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feat(enterprise): U1-U6 enterprise agent platform (#24)
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Merge PR #24 — U1-U6 enterprise agent platform

ce-debug 批量修复：
- PERF-1: PII 脱敏接入 gateway 生产路径
- DEPLOY-1: 部署名引用修正（label selector）
- DEPLOY-2: Redis 鉴权（11 处 from_url 消费 REDIS_PASSWORD）
- DEPLOY-4: 移除死 env POSTGRES_PASSWORD
- DEPLOY-5: OTel token 格式 Authorization=Bearer
- SCIM RFC 7643/7644 合规
- API-4/8/10: SSO token 原子化 + provider 区分 + response_model
This commit is contained in:
Fischer 2026-07-06 11:42:29 +08:00
parent 8633f60831 cb278bb5f0
commit a406f59bdf
77 changed files with 8036 additions and 437 deletions
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77
agentkit.yaml
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@ -28,6 +28,24 @@ llm:
coding: bailian-coding/qwen3-coder-plus
chat: deepseek/deepseek-chat
reasoning: deepseek/deepseek-reasoner
# U2/R3 — 模型 fallback 链：主模型失败时按序尝试 fallback。
# 等保合规场景：fallback provider 在客户内网（DashScope/DeepSeek OpenAI-compatible API），
# 不依赖 Anthropic 境外服务。fallback providers 默认 prompt_cache_enable=false
#（非 Anthropic provider 无 cache_control 透传，走自动前缀缓存）。
fallbacks:
default: [fast] # default 失败 → fast（同 provider 内降级）
# 等保合规 fallback（注释，按需启用）：将主模型 fallback 到本地推理 provider
# default: [chat, fast] # default 失败 → deepseek-chat → qwen-turbo
# U2/R3 — PII 脱敏 hook（fail-closed）。
# 启用后，所有发送至 LLM 的 prompt 先经过 pii_filter 脱敏：
# - 正则识别手机号/邮箱/身份证/银行卡，替换为 [REDACTED_TYPE:hash8]
# - 脱敏前后记录 hash 用于审计（原文不落盘）
# - 任何异常时 fail-closed（拒绝发送至 LLM）
# - 留 ner_hook 接入客户内网 NER 模型（LAC/HanLP），未配置时用正则版
pii_filter:
enabled: false # 默认关闭；等保合规场景设 true
ner_hook: null # 可选：自定义 NER 函数路径（module:func）
fail_closed: true # 脱敏失败时拒绝发送（true）或降级发送（false）
# G4/U1: Auxiliary model for cost-sensitive tasks (summarization).
# When set, ContextCompressor tries this alias first, falling back to
# the main model on failure or empty content. Commented to preserve
@ -70,19 +88,64 @@ fallback_chain:
# Tests run in-memory for isolation; production / staging should use Redis.
session:
backend: ${AGENTKIT_SESSION_BACKEND:-memory}
redis_url: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://127.0.0.1:6391/0}
bus:
backend: ${AGENTKIT_BUS_BACKEND:-memory}
redis_url: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://127.0.0.1:6379/0}
redis_url: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://127.0.0.1:6391/0}
task_store:
backend: ${AGENTKIT_TASK_STORE_BACKEND:-memory}
redis_url: ${REDIS_URL:-redis://127.0.0.1:6391/0}
skills: {auto_discover: true, paths: ["./configs/skills"]}
experts: {paths: ["./configs/experts"]}
board: {max_rounds: 5, default_template: private_board, parallel_speech: true, history_compression_threshold: 20}
logging: {level: INFO, format: text}
router: {classifier: heuristic, auction_enabled: false}
# OTel 可观测性 — 默认注释（OTel 为可选依赖，未安装时 telemetry/metrics.py 返回 NoOp）。
# 启用：pip install opentelemetry-sdk opentelemetry-exporter-otlp，取消注释并指向 collector。
# 未配置时所有指标（请求量/延迟/token 消耗）静默丢弃，形成监控盲区。
# telemetry:
# otlp_endpoint: http://localhost:4317 # OTLP gRPC 端点
# service_name: fischer-agentkit
# U4 SSO 集成 — 多 IDP 信任边界 (R1a) + SCIM 2.0 + 手动 deprovisioning。
# OIDC (authlib) + SAML 2.0 (python3-saml) 并存，按 IDP sub/NameID 关联，禁止邮箱合并。
# 单租户设计 (R1c)。证书热轮换不重启，单 IDP 故障不影响其他。
auth:
scim_token: "${AGENTKIT_SCIM_TOKEN:-}" # SCIM bearer token（独立于 JWT）
idps: [] # 多 IDP 配置列表，示例见下方注释
# idps:
# - name: feishu
# type: oidc
# display_name: 飞书
# enabled: true
# oidc:
# client_id: "${FEISHU_OIDC_CLIENT_ID}"
# client_secret: "${FEISHU_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET}"
# server_metadata_url: https://passport.feishu.cn/suite/passport/oauth/authorize
# redirect_uri: https://your-host/api/v1/auth/oauth/feishu/callback
# scope: "openid email profile"
# - name: azure_ad
# type: oidc
# display_name: Azure AD
# enabled: true
# oidc:
# client_id: "${AZURE_AD_CLIENT_ID}"
# client_secret: "${AZURE_AD_CLIENT_SECRET}"
# server_metadata_url: https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration
# redirect_uri: https://your-host/api/v1/auth/oauth/azure_ad/callback
# - name: aliyun_idaas
# type: saml
# display_name: 阿里云 IDaaS
# enabled: true
# saml:
# entity_id: https://idaas.aliyun.com/idp/xxx
# sso_url: https://idaas.aliyun.com/sso/xxx
# idp_cert: |
# -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
# ...IDP 签名证书 PEM...
# -----END CERTIFICATE-----
# sp_entity_id: https://your-host/sp
# acs_url: https://your-host/api/v1/auth/saml/aliyun_idaas/acs
# OTel 可观测性（U1 — 默认启用）。
# OTel 依赖已升级为 required（pyproject.toml [project] dependencies），
# ImportError 静默回退已移除 — 缺包将硬失败。设 enabled=false 可显式关闭。
# otlp_endpoint 指向 OTel collector（容器名 otel-collector / jaeger）。
telemetry:
enabled: true
otlp_endpoint: http://localhost:4317 # OTLP gRPC 端点（开发环境；生产指向集群 collector）
service_name: fischer-agentkit
export_traces: true
export_metrics: true

