) -> None:
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return # local provider: no-op
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async def revoke_user(self, user_id: int) -> None:
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await self._db.execute(
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"UPDATE users SET is_active = 0 WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
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)
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await self._db.commit()
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```
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#### 5.5.3 占位实现 StubOIDCProvider
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```python
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# auth/providers/oidc_stub.py
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class StubOIDCProvider:
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"""OIDC 对接的接口占位。
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当前阶段只定义接口契约，不做实际 IdP 通讯。下一迭代实现时，
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重写 authenticate / sync_user_attributes / revoke_user 即可，
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路由层、admin API、Session 表零修改。
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"""
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name = "oidc-stub"
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async def authenticate(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> User:
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raise NotImplementedError(
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"OIDC provider not implemented. "
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"Use 'local' provider in agentkit.yaml: auth.provider: local"
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)
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async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: int) -> User | None:
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raise NotImplementedError
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async def sync_user_attributes(self, user_id: int) -> None:
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raise NotImplementedError
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async def revoke_user(self, user_id: int) -> None:
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raise NotImplementedError
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```
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#### 5.5.4 Provider 切换配置
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```yaml
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# agentkit.yaml
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auth:
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provider: local # local | oidc-stub (未来: oidc-keycloak, oidc-feishu, ...)
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session:
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table: auth_sessions
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access_ttl_seconds: 900
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refresh_ttl_seconds: 604800
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refresh_ttl_remember_me_seconds: 2592000
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jwt:
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secret_env: AGENTKIT_JWT_SECRET
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algorithm: HS256
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```
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#### 5.5.5 路由层 DI 注入
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```python
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# auth/providers/__init__.py
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from functools import lru_cache
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from ..config import get_settings
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from .base import AuthProvider
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from .local import LocalAuthProvider
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from .oidc_stub import StubOIDCProvider
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@lru_cache
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def get_auth_provider() -> AuthProvider:
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settings = get_settings()
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db = await get_auth_db() # 现有 aiosqlite 连接
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if settings.auth.provider == "local":
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return LocalAuthProvider(db)
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elif settings.auth.provider == "oidc-stub":
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return StubOIDCProvider()
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else:
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raise ValueError(f"unknown auth provider: {settings.auth.provider}")
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```
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```python
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# routes/auth.py 改造点
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from fastapi import Depends
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from ..auth.providers import get_auth_provider, AuthProvider
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@router.post("/login")
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async def login(
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body: LoginRequest,
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provider: AuthProvider = Depends(get_auth_provider),
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) -> LoginResponse:
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user = await provider.authenticate(username=body.username, password=body.password)
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# ... 后续 session 创建逻辑不变
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```
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#### 5.5.6 admin 端点与 Provider 解耦
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所有 admin API（`/admin/users/{id}/sessions` 等）都通过 `user_id` 操作，**不直接调用 provider.authenticate**。这意味着：
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- 未来切到 OIDC，admin 踢人 / 看 session 列表功能不变
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- LocalAuthProvider.revoke_user 和 OidcAuthProvider.revoke_user 实现不同，但 admin 端点统一调 `provider.revoke_user(user_id)`
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- 审计日志记录 `auth_provider`，未来切 IdP 后可溯源"哪个 session 是本地建的、哪个是 IdP 建的"
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#### 5.5.7 未来 IdP 对接清单（下一迭代参考）
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下一迭代实现 OIDC 时，按此 checklist 推进：
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- [ ] `auth/providers/oidc.py` — 实现 OidcAuthProvider（authenticate / get_user / sync_attributes / revoke_user）
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- [ ] `auth/oauth_routes.py` — `/auth/oauth/{provider}/redirect` 和 `/auth/oauth/{provider}/callback` 端点
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- [ ] `auth/state_cache.py` — OAuth state 参数防 CSRF（Redis TTL 5min）
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- [ ] 用户首次从 IdP 登录时的「本地账号创建」策略（justeer / 拒绝 / 邀请制）
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- [ ] IdP 端的 session 同步（IdP 登出时本地 session 也撤销）
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- [ ] 集团部门 / 职位属性映射到本地 users 表
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本次迭代只做 1-3 项的占位（接口 + stub 实现），其余列入下一迭代的独立 brainstorm。
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---
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## 6. Non-Functional Requirements
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@ -375,8 +566,12 @@ apiClient.interceptors.request.use(async (config) => {
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/session.py` — session CRUD + 轮换逻辑
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py` — 扩展 JWT payload（加 sid / jti）
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/keychain_audit.py` — refresh reuse 检测
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- `src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py` — 修改 login/refresh/logout，新增 whoami/sessions/change-password
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- `src/agentkit/server/routes/admin.py`（或 auth 内部）— admin session 管理
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/base.py` — `AuthProvider` Protocol 接口契约
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/local.py` — `LocalAuthProvider` 默认实现（封装 SQLite + bcrypt）
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc_stub.py` — `StubOIDCProvider` 占位实现（NotImplementedError + 文档）
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/__init__.py` — `get_auth_provider()` DI 工厂
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- `src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py` — 修改 login/refresh/logout，新增 whoami/sessions/change-password；通过 `Depends(get_auth_provider)` 注入 provider
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- `src/agentkit/server/routes/admin.py`（或 auth 内部）— admin session 管理（按 user_id 操作，与 provider 解耦）
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- `migrations/versions/xxx_add_auth_sessions.py` — Alembic migration
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- `src/agentkit/server/auth/cache.py` — Redis session 元数据 cache
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### 8.1 假设
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- **A1**: 用户当前没有 IdP 集成需求，集团统一管理仅靠本系统自带的 session 管理 + admin 端点满足
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- **A1**: 本次迭代只预留 AuthProvider 抽象层（接口 + Local + OIDC stub），不实现具体 IdP 适配；集团对接需求在下一迭代独立 brainstorm
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- **A2**: 单租户架构不变（`auth.db` 全局共享）
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- **A3**: Tauri 仅支持桌面平台（macOS / Windows / Linux），不规划移动端
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- **A4**: Keychain 失败时降级到 localStorage 可接受（dev 环境 / Linux 无 keyring daemon）
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- **A5**: Web 端仅作为开发/降级用途，不追求 localStorage 加密
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- **A6**: 旧客户端灰度期 ≤ 1 个 minor 版本（约 30 天）
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- **A7**: AuthProvider 的 Local 实现保留 bcrypt 成本 = 12（已实现），未来 IdP 接管时 Local 仍可用作「本地应急账号」
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- **A8**: admin API 鉴权走现有 RBAC（不依赖 provider），未来切 IdP 时 admin 角色定义保持不变
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### 8.2 待澄清（实施前确认）
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@ -495,13 +692,14 @@ apiClient.interceptors.request.use(async (config) => {
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## 10. Out of Scope (Explicit)
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- 企业 IdP / SSO（OIDC / SAML / LDAP / 飞书 / 钉钉 / 企微）— 下一迭代
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- 2FA / TOTP / WebAuthn / Passkey — 后续
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- 多租户 — 后续
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- 密码强度策略 / 密码过期 — 后续
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- 登录失败锁定 / 滑窗限流 — 后续安全加固
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- 邮件 / 短信通知 — 需要先有通知服务
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- 完整审计日志 / 全文检索 / 导出 — 后续
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- ❌ **实现具体企业 IdP / SSO 适配**（OIDC / SAML / LDAP / 飞书 / 钉钉 / 企微）— 下一迭代单独 brainstorm；本次只预留 AuthProvider 抽象层
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- ❌ OAuth / SAML 跳转流程、state cache、用户属性同步等 IdP 集成细节 — 见 5.5.7 checklist
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- ❌ 2FA / TOTP / WebAuthn / Passkey — 后续
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- ❌ 多租户 — 后续
|
||||
- ❌ 密码强度策略 / 密码过期 — 后续
|
||||
- ❌ 登录失败锁定 / 滑窗限流 — 后续安全加固
|
||||
- ❌ 邮件 / 短信通知 — 需要先有通知服务
|
||||
- ❌ 完整审计日志 / 全文检索 / 导出 — 后续
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -520,3 +718,5 @@ apiClient.interceptors.request.use(async (config) => {
|
|||
- `keyring` crate：https://docs.rs/keyring/latest/keyring/
|
||||
- OWASP JWT 安全备忘单：https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/JSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheet.html
|
||||
- Auth0 Refresh Token Rotation：https://auth0.com/docs/secure/tokens/refresh-tokens/refresh-token-rotation
|
||||
- OIDC Core 1.0（未来对接参考）：https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html
|
||||
- OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework（未来对接参考）：https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,15 +2,17 @@
|
|||
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-06-20
|
||||
**Status:** active
|
||||
**Branch:** `feat/centralized-auth-token-persistence`
|
||||
**Branch:** `feat/auth-server-token-persistence`（原 `feat/centralized-auth-token-persistence`）
|
||||
**Type:** feat
|
||||
**Origin:** [docs/brainstorms/2026-06-20-centralized-auth-token-persistence-requirements.md](docs/brainstorms/2026-06-20-centralized-auth-token-persistence-requirements.md)
|
||||
|
||||
> **2026-06-20 更新**：合并 AuthProvider 抽象层 scope（origin §5.5），新增 KTD-10、U1 `auth_provider` 字段、U3/U4 改造点、U11 实施单元、Phase 6、AE-10/AE-11。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
|
||||
Replace the current minimal JWT + localStorage auth with a production-grade scheme: server-side **session table** (track every login, enable forced revocation), **Tauri OS Keychain** storage for refresh tokens (encrypted at rest), **refresh token rotation** (defense against token leakage), **pre-emptive token refresh** (no 401 storms), and a **three-state startup** (valid / invalid / error). Goal: after first login, Tauri cold-start goes directly to the main app, no login page; admin can see/force-revoke any user's active sessions; password change instantly invalidates all other devices.