15
deploy/helm/agentkit/Chart.yaml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
apiVersion: v2
name: agentkit
description: Fischer AgentKit — 政企生产级 K8s Helm Chart（含 Sealed Secrets / External Secrets 双模板 + 离线安装支持）
type: application
version: 0.1.0
appVersion: "0.1.0"
kubeVersion: ">=1.28-0"
keywords:
- agentkit
- llm
- enterprise
- k8s
maintainers:
- name: Fischer Team
icon: ""

65
deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/_helpers.tpl Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
{{/*
Expand the name of the chart.
*/}}
{{- define "agentkit.name" -}}
{{- default .Chart.Name .Values.nameOverride | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Fully qualified app name — release-name + chart-name（避免多 release 命名冲突）。
*/}}
{{- define "agentkit.fullname" -}}
{{- if .Values.fullnameOverride }}
{{- .Values.fullnameOverride | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- else }}
{{- $name := default .Chart.Name .Values.nameOverride }}
{{- if contains $name .Release.Name }}
{{- .Release.Name | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- else }}
{{- printf "%s-%s" .Release.Name $name | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Chart name + version label。
*/}}
{{- define "agentkit.chart" -}}
{{- printf "%s-%s" .Chart.Name .Chart.Version | replace "+" "_" | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Common labels。
*/}}
{{- define "agentkit.labels" -}}
helm.sh/chart: {{ include "agentkit.chart" . }}
{{ include "agentkit.selectorLabels" . }}
app.kubernetes.io/version: {{ .Chart.AppVersion | quote }}
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: {{ .Release.Service }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Selector labels。
*/}}
{{- define "agentkit.selectorLabels" -}}
app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ include "agentkit.name" . }}
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Service account name — 若未指定则用 fullname。
*/}}
{{- define "agentkit.serviceAccountName" -}}
{{- if .Values.serviceAccount.create }}
{{- default (include "agentkit.fullname" .) .Values.serviceAccount.name }}
{{- else }}
{{- default "default" .Values.serviceAccount.name }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Secret backend 名称（Sealed Secret / External Secret 共用的目标 Secret 名）。
*/}}
{{- define "agentkit.secretName" -}}
{{- printf "%s-secrets" (include "agentkit.fullname" .) | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- end }}

44
deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/configmap.yaml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
{{- /*
非密配置 ConfigMap — 渲染 agentkit.yaml 的非密段（server/session/bus/task_store/
skills/experts/logging）。含密钥的段（llm/auth/telemetry headers）由 env 注入，
不进 ConfigMap。
*/ -}}
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
data:
agentkit.yaml: |
server:
host: {{ .Values.config.server.host | quote }}
port: {{ .Values.config.server.port }}
workers: {{ .Values.config.server.workers }}
rate_limit: {{ .Values.config.server.rate_limit }}
session:
backend: {{ .Values.config.session.backend | quote }}
redis_url: {{ .Values.redis.url | quote }}
bus:
backend: {{ .Values.config.bus.backend | quote }}
redis_url: {{ .Values.redis.url | quote }}
task_store:
backend: {{ .Values.config.task_store.backend | quote }}
redis_url: {{ .Values.redis.url | quote }}
skills:
auto_discover: {{ .Values.config.skills.auto_discover }}
paths:
{{- range .Values.config.skills.paths }}
- {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
experts:
paths:
{{- range .Values.config.experts.paths }}
- {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
logging:
level: {{ .Values.config.logging.level | quote }}
format: {{ .Values.config.logging.format | quote }}
# DATABASE_URL / REDIS_PASSWORD / LLM provider keys / JWT signing key /
# SCIM token / OTel token 等 — 全部由 env 注入（来自 Secret）。
# 见 deployment.yaml env / envFrom。

127
deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
spec:
replicas: {{ .Values.replicaCount }}
selector:
matchLabels:
{{- include "agentkit.selectorLabels" . | nindent 6 }}
template:
metadata:
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.selectorLabels" . | nindent 8 }}
annotations:
# ConfigMap 变更触发 rollout
checksum/config: {{ include (print $.Template.BasePath "/configmap.yaml") . | sha256sum }}
spec:
serviceAccountName: {{ include "agentkit.serviceAccountName" . }}
{{- with .Values.image.pullSecret }}
imagePullSecrets:
- name: {{ . }}
{{- end }}
securityContext:
{{- toYaml .Values.podSecurityContext | nindent 8 }}
containers:
- name: agentkit
image: "{{ .Values.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.image.tag | default .Chart.AppVersion }}"
imagePullPolicy: {{ .Values.image.pullPolicy }}
securityContext:
{{- toYaml .Values.securityContext | nindent 12 }}
args:
- serve
- --config
- /etc/agentkit/agentkit.yaml
- --host
- 0.0.0.0
- --port
- {{ .Values.service.apiPort | quote }}
ports:
- name: api
containerPort: {{ .Values.service.apiPort }}
protocol: TCP
- name: gui
containerPort: {{ .Values.service.guiPort }}
protocol: TCP
env:
# --- 密钥从统一 Secret 注入（Sealed Secret / External Secret 渲染）---
- name: JWT_SIGNING_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.jwtSigningKey.key }}
- name: API_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.apiKey.key }}
- name: DATABASE_URL
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.dbCredentials.key }}
- name: IDP_SIGNING_CERTS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.idpSigningCerts.key }}
- name: THIRD_PARTY_API_KEYS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.thirdPartyApiKeys.key }}
- name: MTLS_CLIENT_CERT
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.mtlsClientCert.key }}
- name: KMS_HSM_PIN
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.kmsHsmPin.key }}
- name: OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.otelExporterToken.key }}
- name: REDIS_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
key: {{ .Values.secrets.redisPassword.key }}
# DEPLOY-4: 移除 POSTGRES_PASSWORD env — 应用通过 DATABASE_URL（Slot 3）
# 消费 PG 密码（DSN 内嵌），POSTGRES_PASSWORD 仅用于 PostgreSQL StatefulSet
# 初始化（由独立 PG chart / StatefulSet 引用 secrets.postgresPassword）。
# 此处注入是死 env，误导运维以为应用读 POSTGRES_PASSWORD。
# --- 非密配置（OTel endpoint、service name）---
{{- if .Values.otel.enabled }}
- name: OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT
value: {{ .Values.otel.endpoint | quote }}
- name: OTEL_SERVICE_NAME
value: {{ .Values.otel.serviceName | quote }}
{{- end }}
envFrom:
# agentkit.yaml 从 ConfigMap 注入（通过 AGENTKIT_CONFIG 环境变量指向挂载路径）
- configMapRef:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
volumeMounts:
- name: config
mountPath: /etc/agentkit
readOnly: true
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
resources:
{{- toYaml .Values.resources | nindent 12 }}
livenessProbe:
{{- toYaml .Values.probes.liveness | nindent 12 }}
readinessProbe:
{{- toYaml .Values.probes.readiness | nindent 12 }}
volumes:
- name: config
configMap:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
- name: tmp
emptyDir: {}