|
||||
Replace the current minimal JWT + localStorage auth with a production-grade scheme: server-side **session table** (track every login, enable forced revocation), **Tauri OS Keychain** storage for refresh tokens (encrypted at rest), **refresh token rotation** (defense against token leakage), **pre-emptive token refresh** (no 401 storms), a **three-state startup** (valid / invalid / error), and an **AuthProvider 抽象层** that decouples routes / admin API / session table from the concrete auth backend (Local today; OIDC / SAML / LDAP tomorrow via adapter). Goal: after first login, Tauri cold-start goes directly to the main app, no login page; admin can see/force-revoke any user's active sessions; password change instantly invalidates all other devices; future enterprise IdP integration requires no rewrite of the routing or admin layer.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ The current auth flow has three structural gaps:
|
|||
|
||||
The user's primary stated need is "after I log in once, subsequent app opens should go straight to the main app." The current code attempts this via localStorage rehydration, but two failure modes break it: (a) refresh hits `_refreshFailed` and the auth store clears itself; (b) when the access token expires mid-session and refresh fails (server restart, network blip), the store clears and the user is bounced to `/login`. We need both stronger local persistence and server-side session awareness to make this experience reliable.
|
||||
|
||||
The secondary stated need is **"集团统一管理"** (centralized enterprise management). Without a session table and admin endpoints, an admin cannot: see who is logged in, force-logout a lost device, or ensure that a compromised employee is immediately removed from all devices. This groundwork is also a prerequisite for the future OIDC/SAML integration brainstorm (out of scope here, but the session table is the same data model an IdP would feed).
|
||||
The secondary stated needs are **"集团统一管理"** (centralized enterprise management) and **"和集团的账号密码对接"** (eventual IdP integration). Without a session table and admin endpoints, an admin cannot: see who is logged in, force-logout a lost device, or ensure that a compromised employee is immediately removed from all devices. The session table is the same data model an IdP would feed. To keep the future IdP integration from requiring a routing / admin rewrite, the auth backend must be **pluggable behind an `AuthProvider` Protocol** (see KTD-10 and U11). Local today, OIDC tomorrow — without touching routes or admin code.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -46,6 +48,9 @@ The secondary stated need is **"集团统一管理"** (centralized enterprise ma
|
|||
- Frontend "Active sessions" management UI in `SettingsView` (list current devices, kick others)
|
||||
- Admin UI: see any user's active sessions, kick any session
|
||||
- Backwards-compat for one minor version: old clients without `sid` claim still work via `user_sessions` table fallback
|
||||
- **AuthProvider 抽象层** (`auth/providers/base.py` Protocol + `LocalAuthProvider` + `StubOIDCProvider`) — routes / admin / SessionService 通过 `Depends(get_auth_provider)` 拿到 provider；切换 IdP 不重写路由
|
||||
- `auth_sessions` 表 `auth_provider` 字段记录登录来源（`local` / `oidc-stub` / 未来 `oidc-keycloak` / `saml` / `ldap`）
|
||||
- 配置开关 `auth.provider: local | oidc-stub`（agentkit.yaml），未来加新 provider 只需新 adapter
|
||||
|
||||
### Out of Scope (deferred to follow-up work)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -84,6 +89,9 @@ The plan must satisfy all of the following origin IDs (see [requirements doc](do
|
|||
- **F10** Pre-emptive refresh when access expires in <2 min
|
||||
- **F11** Startup distinguishes `valid` / `invalid` / `error`
|
||||
- **F12** Multiple Tauri / Web clients can log in the same user simultaneously (independent sessions)
|
||||
- **F13** AuthProvider 可插拔（`auth.provider` 配置切换 local ↔ oidc-stub，路由/Admin/Session 表零修改）
|
||||
- **F14** admin 端点与认证后端解耦（未来切 IdP，admin 看 session 列表 / 踢人功能不变）
|
||||
- **F15** 审计日志记录 `auth_provider` 字段（登录来源可溯源）
|
||||
- **N1** Token validation P99 < 5ms (Redis cache for session metadata)
|
||||
- **N5** All auth code has unit + integration tests
|
||||
- **N6** Backwards-compat for old clients (1 minor version)
|
||||
|
|
@ -164,6 +172,20 @@ The plan must satisfy all of the following origin IDs (see [requirements doc](do
|
|||
|
||||
**Trade-off**: Two validation paths in `get_current_user`. Mitigated by extracting the session-lookup into a helper that both paths share.
|
||||
|
||||
### KTD-10: AuthProvider 抽象层（为未来 IdP 对接留扩展点）
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision**: 鉴权逻辑走 `auth/providers/base.py:AuthProvider` Protocol（`name` / `authenticate` / `get_user_by_id` / `sync_user_attributes` / `revoke_user`），路由层用 `Depends(get_auth_provider)` 注入。当前默认 `LocalAuthProvider`（封装 SQLite + bcrypt），未来 `OidcAuthProvider` 接管时**路由 / admin / Session 表零修改**。`StubOIDCProvider` 作为占位（`raise NotImplementedError`），用于未来接口契约验证。
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale**: 用户明确"未来要和集团账号密码对接"（OIDC / SAML / LDAP / 飞书 / 钉钉 / 企微）。如果现在把"用户存在哪里 / 密码怎么校验"写死在 routes/admin 里，未来切 IdP 必须重写所有路由层 + admin 端点。提前抽象可以让未来 IdP 集成只需新增一个 adapter（~300-500 行），不触及现有 routes / admin / SessionService。`auth_sessions` 表加 `auth_provider` 字段记录登录来源，审计可溯源。
|
||||
|
||||
**Trade-off**:
|
||||
- 多 1 个抽象层（`auth/providers/base.py` Protocol）+ 1 个 DI 工厂（`get_auth_provider`）+ 1 个 StubOIDCProvider 占位
|
||||
- 收益：未来 IdP 集成不重写路由层 + admin API；admin 踢人 / 看 session 列表跨 provider 一致
|
||||
|
||||
**Alternatives considered**:
|
||||
- ❌ 不预留扩展点，只做当下 LocalAuthProvider：未来切 IdP 必须重写 routes + admin + SessionService
|
||||
- ❌ 直接实现 OIDC：拉长本迭代 2-3 倍
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## High-Level Technical Design
|
||||
|
|
@ -196,20 +218,23 @@ The plan must satisfy all of the following origin IDs (see [requirements doc](do
|
|||
│ ▼ │
|
||||
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
|
||||
│ │ FastAPI server (Python sidecar) │ │
|
||||
│ │ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ routes/auth.py │───▶│ auth/session.py │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ routes/auth.py │──▶│ auth/session.py │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ + admin routes │ │ - create / rotate │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ └──────────────────┘ │ - revoke / kick │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ - reuse detection │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ └──────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ ▼ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ auth/models.py │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ AuthSessionModel │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ └──────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ Depends(get_auth_ │ │ - revoke / kick │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ provider) ─────┼──▶│ - reuse detection │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ └────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ ▼ ▼ │ │
|
||||
│ │ ┌────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ auth/providers/ │ │ auth/models.py │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ - base.py (Protocol) │ │ AuthSessionModel │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ - local.py (Local) │ │ + auth_provider col │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ - oidc_stub.py (stub) │ └──────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ get_auth_provider() DI │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ └────────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ ▼ │ │
|
||||
│ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
|
||||
│ │ │ auth/cache.py (Redis or in-process LRU) │ │ │
|
||||
│ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │
|
||||
|
|
@ -373,32 +398,112 @@ Client Server
|
|||
|
||||
## Implementation Units
|
||||
|
||||
### U1. Schema: AuthSessionModel + Alembic migration
|
||||
### U1. Schema: AuthSessionModel + extended bootstrap + backfill
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal**: Add the `auth_sessions` table with all required fields and indexes.
|
||||
**Goal**: Add the `auth_sessions` table with all required fields and indexes, AND backfill existing `user_sessions` rows on first startup.
|
||||
|
||||
**Requirements**: F6, N5, N6 (the table backs every session-aware endpoint).
|
||||
**Requirements**: F6, F15, N5, N6 (the table backs every session-aware endpoint; backfill prevents forced re-login; `auth_provider` field enables future IdP audit traceability).
|
||||
|
||||
**Dependencies**: None.
|
||||
|
||||
**Files**:
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/auth/models.py` — add `AuthSessionModel` (SQLAlchemy 2 typed) + extend `_SCHEMA_SQL` for direct aiosqlite init
|
||||
- `migrations/versions/2026_06_20_001_add_auth_sessions.py` — Alembic migration: CREATE TABLE + 3 indexes (`(user_id, revoked, expires_at)`, `(expires_at)`, `(refresh_token_hash)`)
|
||||
- `tests/unit/auth/test_models.py` — model serialization + index smoke tests
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/auth/models.py` — add `AuthSessionModel` (SQLAlchemy 2 typed) + extend `_SCHEMA_SQL` for direct aiosqlite init + add `_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2` constant + extend `init_auth_db()` to run the backfill
|
||||
- `tests/unit/auth/test_models.py` — model serialization + index smoke + backfill tests
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach**:
|
||||
**Approach (schema)**:
|
||||
- Use UUID strings as PK (matches existing `users.id` style in this codebase)
|
||||
- `device_info` is a JSON string (reuse pattern from `UserSessionModel.device_info`)
|
||||
- `expires_at` is ISO-8601 string (matches `UserModel.last_login_at`)
|
||||
- `revoked` is INTEGER (0/1) for SQLite compatibility
|
||||
- Add the new `CREATE TABLE auth_sessions` block to `_SCHEMA_SQL` (line 234-242 is the current `user_sessions` block; append after it) with these indexes:
|
||||
- `idx_auth_sessions_user_id_active` on `(user_id, revoked, expires_at)` — supports the cap-count query and the list-active query
|
||||
- `idx_auth_sessions_expires_at` on `(expires_at)` — supports cleanup sweeps
|
||||
- `idx_auth_sessions_refresh_token_hash` on `(refresh_token_hash)` — unique
|
||||
- `idx_auth_sessions_auth_provider` on `(auth_provider)` — supports future IdP "list sessions by provider" query
|
||||
- **Add `auth_provider` column** (NEW per KTD-10): `TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'local'` — records which provider created the session. Values: `local` (current) / `oidc-stub` (future stub) / `oidc-keycloak` / `saml` / `ldap` (future real adapters). Backfilled rows get `'local'` via the default.
|
||||
- Bump `_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2` (currently implicit; the existing `init_auth_db` is idempotent via `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` so version is mostly for the backfill gate)
|
||||
|
||||
**Test scenarios**:
|
||||
**Approach (backfill) — critical, was missing from the original plan**:
|
||||
The current `routes/auth.py:201-213` writes to `user_sessions` on login. After the new schema lands, the new `SessionService.create_session` writes to `auth_sessions` instead. To prevent forcing every existing user to re-login on the deploy, `init_auth_db()` runs a **one-time backfill** on startup:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
async def _backfill_user_sessions(db: aiosqlite.Connection) -> int:
|
||||
"""One-time backfill from user_sessions to auth_sessions.
|
||||
|
||||
Runs only when auth_sessions is empty AND user_sessions has rows.
|
||||
Idempotent: subsequent restarts are no-ops.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM auth_sessions")
|
||||
(count,) = await cursor.fetchone()
|
||||
if count > 0:
|
||||
return 0 # already backfilled
|
||||
|
||||
cursor = await db.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT id, user_id, refresh_token_hash, device_info, created_at, expires_at, revoked_at "
|
||||
"FROM user_sessions WHERE revoked_at IS NULL"
|
||||
)
|
||||
rows = await cursor.fetchall()
|
||||
backfilled = 0
|
||||
for row in rows:
|
||||
device_info = json.loads(row["device_info"]) if row["device_info"] else {}
|
||||
# Use existing user_sessions.id as the auth_sessions.id so that
|
||||
# legacy clients holding the old refresh_token_hash still match
|
||||
# a row in the new table (this is what the back-compat path in
|
||||
# U10 relies on).
|
||||
await db.execute(
|
||||
"INSERT OR IGNORE INTO auth_sessions "
|
||||
"(id, user_id, refresh_token_hash, device_fingerprint, device_label, "
|
||||
" ip, user_agent, created_at, last_active_at, expires_at, revoked, revoked_reason) "
|
||||
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
|
||||
(
|
||||
row["id"], # reuse legacy id for back-compat
|
||||
row["user_id"],
|
||||
row["refresh_token_hash"],
|
||||
device_info.get("fingerprint", "unknown"),
|
||||
device_info.get("label", "Unknown device"),
|
||||
device_info.get("ip", ""),
|
||||
device_info.get("user_agent", ""),
|
||||
row["created_at"],
|
||||
row["created_at"], # last_active_at defaults to created_at
|
||||
row["expires_at"],
|
||||
0, # not revoked (already filtered)
|
||||
None,
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
backfilled += 1
|
||||
if backfilled:
|
||||
logger.info(f"Backfilled {backfilled} user_sessions rows to auth_sessions")
|
||||
return backfilled
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (idempotency)**:
|
||||
- The `INSERT OR IGNORE` on `auth_sessions.id PK` makes the backfill safe to re-run
|
||||
- The `count > 0` early-exit means after the first backfill, subsequent startups are < 1ms
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (rolled-back risk)**:
|
||||
- The backfill does NOT delete `user_sessions` rows. They are kept for 1 minor version as the legacy read path. U10's Phase 5 cleanup drops the table.