66
deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/external-secret.yaml Normal file
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{{- /*
External Secrets Operator 模板 — 当 secrets.backend=external-secrets 时渲染。
ExternalSecret 引用运维预创建的 SecretStore（指向 Vault / AWS SM / GCP SM / Azure KV），
从外部密钥管理服务拉取全部 11 个 secret slot（KTD-4）。
*/ -}}
{{- if eq .Values.secrets.backend "external-secrets" }}
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
namespace: {{ .Release.Namespace }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
spec:
secretStoreRef:
name: {{ .Values.secrets.externalSecret.secretStoreName | quote }}
kind: SecretStore
target:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
# 1) JWT 签名密钥
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.jwtSigningKey.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/jwt-signing-key
# 2) API Key
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.apiKey.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/api-key
# 3) DATABASE_URL
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.dbCredentials.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/database-url
# 4) IDP 签名证书
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.idpSigningCerts.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/idp-signing-certs
# 5) 第三方 API Key
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.thirdPartyApiKeys.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/third-party-api-keys
# 6) TLS 服务器证书
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.tlsServerCert.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/tls-server-cert
# 7) mTLS 客户端证书
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.mtlsClientCert.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/mtls-client-cert
# 8) KMS/HSM PKCS#11 PIN
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.kmsHsmPin.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/kms-hsm-pin
# 9) OTel exporter token
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.otelExporterToken.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/otel-exporter-token
# 10) Redis 密码
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.redisPassword.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/redis-password
# 11) PostgreSQL 密码
- secretKey: {{ .Values.secrets.postgresPassword.key }}
remoteRef:
key: agentkit/postgres-password
{{- end }}

41
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{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
{{- with .Values.ingress.annotations }}
annotations:
{{- toYaml . | nindent 4 }}
{{- end }}
spec:
{{- if .Values.ingress.className }}
ingressClassName: {{ .Values.ingress.className | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.ingress.tls.enabled }}
tls:
- hosts:
- {{ .Values.ingress.host | quote }}
secretName: {{ .Values.ingress.tls.secretName | quote }}
{{- end }}
rules:
- host: {{ .Values.ingress.host | quote }}
http:
paths:
# GUI 走根路径，API 走 /api 前缀
- path: /api
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
port:
name: api
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
port:
name: gui
{{- end }}

43
deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/sealed-secret.yaml Normal file
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{{- /*
Sealed Secrets 模板（Bitnami Sealed Secrets controller）— 当 secrets.backend=sealed-secrets 时渲染。
覆盖全部 11 个 secret slot（KTD-4）。encryptedData 由运维通过 kubeseal 生成后以 --set 或
override values 文件注入。禁止明文 Kubernetes Secret + Git 提交。
*/ -}}
{{- if eq .Values.secrets.backend "sealed-secrets" }}
apiVersion: bitnami.com/v1alpha1
kind: SealedSecret
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
namespace: {{ .Release.Namespace }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
spec:
encryptedData:
# 1) JWT 签名密钥
{{ .Values.secrets.jwtSigningKey.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.jwtSigningKey.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 2) API Key
{{ .Values.secrets.apiKey.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.apiKey.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 3) DATABASE_URL
{{ .Values.secrets.dbCredentials.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.dbCredentials.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 4) IDP 签名证书
{{ .Values.secrets.idpSigningCerts.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.idpSigningCerts.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 5) 第三方 API Key
{{ .Values.secrets.thirdPartyApiKeys.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.thirdPartyApiKeys.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 6) TLS 服务器证书（tls.crt + tls.key — ponytail: 单独 Secret 由 cert-manager 或运维创建，此处仅登记）
{{ .Values.secrets.tlsServerCert.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.tlsServerCert.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 7) mTLS 客户端证书
{{ .Values.secrets.mtlsClientCert.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.mtlsClientCert.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 8) KMS/HSM PKCS#11 PIN
{{ .Values.secrets.kmsHsmPin.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.kmsHsmPin.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 9) OTel exporter token
{{ .Values.secrets.otelExporterToken.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.otelExporterToken.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 10) Redis 密码
{{ .Values.secrets.redisPassword.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.redisPassword.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
# 11) PostgreSQL 密码
{{ .Values.secrets.postgresPassword.key }}: {{ .Values.secrets.postgresPassword.encryptedData | default "" | quote }}
template:
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.secretName" . }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 8 }}
{{- end }}

19
deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/service.yaml Normal file
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apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.fullname" . }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
spec:
type: {{ .Values.service.type }}
ports:
- name: api
port: {{ .Values.service.apiPort }}
targetPort: api
protocol: TCP
- name: gui
port: {{ .Values.service.guiPort }}
targetPort: gui
protocol: TCP
selector:
{{- include "agentkit.selectorLabels" . | nindent 4 }}