|
||||
|
||||
**Test scenarios** (test_models.py):
|
||||
- Create session, query by `sid`, find it
|
||||
- Create 11 sessions for one user, count = 11 (cap check is in U4)
|
||||
- Create 11 sessions for one user, count = 11 (cap check is in U3)
|
||||
- Query `WHERE user_id=? AND revoked=0 AND expires_at > now` returns active sessions
|
||||
- Index `(user_id, revoked, expires_at)` is present (verify via `PRAGMA index_list`)
|
||||
- Index `idx_auth_sessions_auth_provider` is present
|
||||
- **`auth_provider` column** tests (NEW per KTD-10):
|
||||
- Default value is `'local'` when column is omitted from INSERT
|
||||
- `WHERE auth_provider = 'local'` returns only local-created sessions
|
||||
- `WHERE auth_provider = 'oidc-stub'` returns zero rows in current code
|
||||
- **Backfill tests** (NEW):
|
||||
- `init_auth_db` on a DB with `user_sessions` rows but empty `auth_sessions` → backfills all non-revoked rows
|
||||
- `init_auth_db` on a DB with existing `auth_sessions` rows → does NOT re-backfill (idempotent)
|
||||
- Backfilled rows have the original `user_sessions.id` as their `auth_sessions.id`
|
||||
- Backfilled rows have `revoked=0`
|
||||
- Backfilled rows have their `expires_at` preserved
|
||||
- Backfill does NOT touch `user_sessions` rows that are already revoked (`revoked_at IS NOT NULL`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification**: `pytest tests/unit/auth/test_models.py -v` passes; migration runs cleanly on a test DB.
|
||||
**Verification**: `pytest tests/unit/auth/test_models.py -v` passes; `init_auth_db` runs cleanly on a copy of prod DB with the existing `user_sessions` table; backfill log line appears exactly once per fresh DB.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note on Alembic**: This codebase does **not** use Alembic. There is no `alembic.ini`, no `migrations/` directory, and no `alembic` dependency in `pyproject.toml`. The auth DB schema is managed via the `_SCHEMA_SQL` constant + `init_auth_db()` pattern (see `auth/models.py:202-333`). This U1 unit aligns with that pattern; the original plan's Alembic reference was incorrect.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -437,7 +542,7 @@ Client Server
|
|||
|
||||
**Goal**: Centralize all session operations behind a `SessionService` class so routes don't duplicate the logic.
|
||||
|
||||
**Requirements**: F5, F6, F8, F9, F11 (rotation, recording, kick, password change, three-state validation).
|
||||
**Requirements**: F5, F6, F8, F9, F11, F13, F15 (rotation, recording, kick, password change, three-state validation, provider-pluggability, audit field).
|
||||
|
||||
**Dependencies**: U1 (model), U2 (denylist).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -447,10 +552,11 @@ Client Server
|
|||
- `tests/unit/auth/test_session.py` — full service test suite
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (SessionService methods)**:
|
||||
- `async create_session(user_id, device_fingerprint, device_label, ip, user_agent, remember_me: bool) -> AuthSessionModel`
|
||||
- `async create_session(user_id, device_fingerprint, device_label, ip, user_agent, remember_me: bool, auth_provider: str = "local") -> AuthSessionModel`
|
||||
- **Cap check first**: count active sessions for user; if ≥10, mark oldest non-current as `revoked` with `revoked_reason='session_cap_eviction'`
|
||||
- Generate new `sid` (uuid4), `jti` (uuid4)
|
||||
- Compute `expires_at` based on `remember_me` (30d vs 7d)
|
||||
- **Store `auth_provider` from caller** (U4 passes `provider.name`); enables F15 audit traceability
|
||||
- Insert row, return model
|
||||
- `async get_active_session(sid: str) -> AuthSessionModel | None`
|
||||
- First check `SessionCache.get(sid)`; on miss, query DB, write to cache (60s TTL)
|
||||
|
|
@ -459,7 +565,7 @@ Client Server
|
|||
- Decode `old_refresh_token`; get `sid`; lookup session
|
||||
- **Reuse detection**: compare `sha256(old_refresh_token)` against `session.refresh_token_hash`. If different, this is a reuse → call `revoke_all_for_user(user_id, reason='reuse_detected')` + raise `TokenReuseDetected`
|
||||
- Also check `RecentlyRevokedTokens.contains(sha256(old_refresh_token))` — if yes, same handling
|
||||
- On legitimate use: generate new `refresh_token`, update `session.refresh_token_hash` = `sha256(new)`, `session.last_active_at` = now, `session.expires_at` = now + ttl, `session.previous_session_id` = old sid (audit)
|
||||
- On legitimate use: generate new `refresh_token`, update `session.refresh_token_hash` = `sha256(new)`, `session.last_active_at` = now, `session.expires_at` = now + ttl, `session.previous_session_id` = old sid (audit), `auth_provider` **preserved** (rotation doesn't change provider)
|
||||
- Add `sha256(old_refresh_token)` to denylist for 30s
|
||||
- Issue new access + refresh JWTs (call into jwt_utils)
|
||||
- Invalidate cache entry for this sid
|
||||
|
|
@ -469,6 +575,7 @@ Client Server
|
|||
- Bulk update; returns count of revoked sessions
|
||||
- `async list_active_for_user(user_id: str) -> list[AuthSessionModel]`
|
||||
- `async list_all_for_admin(user_id: str) -> list[AuthSessionModel]` (admin endpoint)
|
||||
- `async list_active_by_provider(auth_provider: str) -> list[AuthSessionModel]` (NEW per KTD-10) — supports future "show me all OIDC sessions" admin view
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (SessionCache)**:
|
||||
```python
|
||||
|
|
@ -485,11 +592,13 @@ class SessionCache(Protocol):
|
|||
- `create_session` with remember_me=True sets expires_at 30d out, else 7d
|
||||
- `create_session` for a user with 10 active sessions evicts the oldest non-current one
|
||||
- `create_session` for a user with 10 active sessions, the new login is one of them, the evicted one is the OLDEST non-new
|
||||
- **`create_session` with `auth_provider='oidc-stub'`** stores that value in the row (NEW per KTD-10)
|
||||
- `get_active_session` returns the row when valid
|
||||
- `get_active_session` returns None when `revoked=True`
|
||||
- `get_active_session` returns None when `expires_at < now`
|
||||
- `get_active_session` second call within 60s hits cache (spy on DB call count)
|
||||
- `rotate_refresh` with the CURRENT token returns new pair
|
||||
- `rotate_refresh` preserves the original `auth_provider` value (NEW per KTD-10)
|
||||
- `rotate_refresh` with a REUSED old token (different hash) → `TokenReuseDetected` raised + ALL sessions for user revoked
|
||||
- `rotate_refresh` with a token in the denylist → same handling
|
||||
- `rotate_refresh` updates `previous_session_id` to the old sid
|
||||
|
|
@ -498,6 +607,7 @@ class SessionCache(Protocol):
|
|||
- `revoke_all_for_user` except_sid=<current> keeps the current session
|
||||
- `list_active_for_user` returns only `revoked=False AND expires_at > now`
|
||||
- `list_all_for_admin` returns all rows including revoked (for audit)
|
||||
- `list_active_by_provider('local')` returns only local sessions; `('oidc-stub')` returns empty in current code (NEW per KTD-10)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification**: All unit tests pass; `pytest tests/unit/auth/test_session.py -v` shows 100% line coverage of `session.py`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -507,30 +617,30 @@ class SessionCache(Protocol):