36
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{{- /*
ServiceAccount — 当 serviceAccount.create=true 时创建。
workloadIdentity.enabled=true 时：
1) automountServiceAccountToken=false（禁用默认 token 投递）
2) 额外创建 type=service-account-token 的 Secret（projected token），供 KMS/HSM 使用
*/ -}}
{{- if .Values.serviceAccount.create }}
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.serviceAccountName" . }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
{{- with .Values.serviceAccount.annotations }}
annotations:
{{- toYaml . | nindent 4 }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.workloadIdentity.enabled }}
automountServiceAccountToken: false
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if and .Values.serviceAccount.create .Values.workloadIdentity.enabled }}
---
# ponytail: projected SA token — 限时令牌，供 KMS/HSM workload identity 换取访问凭据。
# 升级路径：云厂商原生 workload identity 注解（P1，避免手动 token 投递）。
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: {{ include "agentkit.serviceAccountName" . }}-token
namespace: {{ .Release.Namespace }}
labels:
{{- include "agentkit.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
annotations:
kubernetes.io/service-account.name: {{ include "agentkit.serviceAccountName" . }}
type: kubernetes.io/service-account-token
{{- end }}

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# Fischer AgentKit — Helm values
#政企生产级配置；所有密钥通过 Sealed Secrets 或 External Secrets Operator 注入，
# 禁止明文 Kubernetes Secret + Git 提交（KTD-4 / R2a）。
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 镜像配置
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
image:
repository: fischer-agentkit
tag: 0.1.0
pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
# 私有镜像仓库时配置 pullSecret（secret 引用名，由外部创建）
pullSecret: ""
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 副本与调度
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
replicaCount: 1
# ponytail: 暂不支持 HPA，单副本起步；扩容由运维手动 rollout。
# 升级路径： values.replicaCount > 1 + PodDisruptionBudget（P1）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ServiceAccount
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
serviceAccount:
create: true
name: "" # 留空则用 fullname
annotations: {} # 云厂商 workload identity 注解（如 EKS/GKE）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Service
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
service:
type: ClusterIP
apiPort: 8001 # API 服务（agentkit serve）
guiPort: 8002 # Web GUI（agentkit gui）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Ingress（TLS 终止）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ingress:
enabled: true
className: nginx
annotations: {}
host: agentkit.example.com
tls:
enabled: true
# 引用 secrets.tlsServerCert 对应的 TLS Secret
secretName: agentkit-tls
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 资源
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
cpu: "1000m"
memory: 2Gi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pod 安全上下文（非 root 用户，与 Dockerfile appuser 对齐）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
podSecurityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
securityContext:
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false # agentkit 需写临时文件（缓存/日志）
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: [ALL]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 探针
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
probes:
liveness:
httpGet:
path: /api/v1/health
port: api
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 3
readiness:
httpGet:
path: /api/v1/health
port: api
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OTel 可观测性
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
otel:
enabled: true
endpoint: http://otel-collector:4317 # OTLP gRPC
serviceName: fischer-agentkit
# exporter token 从 secrets.otelExporterToken 引用（OTel collector 启用鉴权时）
headers: {}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Redis / PostgreSQL 连接（密码从 secrets 引用）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
redis:
url: redis://redis:6379/0
# 实际密码通过 env REDIS_PASSWORD 注入（来自 secrets.redisPassword）
postgres:
# DATABASE_URL（不含密码，密码通过 ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD} 占位由 env 注入）
url: postgresql+asyncpg://agentkit@postgres:5432/agentkit
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 认证 / IDP（引用 secrets）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
auth:
scimToken: "" # 从 secrets.apiKey 引用（SCIM bearer）
idps: [] # IDP 配置列表（非密部分），密钥引用 secrets.idpSigningCerts
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 密钥清单 — 11 个 secret slot（KTD-4 / R2a）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# backend 选择：
# sealed-secrets — 使用 Bitnami Sealed Secrets（模板 templates/sealed-secret.yaml）
# external-secrets — 使用 External Secrets Operator（模板 templates/external-secret.yaml）
# 客户按环境二选一；模板按 backend 条件渲染。禁止明文 Kubernetes Secret + Git 提交。
secrets:
backend: sealed-secrets
# External Secrets Operator 配置（仅当 backend: external-secrets 时生效）
externalSecret:
# SecretStore 名称（运维预创建，指向 Vault / AWS SM / GCP SM / Azure KV）
secretStoreName: agentkit-vault-store
# 后端类型：vault | aws | gcp | azure
backend: vault
# --- 11 个 secret slot ---
# 每个 slot：name=Kubernetes Secret key；description=用途；rotation=轮换周期
# 1) JWT 签名密钥（HS256）— access(15m) + refresh(7d) token 签名
jwtSigningKey:
key: jwt-signing-key
description: "JWT access/refresh token HS256 签名密钥"
rotation: 90d
# 2) API Key — 服务间 / SCIM / 客户端鉴权（恒定时间比较）
apiKey:
key: api-key
description: "服务间调用 / SCIM bearer / agentkit pair 生成的 API Key"
rotation: 180d
# 3) DB 凭据 — 应用层 DATABASE_URL（含用户名，密码占位由 env 注入）
dbCredentials:
key: database-url
description: "应用层 DATABASE_URL DSN（postgresql+asyncpg://agentkit:***@postgres:5432/agentkit）"
rotation: 90d
# 4) IDP 签名证书 — OIDC/SAML IdP 签名证书 PEM（多 IDP 信任边界）
idpSigningCerts:
key: idp-signing-certs
description: "OIDC/SAML IdP 签名证书 PEM（JSON map: {idp_name: pem}，支持多 IDP 热轮换）"
rotation: 365d
# 5) 第三方 API Key（LLM providers）— DashScope / DeepSeek / OpenAI / Anthropic 等
thirdPartyApiKeys:
key: third-party-api-keys
description: "LLM provider API Key（JSON map: {provider: key}，DashScope/DeepSeek/OpenAI/Anthropic）"
rotation: 90d
# 6) TLS 服务器证书私钥 — Ingress TLS 终止用的 cert + key
tlsServerCert:
key: tls-server-cert
description: "Ingress TLS 服务器证书 + 私钥（PEM，tls.crt + tls.key）"
rotation: 365d
# 7) mTLS 客户端证书私钥 — 与下游服务（KMS/HSM、内部 API）双向 TLS
mtlsClientCert:
key: mtls-client-cert
description: "mTLS 客户端证书 + 私钥（PEM，client.crt + client.key + ca.crt）"
rotation: 180d
# 8) KMS/HSM PKCS#11 PIN — 硬件安全模块访问 PIN
kmsHsmPin:
key: kms-hsm-pin
description: "KMS/HSM PKCS#11 访问 PIN（用于密钥托管 / 签名 / 解密）"
rotation: 365d
# 9) OTel exporter token — OTLP collector 鉴权 token
otelExporterToken:
key: otel-exporter-token
description: "OTLP exporter 鉴权 token（DEPLOY-5: 值格式必须为 'Authorization=Bearer <token>'，符合 OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS key=value 规范）"
rotation: 90d
# 10) Redis 密码 — Redis requirepass（基础设施层）
redisPassword:
key: redis-password
description: "Redis requirepass（基础设施层，env REDIS_PASSWORD 注入应用）"
rotation: 90d
# 11) PostgreSQL 密码 — POSTGRES_PASSWORD（基础设施层，PG StatefulSet 初始化用）
postgresPassword:
key: postgres-password
description: "PostgreSQL POSTGRES_PASSWORD（DEPLOY-4: 仅 PG StatefulSet 初始化消费，应用通过 DATABASE_URL Slot 3 内嵌密码连接，不读此 env）"
rotation: 90d
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# workload identity — KMS/HSM projected service account token
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
workloadIdentity:
enabled: false # 启用后 serviceaccount.yaml 注入 projected SA token
audience: sts.example.com # 受众（云厂商 STS / 内部 KMS）
expirationSeconds: 3600
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# agentkit.yaml 非密配置（注入 ConfigMap）
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
config:
server:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: 8001
workers: 1
rate_limit: 60
session:
backend: redis
bus:
backend: redis
task_store:
backend: redis
skills:
auto_discover: true
paths: ["./configs/skills"]
experts:
paths: ["./configs/experts"]
logging:
level: INFO
format: text
# 注意：llm / auth / telemetry 等含密钥的段由 env 注入，不进 ConfigMap