|
|||
|
||||
**Goal**: Expose all session operations as HTTP endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
**Requirements**: F1, F2, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11.
|
||||
**Requirements**: F1, F2, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11, F13, F14, F15.
|
||||
|
||||
**Dependencies**: U3 (the service).
|
||||
**Dependencies**: U3 (the service), **U11 (AuthProvider 抽象层 — must land first or alongside)**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Files**:
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py` — extend `LoginRequest` with `remember_me: bool = False`; add `WhoamiResponse`, `SessionInfoResponse`; add new endpoints
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/routes/admin.py` — new module: admin session management endpoints (or extend existing admin module)
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py` — extend `LoginRequest` with `remember_me: bool = False`; add `WhoamiResponse`, `SessionInfoResponse`; add new endpoints; **DI 注入 `AuthProvider` 通过 `Depends(get_auth_provider)`**（KTD-10）
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/routes/admin.py` — new module: admin session management endpoints (or extend existing admin module); **调用 `provider.revoke_user(user_id)` 而不是直接改 users 表**（KTD-10）
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/dependencies.py` — `get_current_user` extension to look up session via sid; back-compat fallback for old tokens
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/auth/password.py` — extend with `change_password(user_id, new_password)` that revokes all other sessions
|
||||
- `tests/integration/auth/test_auth_routes.py` — full endpoint suite
|
||||
- `tests/integration/auth/test_auth_routes.py` — full endpoint suite; **追加 provider mock 注入测试**（KTD-10）
|
||||
- `tests/integration/auth/test_admin_routes.py` — admin endpoints
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (new endpoints)**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Method | Path | Body / Query | Auth | Behavior |
|
||||
|--------|------|--------------|------|----------|
|
||||
| POST | `/auth/login` | `{username, password, remember_me?}` | none | bcrypt verify → `SessionService.create_session` → return `TokenResponse` |
|
||||
| POST | `/auth/login` | `{username, password, remember_me?}` | none | **`provider.authenticate(username, password)`** → `SessionService.create_session(auth_provider=provider.name)` → return `TokenResponse` |
|
||||
| POST | `/auth/refresh` | `{refresh_token}` | refresh | `SessionService.rotate_refresh` → return new `TokenResponse`; on `TokenReuseDetected` → 401 `{error: "token_reuse_detected"}` |
|
||||
| POST | `/auth/logout` | `{refresh_token}` | access (optional) | `revoke_session(sid, reason='user_terminated')` |
|
||||
| GET | `/auth/whoami` | — | access OR refresh | Returns `{user, session: {sid, device_label, ip, created_at, last_active_at, expires_at}}`. Accepts refresh token to support cold-start where access is gone. |
|
||||
| GET | `/auth/sessions` | — | access | List current user's active sessions |
|
||||
| GET | `/auth/whoami` | — | access OR refresh | Returns `{user, session: {sid, device_label, ip, auth_provider, created_at, last_active_at, expires_at}}`. Accepts refresh token to support cold-start where access is gone. |
|
||||
| GET | `/auth/sessions` | — | access | List current user's active sessions (each annotated with `auth_provider`) |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/auth/sessions/{sid}` | — | access | Revoke that session (if owned by current user) |
|
||||
| POST | `/auth/logout-others` | — | access | Revoke all sessions except current |
|
||||
| POST | `/auth/change-password` | `{old_password, new_password}` | access | `verify_password(old)` → `hash_password(new)` → update user → `revoke_all_for_user(except_sid=current)` |
|
||||
| POST | `/auth/change-password` | `{old_password, new_password}` | access | `provider.authenticate` 校验 old → `provider.revoke_user(user_id)` 失效其他 session（KTD-10: 跨 provider 行为一致） |
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (admin endpoints)**:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -539,37 +649,164 @@ class SessionCache(Protocol):
|
|||
| GET | `/admin/users/{user_id}/sessions` | admin | List all that user's sessions (incl revoked) |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/admin/users/{user_id}/sessions/{sid}` | admin | Force-revoke any session |
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (`get_current_user` back-compat)**:
|
||||
**Approach (`/auth/whoami` middleware bypass — critical fix)**:
|
||||
|
||||
The current `AuthMiddleware._verify_jwt` (in `src/agentkit/server/auth/middleware.py:80-91`) only accepts `type=access` tokens and 401s on `type=refresh`. The cold-start sequence sends a refresh token (because the access token is gone). To make this work without weakening auth, `/auth/whoami` is added to `AuthMiddleware.WHITELIST_PATHS` and the route does its own auth:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
async def get_current_user(token: str = Depends(oauth2_scheme)) -> User:
|
||||
payload = verify_token(token, expected_type="access")
|
||||
# In auth/middleware.py:
|
||||
WHITELIST_PATHS = (
|
||||
"/api/v1/health",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/login",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/refresh",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/logout",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/whoami", # NEW: route does its own auth
|
||||
"/docs",
|
||||
"/openapi.json",
|
||||
"/redoc",
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `/auth/whoami` route accepts **either** an access token (normal call) **or** a refresh token (cold-start), and the auth check happens inside the route via `verify_token` + session lookup:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
@router.get("/whoami")
|
||||
async def whoami(request: Request) -> WhoamiResponse:
|
||||
"""Returns the current user + session metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
Accepts either type=access (normal) or type=refresh (cold-start).
|
||||
On 401 from this endpoint, the client treats it as 'invalid' state
|
||||
(NOT 'error' state) so the router redirects to /login.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
|
||||
if not auth_header.startswith("Bearer "):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(401, "missing bearer token")
|
||||
token = auth_header[7:]
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
payload = verify_token(token, expected_type=None) # accept both types
|
||||
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(401, "token expired")
|
||||
except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(401, "invalid token")
|
||||
|
||||
sid = payload.get("sid")
|
||||
if sid:
|
||||
# New-style: validate session in DB
|
||||
session = await session_service.get_active_session(sid)
|
||||
if not session:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(401, "session revoked or expired")
|
||||
# attach session to request.state for downstream use
|
||||
return await load_user(session.user_id)
|
||||
# Legacy path: JWT without sid → still valid if signature + exp ok
|
||||
logger.debug("Legacy JWT without sid; using exp-only validation")
|
||||
return await load_user(payload["sub"])
|
||||
user = await load_user(session.user_id)
|
||||
# Issue a fresh access token so the client doesn't need a separate /refresh
|
||||
new_access = create_access_token(user_id=user.id, session_id=session.id)
|
||||
return WhoamiResponse(
|
||||
user=user_to_response(user),
|
||||
access_token=new_access,
|
||||
session=session_to_response(session),
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# Legacy token without sid — back-compat path (U10)
|
||||
user = await load_user(payload["sub"])
|
||||
if not user or not user.is_active:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(401, "user not found or inactive")
|
||||
new_access = create_access_token(user_id=user.id, session_id=None) # legacy
|
||||
return WhoamiResponse(
|
||||
user=user_to_response(user),
|
||||
access_token=new_access,
|
||||
session=None, # no session metadata for legacy
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (`change_password`)**:
|
||||
**Approach (defined phantom functions)**:
|
||||
|
||||
The plan's pseudo-code references several functions that don't exist yet. Define them explicitly:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# In auth/dependencies.py — NEW dependency for current session
|
||||
async def get_current_session(request: Request) -> AuthSession:
|
||||
"""Return the active session for the current request.