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# Fischer AgentKit — 离线安装包构建编排
# 目标：在联网环境打包镜像 + Chart，拷贝到离线集群安装。
#
# 用法：
# make all # 构建镜像 + 打包 chart（联网环境）
# make install # 离线集群安装（需先拷贝 dist/ 过去）
# make clean # 清理 dist/
SHELL := /bin/bash
.DEFAULT_GOAL := all
# 可覆盖变量
IMAGE_REPO ?= fischer-agentkit
IMAGE_TAG ?= 0.1.0
CHART_DIR ?= ../helm/agentkit
DIST_DIR ?= dist
NAMESPACE ?= agentkit
RELEASE ?= agentkit
.PHONY: all build-images package-chart install clean
all: build-images package-chart
# 构建镜像并保存为 tarball
build-images:
@bash scripts/build-images.sh $(IMAGE_REPO) $(IMAGE_TAG) $(DIST_DIR)
# 打包 Helm chart 为 tgz
package-chart:
@bash scripts/package-chart.sh $(CHART_DIR) $(DIST_DIR)
# 离线安装：加载镜像 + helm install
install:
@bash scripts/install.sh $(DIST_DIR) $(NAMESPACE) $(RELEASE)
clean:
rm -rf $(DIST_DIR)

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# build-images.sh — 构建 AgentKit Docker 镜像并保存为 tarball（离线安装用）
# 用法：bash build-images.sh [IMAGE_REPO] [IMAGE_TAG] [DIST_DIR]
set -euo pipefail
IMAGE_REPO="${1:-fischer-agentkit}"
IMAGE_TAG="${2:-0.1.0}"
DIST_DIR="${3:-dist}"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../../.." && pwd)"
mkdir -p "$DIST_DIR"
cd "$REPO_ROOT"
IMAGE_REF="${IMAGE_REPO}:${IMAGE_TAG}"
echo "==> 构建 Docker 镜像：${IMAGE_REF}"
docker build -t "${IMAGE_REF}" -f Dockerfile .
TARBALL="${DIST_DIR}/agentkit-image-${IMAGE_TAG}.tar.gz"
echo "==> 保存镜像到 tarball：${TARBALL}"
# ponytail: gzip 压缩镜像，离线传输体积更小；docker save 默认未压缩。
docker save "${IMAGE_REF}" | gzip > "${TARBALL}"
echo "==> 完成。产物：${TARBALL}"
echo " 大小：$(du -h "${TARBALL}" | cut -f1)"

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# install.sh — 离线安装 AgentKit（加载镜像 + helm install）
# 用法：bash install.sh [DIST_DIR] [NAMESPACE] [RELEASE_NAME]
# 前置：已将 dist/ 拷贝到离线集群节点，节点已安装 docker + helm + kubectl。
set -euo pipefail
DIST_DIR="${1:-dist}"
NAMESPACE="${2:-agentkit}"
RELEASE="${3:-agentkit}"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}"
echo "==> 检查依赖"
for cmd in docker helm kubectl; do
if ! command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "ERROR: ${cmd} 未安装" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
if [ ! -d "${DIST_DIR}" ]; then
echo "ERROR: 产物目录不存在：${DIST_DIR}" >&2
echo " 请先在联网环境执行 make all，并将 dist/ 拷贝到本节点。" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 1) 加载镜像 tarball
IMAGE_TARBALL="$(ls "${DIST_DIR}"/agentkit-image-*.tar.gz 2>/dev/null | head -1 || true)"
if [ -z "${IMAGE_TARBALL}" ]; then
echo "ERROR: 镜像 tarball 未找到（${DIST_DIR}/agentkit-image-*.tar.gz）" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "==> 加载镜像：${IMAGE_TARBALL}"
gunzip -c "${IMAGE_TARBALL}" | docker load
# 列出刚加载的镜像（便于校验 tag）
LOADED_IMAGE="$(docker images --format '{{.Repository}}:{{.Tag}}' | grep agentkit | head -1)"
echo " 已加载：${LOADED_IMAGE}"
# 2) helm install
CHART_TGZ="$(ls "${DIST_DIR}"/agentkit-*.tgz 2>/dev/null | grep -v agentkit-image | head -1 || true)"
if [ -z "${CHART_TGZ}" ]; then
echo "ERROR: chart tgz 未找到（${DIST_DIR}/agentkit-*.tgz）" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "==> 创建 namespace：${NAMESPACE}"
kubectl get namespace "${NAMESPACE}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
kubectl create namespace "${NAMESPACE}"
echo "==> helm install：${RELEASE} (namespace=${NAMESPACE})"
helm upgrade --install "${RELEASE}" "${CHART_TGZ}" \
--namespace "${NAMESPACE}" \
--set image.repository="$(echo "${LOADED_IMAGE}" | cut -d: -f1)" \
--set image.tag="$(echo "${LOADED_IMAGE}" | cut -d: -f2)" \
--set image.pullPolicy=Never # 离线本地镜像，Never 强制使用已加载的本地镜像
echo "==> 等待 rollout"
# DEPLOY-1: 用标签选择器定位 Deployment — fullname 在 release 名包含 chart 名时
# 仅返回 release 名（如 release=agentkit → Deployment=agentkit），其他情况返回
# release-chart（如 release=myprod → myprod-agentkit）。硬编码 "${RELEASE}-agentkit"
# 在默认 release=agentkit 时拼出不存在的 agentkit-agentkit。改用 instance 标签。
kubectl rollout status deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance="${RELEASE}" -n "${NAMESPACE}" --timeout=300s || \
echo "WARN: rollout 未在 300s 内完成，请检查 pod 状态：kubectl get pods -n ${NAMESPACE}"
echo "==> 完成。验证："
echo " kubectl get pods -n ${NAMESPACE}"
echo " kubectl get ingress -n ${NAMESPACE}"
echo " helm status ${RELEASE} -n ${NAMESPACE}"