|
||||
|
||||
Reads request.state.session (set by get_current_user middleware/dependency).
|
||||
Raises 401 if no session (legacy tokens) or session is revoked.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
session = getattr(request.state, "session", None)
|
||||
if session is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(401, "no active session (legacy token)")
|
||||
return session
|
||||
|
||||
# In auth/dependencies.py — keep existing get_current_user but extend it
|
||||
async def get_current_user(request: Request) -> User:
|
||||
"""Return the current authenticated user.
|
||||
|
||||
Strategy:
|
||||
- If request.state.current_user is already set (by AuthMiddleware for
|
||||
type=access tokens), return it.
|
||||
- Otherwise, this is called from a path that bypassed middleware
|
||||
(e.g. /auth/whoami). The route must have set request.state.user
|
||||
via its own auth check.
|
||||
- Legacy tokens (no sid) only set current_user, not session.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
user = getattr(request.state, "current_user", None)
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
user = getattr(request.state, "user", None) # set by whoami route
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(401, "not authenticated")
|
||||
return user
|
||||
|
||||
# In auth/users.py — NEW helper
|
||||
async def load_user(user_id: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Load a user by id. Returns None if not found or inactive."""
|
||||
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH)) as db:
|
||||
cursor = await db.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? AND is_active = 1", (user_id,)
|
||||
)
|
||||
row = await cursor.fetchone()
|
||||
return user_row_to_dict(row) if row else None
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (`get_current_user` back-compat with sid validation)**:
|
||||
|
||||
The new `get_current_user` is called by routes after `AuthMiddleware` has run. The middleware sets `request.state.current_user` (a dict with `id`, `username`, `role`, etc.) for `type=access` tokens. With the new sid-bearing tokens, the middleware is extended to also set `request.state.session`:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# In auth/middleware.py — extend _verify_jwt to also load session
|
||||
def _verify_jwt(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
# ... existing signature/expiry check ...
|
||||
sid = payload.get("sid")
|
||||
if sid:
|
||||
# Synchronous check is not possible (DB call). Defer to a
|
||||
# per-route dependency. Middleware only checks signature + expiry
|
||||
# for new tokens; the session-revoked check happens in the
|
||||
# get_current_user dependency.
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The session-revoked check is then done lazily in `get_current_session`, which calls `SessionService.get_active_session(sid)`. This is one extra DB-or-cache call per request, mitigated by the 60s Redis cache (KTD-6).
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (`change_password`)**:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
@router.post("/change-password")
|
||||
async def change_password(
|
||||
payload: ChangePasswordRequest,
|
||||
current: User = Depends(get_current_user),
|
||||
user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
|
||||
session: AuthSession = Depends(get_current_session),
|
||||
):
|
||||
if not verify_password(payload.old_password, current.password_hash):
|
||||
if not verify_password(payload.old_password, user.password_hash):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(400, "old password incorrect")
|
||||
new_hash = hash_password(payload.new_password)
|
||||
await db.execute("UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, updated_at=? WHERE id=?", ...)
|
||||
await session_service.revoke_all_for_user(
|
||||
current.id, except_sid=session.id, reason="password_changed"
|
||||
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH)) as db:
|
||||
await db.execute(
|
||||
"UPDATE users SET password_hash=?, updated_at=? WHERE id=?",
|
||||
(new_hash, _now_iso(), user.id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"ok": True}
|
||||
await db.commit()
|
||||
revoked_count = await session_service.revoke_all_for_user(
|
||||
user.id, except_sid=session.id, reason="password_changed"
|
||||
)
|
||||
logger.info(f"Password changed for user {user.id}; revoked {revoked_count} other sessions")
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "revoked_sessions": revoked_count}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Test scenarios** (test_auth_routes.py):
|
||||
|
|
@ -1052,6 +1289,148 @@ async function handleSubmit() {
|
|||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### U11. AuthProvider 抽象层（为未来 IdP 对接留扩展点）
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal**: 把"用户存在哪里 / 密码怎么校验 / 属性怎么同步"封装在可插拔的 `AuthProvider` adapter 后面。当前实现 `LocalAuthProvider`（封装 SQLite + bcrypt）；同时提供 `StubOIDCProvider` 占位实现（`raise NotImplementedError`）作为未来 OIDC 实现的接口契约参考。路由层 / admin API / SessionService 通过 `Depends(get_auth_provider)` 拿到 provider 引用，**未来切 IdP 零修改路由**。
|
||||
|
||||
**Requirements**: F13, F14, F15.
|
||||
|
||||
**Dependencies**: None（被 U1/U3/U4 引用；可与 U1-U4 任何阶段并行或先后落地；建议在 Phase 1 早期就上，因为 U1 schema 需要 `auth_provider` 字段）。
|
||||
|
||||
**Files**:
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/__init__.py` — new package；导出 `AuthProvider`、`get_auth_provider()` 工厂、`LocalAuthProvider`、`StubOIDCProvider`
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/base.py` — `AuthProvider` Protocol（`name: str` + `authenticate` / `get_user_by_id` / `sync_user_attributes` / `revoke_user` 4 个 async 方法）
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/local.py` — `LocalAuthProvider` 实现，封装现有 `auth/password.py` 逻辑（bcrypt 校验 + 查 users 表）
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc_stub.py` — `StubOIDCProvider` 占位实现，所有方法 `raise NotImplementedError` 并在 docstring 中指向下一迭代 OIDC 实现的 checklist
|
||||
- `src/agentkit/server/config.py` — extend `AuthConfig` with `provider: Literal["local", "oidc-stub"] = "local"`（或新增 `auth.provider` 字段）
|
||||
- `tests/unit/auth/providers/test_base.py` — Protocol 静态类型检查（`runtime_checkable` Protocol 验证）+ mock provider 用例
|
||||
- `tests/unit/auth/providers/test_local.py` — `LocalAuthProvider` 全量单测（复用 `auth/password.py` 测试场景）
|
||||
- `tests/unit/auth/providers/test_oidc_stub.py` — `StubOIDCProvider` 调用任意方法均抛 `NotImplementedError` 的单测
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (AuthProvider Protocol)**:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# auth/providers/base.py
|
||||
from typing import Protocol, runtime_checkable
|
||||
from ..models import User
|
||||
|
||||
@runtime_checkable
|
||||
class AuthProvider(Protocol):
|
||||
"""所有鉴权后端必须实现的能力。
|
||||
|
||||
路由层只调用以下方法，不感知具体实现是 SQLite / OIDC / LDAP。
|
||||
未来新增 IdP 只需新加一个实现此 Protocol 的 adapter。
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
name: str # 标识当前 provider，写入 session.auth_provider
|
||||
|
||||
async def authenticate(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> User:
|
||||
"""校验用户名 + 密码，返回 User 对象。失败抛 InvalidCredentials。"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: int) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""按 id 查 user（admin 端点、session 校验、whoami 都用这个）。"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
async def sync_user_attributes(self, user_id: int) -> None:
|
||||
"""同步用户属性（部门/邮箱/职位等）。LocalAuthProvider: no-op；OidcAuthProvider: 从 IdP 拉最新 profile 写回本地。"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
async def revoke_user(self, user_id: int) -> None:
|
||||
"""禁用用户（离职/锁定）。LocalAuthProvider: UPDATE users SET is_active=0；OidcAuthProvider: 调 IdP 的 disable API（未来）。"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (LocalAuthProvider)**: 把 `routes/auth.py:201-213` 的 password 校验逻辑（SQLite SELECT + bcrypt 校验 + load_user）搬到 `LocalAuthProvider.authenticate`。路由层不再直接调 `verify_password` / `load_user` —— 统一走 provider。`revoke_user` 走 `UPDATE users SET is_active=0`（admin 端点统一调这个，不再直接写 DB）。
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (StubOIDCProvider)**: 所有方法 raise `NotImplementedError`，docstring 写明：
|
||||
> 当前未实现。下一迭代 OIDC 集成时，重写本类即可，路由 / admin / Session 表零修改。配置 `auth.provider: oidc-stub` 启动会立即报 NotImplementedError（这是设计：避免误启用未完成的功能）。
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (DI 工厂)**:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
# auth/providers/__init__.py
|
||||
from functools import lru_cache
|
||||
from ...config import get_settings
|
||||
from .base import AuthProvider
|
||||
from .local import LocalAuthProvider
|
||||
from .oidc_stub import StubOIDCProvider
|
||||
|
||||
@lru_cache
|
||||
def get_auth_provider() -> AuthProvider:
|
||||
settings = get_settings()
|
||||
provider_name = settings.auth.provider
|
||||
if provider_name == "local":
|
||||
db = get_auth_db() # 现有 aiosqlite 连接（需改造为模块级单例）
|
||||
return LocalAuthProvider(db)
|
||||
elif provider_name == "oidc-stub":
|
||||
return StubOIDCProvider()
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"unknown auth provider: {provider_name}")
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Approach (config 扩展)**:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# agentkit.yaml
|
||||
auth:
|
||||
provider: local # local | oidc-stub (未来: oidc-keycloak, oidc-feishu, ...)
|
||||
session:
|
||||
table: auth_sessions
|
||||
access_ttl_seconds: 900
|
||||
refresh_ttl_seconds: 604800
|
||||
refresh_ttl_remember_me_seconds: 2592000
|
||||
jwt:
|
||||
secret_env: AGENTKIT_JWT_SECRET
|
||||
algorithm: HS256
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Test scenarios** (test_base.py + test_local.py + test_oidc_stub.py):
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider` with valid username+password returns User
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider` with wrong password raises `InvalidCredentials`
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider` with unknown username raises `InvalidCredentials`
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider` with inactive user (`is_active=0`) raises `InvalidCredentials`
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider.get_user_by_id` returns the user or None
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider.sync_user_attributes` is a no-op (returns None)
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider.revoke_user` sets `is_active=0` and subsequent `authenticate` fails
|
||||
- `LocalAuthProvider.name == "local"`
|
||||
- `StubOIDCProvider.authenticate` raises `NotImplementedError` with helpful message
|
||||
- `StubOIDCProvider.get_user_by_id` raises `NotImplementedError`
|
||||
- `StubOIDCProvider.sync_user_attributes` raises `NotImplementedError`
|
||||
- `StubOIDCProvider.revoke_user` raises `NotImplementedError`
|
||||
- `StubOIDCProvider.name == "oidc-stub"`
|
||||
- `get_auth_provider()` with `auth.provider=local` returns `LocalAuthProvider` instance
|
||||
- `get_auth_provider()` with `auth.provider=oidc-stub` returns `StubOIDCProvider` instance
|
||||
- `get_auth_provider()` with `auth.provider=unknown` raises `ValueError`
|
||||
- `get_auth_provider()` is memoized (lru_cache; second call returns same instance)
|
||||
- `runtime_checkable(AuthProvider)`: both Local and Stub pass `isinstance(prov, AuthProvider)` check
|
||||
- Protocol violation: a class missing `authenticate` method does NOT pass `isinstance` check (negative test)
|
||||
|
||||
**Patterns to follow**:
|
||||
- Protocol + runtime_checkable pattern (Python typing best practice)
|
||||
- DI 工厂 + lru_cache 单例（与现有 `get_settings` 一致）
|
||||
- error 类型 `InvalidCredentials` 放到 `auth/providers/exceptions.py`（新建）
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification**:
|
||||
- `pytest tests/unit/auth/providers/ -v` 全部通过
|
||||
- `mypy src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/` 无报错
|
||||
- 启动 dev server，配置 `auth.provider: oidc-stub` → 第一次 `/auth/login` 返回 501 NotImplementedError（确认 stub 起作用）
|
||||
- 启动 dev server，配置 `auth.provider: local` → 走现有登录流程，确认未破坏
|
||||
- admin 踢人功能调用 `provider.revoke_user(user_id)` 后，user 再 `authenticate` 失败（cross-check LocalAuthProvider.revoke_user 行为）
|
||||
|
||||
**未来 IdP 对接 checklist**（下一迭代参考）:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] `auth/providers/oidc.py` — 实现 `OidcAuthProvider`（authenticate / get_user / sync_attributes / revoke_user）
|
||||
- [ ] `auth/oauth_routes.py` — `/auth/oauth/{provider}/redirect` 和 `/auth/oauth/{provider}/callback` 端点
|
||||
- [ ] `auth/state_cache.py` — OAuth state 参数防 CSRF（Redis TTL 5min）
|
||||
- [ ] 用户首次从 IdP 登录时的「本地账号创建」策略（justeer / 拒绝 / 邀请制）
|
||||
- [ ] IdP 端的 session 同步（IdP 登出时本地 session 也撤销）
|
||||
- [ ] 集团部门 / 职位属性映射到本地 users 表
|
||||
|
||||
本次迭代只做 Protocol + Local 实现 + Stub 占位 + DI 工厂 + 上述 1-3 项的占位（接口定义），其余列入下一迭代独立 brainstorm。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## System-Wide Impact
|
||||
|
||||
| Stakeholder | Impact | Mitigation |
|
||||
|
|
@ -1059,10 +1438,11 @@ async function handleSubmit() {
|
|||
| End users (Tauri) | First login → no more login prompts for 7d (30d if "remember me"). | Pre-emptive refresh + Keychain storage prevent the failure modes that broke the existing flow. |
|
||||
| End users (Web) | Same as Tauri but refresh in localStorage (degraded security). | Document the trade-off; Keychain is Tauri-only. |
|
||||
| Admins | New capability: see active sessions, kick any user. | UI in admin pages; surface clearly in the Users view. |
|
||||
| Developers (auth code) | New session module, denylist, cache. | U3 is the single source of truth — routes don't duplicate logic. |
|
||||
| Developers (auth code) | New session module, denylist, cache, **AuthProvider 抽象层**. | U3 is the single source of truth — routes don't duplicate logic. U11 is the single source of auth backend — routes don't import password.py directly. |
|
||||
| **未来集团 IdP 集成团队** | 切到 OIDC / SAML / LDAP 时只新增 adapter，不重写路由 / admin | U11 Protocol + LocalAuthProvider 已上；下一迭代 `auth/providers/oidc.py` 直接实现 Protocol 即可 |
|
||||
| Existing in-flight clients | Unaffected during 30-day window. | U10 shim. |
|
||||
| Server load | +1 cache lookup per request (cached 60s). | Redis-backed cache makes this sub-ms. |
|
||||
| DB schema | New `auth_sessions` table; existing `user_sessions` deprecated. | Alembic migration; keep `user_sessions` reads working for one version. |
|
||||
| DB schema | New `auth_sessions` table (含 `auth_provider` 字段); existing `user_sessions` deprecated. | Alembic migration; keep `user_sessions` reads working for one version. |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1077,6 +1457,9 @@ async function handleSubmit() {
|
|||
| Session cap eviction surprises users (they didn't expect to be kicked) | Low | Low (visible at next login) | Make the cap (10) generous; document it; do not log evicted users out silently. |
|
||||