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# package-chart.sh — 打包 Helm chart 为 tgz（离线安装用）
# 用法：bash package-chart.sh [CHART_DIR] [DIST_DIR]
set -euo pipefail
CHART_DIR="${1:-../helm/agentkit}"
DIST_DIR="${2:-dist}"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
# 解析 CHART_DIR 相对路径（相对于 offline/ 目录）
case "$CHART_DIR" in
/*) ABS_CHART_DIR="$CHART_DIR" ;;
*) ABS_CHART_DIR="${SCRIPT_DIR}/$CHART_DIR" ;;
esac
if [ ! -f "${ABS_CHART_DIR}/Chart.yaml" ]; then
echo "ERROR: Chart.yaml 未找到：${ABS_CHART_DIR}" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! command -v helm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "ERROR: helm 未安装。请先安装 Helm 3.x（https://helm.sh/docs/intro/install/）" >&2
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p "${SCRIPT_DIR}/${DIST_DIR}"
echo "==> 打包 Helm chart：${ABS_CHART_DIR}"
helm dependency build "${ABS_CHART_DIR}" 2>/dev/null || true # ponytail: 无依赖时静默跳过
helm package "${ABS_CHART_DIR}" -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/${DIST_DIR}"
echo "==> 完成。产物目录：${SCRIPT_DIR}/${DIST_DIR}"
ls -lh "${SCRIPT_DIR}/${DIST_DIR}"/agentkit-*.tgz 2>/dev/null || true

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# 等保三级认证文档 — 总览
## 1. 认证目标与范围
### 1.1 认证目标
本套文档用于 Fischer AgentKit（以下简称 "AgentKit"）通过 GB/T 22239-2019
《信息安全技术 网络安全等级保护基本要求》**第三级**（等保三级）测评准备。
目标：在政企 POC 采购关闭前完成认证 readiness，使 AgentKit 作为应用系统
具备部署到等保三级信息系统的合规条件。
### 1.2 认证范围
AgentKit 作为一个**应用系统**纳入等保三级测评，覆盖：
- 应用软件本身（FastAPI 后端 + Vue 前端 + Tauri 桌面客户端）
- 部署形态：Kubernetes（客户内网）+ Redis + PostgreSQL（含 pgvector）
- 数据处理：用户输入、LLM 调用、记忆存储、终端命令执行
**不在范围内**（由客户/平台侧负责）：
- 物理机房环境（客户机房）
- K8s 宿主机操作系统内核加固
- 网络骨干设施（防火墙、入侵检测系统、堡垒机）
- PKI 证书签发机构（CA）
- HSM/KMS 硬件设备
AgentKit 文档中明确标注「依赖客户侧」与「AgentKit 实现」的边界，避免越界承诺。
### 1.3 文档结构
本套文档按 GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求 6 个维度组织：
| 文件 | 维度 | 主要内容 |
|------|------|----------|
| `00-overview.md` | — | 总览（本文档） |
| `01-physical.md` | 物理安全 | 部署假设（客户机房）、物理访问、环境监控、电力 |
| `02-network.md` | 网络安全 | 网络架构、边界防护（Ingress TLS）、访问控制（NetworkPolicy）、入侵防范、安全审计（OTel） |
| `03-host.md` | 主机安全 | 容器镜像安全、K8s node 基线、身份鉴别（SA token）、访问控制（RBAC）、安全审计、入侵防范 |
| `04-application.md` | 应用安全 | 身份鉴别（SSO 多 IDP）、访问控制（RBAC 3 级 + 权限位）、安全审计（OTel + audit.py）、通信完整性（TLS + JWT）、软件容错、资源控制 |
| `05-data.md` | 数据安全 | 数据完整性（PG + pgvector）、数据保密性（PII 脱敏 + 国密 P1）、备份恢复、剩余信息保护（session revoke） |
| `06-management.md` | 管理安全 | 密钥轮换 runbook、break-glass 告警、变更管理、应急响应、安全评估 |
| `control-points.yaml` | — | 控制点清单 + AgentKit 实现映射（已实现 / P0 / P1 / 待评估） |
## 2. AgentKit 架构摘要
### 2.1 技术栈
- **后端**：Python 3.11+、FastAPI、Uvicorn、Pydantic v2、SQLAlchemy 2（async）
- **前端**：Vue 3、TypeScript、Vite 5、Ant Design Vue 4、Pinia
- **桌面端**：Tauri 2.x（Rust 外壳 + Python sidecar）
- **基础设施**：Redis（总线/缓存/状态）、PostgreSQL + pgvector（情景记忆）
- **可观测性**：OpenTelemetry（OTLP gRPC 导出，U1 已强制依赖）
- **部署**：Helm Chart（K8s 内网部署，U5）
### 2.2 部署形态
```
客户内网 K8s 集群
├── Ingress (nginx, TLS 终止) ← 唯一对外入口
│ └── TLS 证书（cert-manager 或手动）
├── AgentKit Pod (非 root, UID 1001)
│ ├── FastAPI serve (:8001) — API
│ └── FastAPI gui (:8002) — Web GUI
├── Redis (内部, requirepass)
├── PostgreSQL + pgvector (内部, 密码)
└── OTel Collector (内部, bearer token)
↑ OTLP gRPC (mTLS: 待评估)
```
密钥通过 Sealed Secrets 或 External Secrets Operator 注入（禁止明文
Kubernetes Secret + Git 提交，KTD-4 / R2a）。共 10 个 secret slot，
每个含轮换周期（90~365 天）。
### 2.3 关键安全子系统映射
| 子系统 | 模块 | 等保维度 |
|--------|------|----------|
| OTel 可观测性 | `src/agentkit/telemetry/` | 网络/主机/应用审计 |
| PII 脱敏 | `src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py` | 数据保密性 |
| SSO 多 IDP | `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/`、`idp_registry.py` | 应用身份鉴别 |
| SCIM 2.0 | `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py` | 应用账户生命周期 |
| RBAC 审计 | `src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py` | 应用安全审计 |
| 终端安全 6 层 | `src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py` | 应用访问控制 |
| RBAC 权限 | `src/agentkit/server/auth/permissions.py` | 应用访问控制 |
| JWT 会话 | `src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py`、`denylist.py` | 应用身份鉴别 + 剩余信息保护 |
| 密码哈希 | `src/agentkit/server/auth/password.py` | 应用身份鉴别 |
| Helm 部署 | `deploy/helm/agentkit/` | 网络/主机/管理 |
| 密钥轮换 | `docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md` | 管理安全 |
## 3. 各维度实现状态概览
下表汇总各维度控制点的实现状态。状态定义：
- **已实现**：代码/配置已落地，有对应文件可查
- **P0**：认证 readiness 必需，本次 POC 采购关闭前需补齐
- **P1**：下一阶段补齐，文档中标注为参考
- **待评估**：依赖客户侧或需进一步评估方案
| 维度 | 控制点数 | 已实现 | P0 | P1 | 待评估 |
|------|----------|--------|----|----|--------|
| 物理安全 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 网络安全 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 主机安全 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| 应用安全 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 数据安全 | 8 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 管理安全 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| **合计** | **44** | **26** | **6** | **3** | **9** |
> 应用安全是 AgentKit 自身责任范围，已全部实现。物理安全完全依赖客户机房，
> 故全部为「待评估」。网络/主机/数据/管理维度的 P0 项（共 6 个）是认证
> readiness 的关键补齐项，详见 `control-points.yaml`。
>
> **P0 关键补齐项清单**：
> - NET-03 NetworkPolicy 模板
> - NET-07 审计日志保留 180 天（KTD-9）
> - HST-03 容器日志标准化采集
> - HST-07 镜像漏洞扫描（Trivy/CI 集成）
> - DAT-03 PostgreSQL 备份恢复 runbook
> - MGT-02 CI/CD 规范文档化
## 4. 与既有交付的引用关系
本套文档不重复实现细节，只映射到既有交付物：
| 既有交付 | 等保映射 | 引用文档 |
|----------|----------|----------|
| U1 OTel（telemetry/） | 应用/网络审计 | `02-network.md` §5、`04-application.md` §4 |
| U2 PII 脱敏（pii_filter.py） | 数据保密性 | `05-data.md` §2 |
| U3 DR-fixes（bitable） | 应用容错 | `04-application.md` §5 |
| U4 SSO/SCIM/Audit | 应用身份鉴别/审计 | `04-application.md` §1/§4、`06-management.md` §2 |
| U5 K8s Helm Chart | 网络/主机/管理 | `02-network.md`、`03-host.md`、`06-management.md` |
| R7a 终端安全 6 层 | 应用访问控制 | `04-application.md` §2 |
## 5. 文档使用说明
1. 测评机构按 `control-points.yaml` 逐条核对，每条含 `id` / `dimension` /
`title` / `requirement` / `implementation` / `status` / `references`。
2. `references` 字段给出 AgentKit 代码文件绝对路径，使用 `file:///` 链接格式。
3. 状态为 P0 的控制点需在认证前补齐，对应文件中标有「P0 补齐项」段落。
4. 状态为 P1 的控制点在文档中标注为「P1 参考」，不阻碍三级认证但需写入整改计划。
5. 状态为「待评估」的控制点依赖客户侧环境，需在客户机房测评时单独核对。

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# 01 — 物理安全
> GB/T 22239-2019 第三级「物理和环境安全」控制点映射。
## 1. 维度说明
AgentKit 作为应用系统以容器形态部署在客户内网 Kubernetes 集群中，
**不拥有也不运维物理机房**。物理安全责任由客户机房运营方承担。
本维度文档的目的是：
1. 明确 AgentKit 部署对物理环境的**假设**（前置条件）。
2. 列出 AgentKit 自身在物理安全维度的**实现空缺**（全部为「待评估」）。
3. 在客户机房测评时，由客户方提供物理安全控制点证据，
AgentKit 侧仅提供「部署形态证明」（Helm Chart / Pod 清单）。
## 2. GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求（简要）
| 控制点 ID | 要求摘要 |
|-----------|----------|
| PHY-01 | 物理访问控制：机房出入口配置电子门禁，记录进入人员和时间 |
| PHY-02 | 防盗窃和防破坏：主要设备设置防盗标识，机房设置监控系统 |
| PHY-03 | 防雷击：机房设置防雷保安器，接地电阻符合要求 |
| PHY-04 | 防火：机房设置火灾自动消防系统，检测报警器 |
| PHY-05 | 防水和防潮：机房安装水敏检测装置，防止水管安装 |
| PHY-06 | 防静电：机房采用防静电地板，设置静电消除器 |
## 3. AgentKit 实现映射
### 3.1 部署假设（前置条件）
AgentKit 容器化部署对物理环境的假设：
1. 客户机房满足 GB/T 22239-2019 三级物理安全全部要求。
2. K8s 宿主机位于受控机房内，物理访问由客户运营方管理。
3. 电力供应由机房提供（含 UPS / 后备发电机）。
4. 网络骨干（防火墙、IDS、堡垒机）由客户网络团队运维。
### 3.2 控制点状态
全部 6 个物理安全控制点状态均为 **待评估** —— 依赖客户机房测评时由客户方
提供证据。AgentKit 侧仅提供以下证明材料：
- 部署形态证明：[deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
（`podSecurityContext.runAsNonRoot: true`，`runAsUser: 1000`）
- Pod 资源清单：[deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml)
- 容器镜像基线：[Dockerfile](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/Dockerfile)
（多阶段构建 + `USER appuser` 非 root 运行）
### 3.3 控制点详情
#### PHY-01 物理访问控制 — 待评估
- **要求**：机房出入口配置电子门禁，记录进入人员和时间。
- **AgentKit 实现**：无物理访问控制责任。AgentKit 软件资产以镜像形式
存储在客户镜像仓库，物理访问由客户机房运营方控制。
- **客户侧需提供**：机房门禁系统记录、人员进出日志、访问审批流程。
#### PHY-02 防盗窃和防破坏 — 待评估
- **要求**：主要设备设置防盗标识，机房设置监控系统。
- **AgentKit 实现**：无物理设备责任。K8s worker node 由客户运维。
- **客户侧需提供**：机房监控系统、设备资产清单。
#### PHY-03 防雷击 — 待评估
- **要求**：机房设置防雷保安器，接地电阻符合要求。
- **AgentKit 实现**：无防雷责任。
- **客户侧需提供**：防雷检测报告、接地电阻测试记录。
#### PHY-04 防火 — 待评估
- **要求**：机房设置火灾自动消防系统，检测报警器。
- **AgentKit 实现**：无消防责任。
- **客户侧需提供**：消防系统验收报告、定期检测记录。
#### PHY-05 防水和防潮 — 待评估
- **要求**：机房安装水敏检测装置，防止水管安装。
- **AgentKit 实现**：无防水责任。
- **客户侧需提供**：水敏检测装置部署记录、机房湿度监控。
#### PHY-06 防静电 — 待评估
- **要求**：机房采用防静电地板，设置静电消除器。
- **AgentKit 实现**：无防静电责任。
- **客户侧需提供**：防静电地板验收报告、静电消除器检测记录。
## 4. 测评建议
物理安全维度在 AgentKit 侧**无代码/配置可核对**，全部依赖客户机房测评。
建议在测评前与客户安全团队确认：
1. 客户机房是否已通过等保三级（或更高）测评。
2. 客户机房测评报告是否覆盖 AgentKit 部署区域。
3. 若客户机房未单独测评，需将 AgentKit 部署区域纳入本次测评范围。
AgentKit 侧提供的证明材料仅证明「软件部署形态合规」（非 root 容器、
资源受限、Helm Chart 标准化部署），不替代物理环境测评。

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# 02 — 网络安全
> GB/T 22239-2019 第三级「网络和通信安全」控制点映射。
## 1. 维度说明
AgentKit 部署在客户内网 K8s 集群，网络安全的边界由 Ingress 控制，
内部东西向流量由 K8s 网络模型与（待补齐的）NetworkPolicy 控制。
AgentKit 自身实现：
- **已实现**：Ingress TLS 终止、OTel 安全审计（日志/trace）、
Redis/PG 密码鉴权（基础设施层）、API 限流。
- **P0 补齐项**：NetworkPolicy 模板（东西向流量隔离）、
审计日志保留策略（180 天，KTD-9）。
- **P1 参考**：OTel exporter mTLS、网络入侵检测接入。
## 2. GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求（简要）
| 控制点 ID | 要求摘要 |
|-----------|----------|
| NET-01 | 网络架构：划分网络区域，避免单点故障 |
| NET-02 | 边界防护：边界实施访问控制和安全过滤 |
| NET-03 | 访问控制：网络层访问控制策略，最小权限 |
| NET-04 | 入侵防范：网络入侵检测，恶意流量检测 |
| NET-05 | 安全审计：网络审计日志，覆盖关键网络活动 |
| NET-06 | 恶意代码防范：网络边界恶意代码检测 |
| NET-07 | 安全审计日志保留：日志保留期满足合规要求 |
| NET-08 | 资源控制：会话与带宽限制，防止资源耗尽 |
## 3. AgentKit 实现映射
### 3.1 网络架构（NET-01）— 已实现
AgentKit K8s 部署采用单 Ingress 入口 + 内部 Service 架构：
```
外网/办公网 ── HTTPS ──> Ingress (nginx, TLS 终止)
│
▼
AgentKit Service (ClusterIP)
│
▼
AgentKit Pod (:8001 API, :8002 GUI)
│
┌─────────────┼─────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
Redis PostgreSQL OTel Collector
(ClusterIP) (ClusterIP) (ClusterIP)
```
- **Ingress 是唯一对外入口**：[deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml)
- **Service 类型为 ClusterIP**（不直接对外暴露）：
[deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
（`service.type: ClusterIP`）
- **API 与 GUI 走分离路径**：`/api` → API Service，`/` → GUI Service
### 3.2 边界防护（NET-02）— 已实现
Ingress 启用 TLS 终止，所有外网流量强制 HTTPS：
```yaml
ingress:
enabled: true
className: nginx
tls:
enabled: true
secretName: agentkit-tls # 引用 secrets.tlsServerCert
```
- TLS 证书通过 cert-manager 自动续期或手动签发（365 天轮换）。
- HTTP→HTTPS 跳转由 nginx ingress controller 默认配置提供
（客户侧 ingress controller 责任）。
- 证书私钥通过 Sealed Secret / External Secret 注入（KTD-4 / R2a）。
**参考文件**：
[deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml)
[deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)（`ingress` 段、`secrets.tlsServerCert` slot）
### 3.3 访问控制 / NetworkPolicy（NET-03）— P0 补齐项
**当前状态：P0**。Helm Chart 暂无 NetworkPolicy 模板，
Pod 间东西向流量默认全通（K8s 默认网络模型）。
**P0 补齐计划**：
1. 新增 `deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/networkpolicy.yaml`。
2. 默认 deny-all，按白名单放行：
- Ingress → AgentKit Pod（8001/8002）
- AgentKit Pod → Redis（6379）
- AgentKit Pod → PostgreSQL（5432）
- AgentKit Pod → OTel Collector（4317）
3. 命名空间隔离：AgentKit 独立 namespace，跨 namespace 流量显式声明。
**当前缓解**