| Test mocks diverge from real `keyring` behavior | Medium | Medium (CI passes, manual fails) | Use `keyring::mock` feature in CI; document that real-platform testing is manual. |
|
||||
| JWT secret rotation in dev mode invalidates all sessions | Low | High (Tauri dev loops) | Document the behavior; provide `agentkit doctor` to check. |
|
||||
| **AuthProvider 切换时遗留 routes 直接调 `verify_password` / 改 users 表**（KTD-10） | Medium | Medium（切 IdP 时必须清理） | U11 引入后强制要求所有 routes 走 `Depends(get_auth_provider)`；code review 模板加 checklist「禁止 routes 直接调 password/auth 函数」 |
|
||||
| **`lru_cache` 单例 + 测试隔离冲突**（U11） | Low | Low（测试 flaky） | `get_auth_provider` 提供 `cache_clear()` helper；`conftest.py` 在每个 test fixture 前后清缓存 |
|
||||
| **未来 IdP 接管时 `LocalAuthProvider` 残留依赖** | Low | Low（迁移期保留即可） | U11 checklist 显式列出：Local 仍可用作"本地应急账号"，OIDC 接管后不删 Local，仅调整路由默认 provider |
|
||||
|
||||
### External Dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1139,6 +1522,28 @@ This plan has natural phasing based on dependency order. Each phase lands as a s
|
|||
- Update `X-Client-Version` floor
|
||||
- ~1 day of work
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 6: AuthProvider 抽象层（U11 + 关联改造）
|
||||
|
||||
> **2026-06-20 新增 Phase**（合并 AuthProvider scope）
|
||||
|
||||
- `auth/providers/base.py` — `AuthProvider` Protocol + `runtime_checkable`
|
||||
- `auth/providers/local.py` — `LocalAuthProvider`（封装现有 `routes/auth.py:201-213` 的 password 校验逻辑）
|
||||
- `auth/providers/oidc_stub.py` — `StubOIDCProvider`（`raise NotImplementedError` 占位）
|
||||
- `auth/providers/__init__.py` — `get_auth_provider()` DI 工厂（`lru_cache` 单例）
|
||||
- `config.py` — 新增 `auth.provider: local | oidc-stub` 配置
|
||||
- U1 schema 加 `auth_provider` 字段（合并入 Phase 1 U1）
|
||||
- U3 SessionService `create_session` 接受 `auth_provider` 参数（合并入 Phase 1 U3）
|
||||
- U4 routes `Depends(get_auth_provider)` 注入；admin 端点调 `provider.revoke_user(user_id)` 而不是直接改 users 表（合并入 Phase 2 U4）
|
||||
- ~1.5 days of work（可以与 Phase 1 早期并行落地）
|
||||
|
||||
**Rollout gate**:
|
||||
- `pytest tests/unit/auth/providers/ -v` 全部通过
|
||||
- 启动 dev server，配置 `auth.provider: oidc-stub` → 第一次 `/auth/login` 返回 501 NotImplementedError
|
||||
- 启动 dev server，配置 `auth.provider: local` → 现有登录流程不受影响
|
||||
- admin 踢人功能调用 `provider.revoke_user(user_id)` 行为与原 DB 直接 UPDATE 等价
|
||||
|
||||
**未来 IdP 集成入口**：下一迭代 OIDC 集成只需新加 `auth/providers/oidc.py` + `auth/oauth_routes.py`（见 U11 checklist），路由 / admin / Session 表零修改。
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Open Questions
|
||||
|
|
@ -1150,6 +1555,8 @@ These are deferred to implementation and tracked here for visibility:
|
|||
3. **Q3**: Should the cap-eviction trigger a server-side notification (e.g. an `audit_event`)? Plan defaults to writing a row to a future `auth_audit_log` table; for now, just the `revoked_reason='session_cap_eviction'` field is enough.
|
||||
4. **Q4**: Should `change_password` rate-limit (e.g. 5 attempts per hour)? Out of scope here but worth a follow-up security brainstorm.
|
||||
5. **Q5**: macOS Tauri builds need code-signing for Keychain access. The dev binary is unsigned → Keychain prompts "always allow". Plan documents this; production builds must be signed.
|
||||
6. **Q6 (新增 2026-06-20)**: AuthProvider 抽象层与现有 `routes/auth.py:201-213` 的 password 校验逻辑如何共存？计划方案：U11 第一步 `LocalAuthProvider` 完整复刻现有逻辑（行为等价），第二步 U4 routes 改造时一次性切换；U11 落地时写"行为等价"测试套件确认切换前后行为一致
|
||||
7. **Q7 (新增 2026-06-20)**: `get_auth_provider()` 的 `lru_cache` 单例在测试环境如何隔离？计划方案：导出 `cache_clear()` helper；`conftest.py` 在每个 test fixture 前后 `get_auth_provider.cache_clear()`；不引入 `dependency_overrides`（避免 FastAPI app 状态污染）
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1255,4 +1662,30 @@ The following end-to-end flows must work after this plan lands. Each is testable
|
|||
2. Log in (gets a legacy JWT without sid)
|
||||
3. Make API calls
|
||||
4. **Expected**: server validates the legacy JWT via the back-compat path; user is not affected
|
||||
|
||||
### AE-10: AuthProvider 切换（local → oidc-stub 验证接口契约）(Covers F13, F14)
|
||||
|
||||
> **2026-06-20 新增**（KTD-10 / U11 验证）
|
||||
|
||||
1. 配置 `agentkit.yaml` 的 `auth.provider: local`，启动 dev server
|
||||
2. 调 `POST /auth/login` 用现有 admin 账号
|
||||
3. **Expected**: 200 OK，返回 TokenResponse；DB 中 `auth_sessions.auth_provider='local'`
|
||||
4. 改配置为 `auth.provider: oidc-stub`，重启 dev server
|
||||
5. 调 `POST /auth/login` 同样账号
|
||||
6. **Expected**: 501 Not Implemented（StubOIDCProvider 抛 NotImplementedError）
|
||||
7. 验证 admin 端点 `/admin/users/{id}/sessions` 仍能列出步骤 3 创建的 session（含 `auth_provider='local'` 字段）
|
||||
8. **Expected**: admin 看 session 列表功能不受 provider 切换影响（KTD-10 核心承诺）
|
||||
9. 调 `isinstance(provider_instance, AuthProvider)` 验证 Local 和 Stub 都通过 Protocol 检查
|
||||
10. **Expected**: 两者都返回 `True`（`runtime_checkable` Protocol 行为正确）
|
||||
|
||||
### AE-11: 审计字段 auth_provider 写入（覆盖历史 + 新建）(Covers F15)
|
||||
|
||||
1. 在 AE-1 步骤 1-2 完成后，调 `GET /auth/sessions` 列出当前 user 的所有 active session
|
||||
2. **Expected**: 每个 session 包含 `auth_provider: "local"` 字段（即使是 backfill 自 `user_sessions` 的行也是 `'local'`，因为 backfill 走默认值）
|
||||
3. admin 调 `GET /admin/users/{id}/sessions` 跨 user 看
|
||||
4. **Expected**: 所有 session 都带 `auth_provider` 字段，admin 可按 provider 过滤（即使当前只有 local，未来 oidc 接入后会有 oidc-* 区分）
|
||||
5. `SessionService.list_active_by_provider('local')` 返回所有 local session
|
||||
6. **Expected**: count = 步骤 2 看到的总数
|
||||
7. `SessionService.list_active_by_provider('oidc-stub')` 在当前实现下返回空 list
|
||||
8. **Expected**: count = 0（证明字段存在但无数据，未来 OIDC 接入后才会有值）
|
||||
5. Server log shows DEBUG: "Legacy JWT without sid; using exp-only validation"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue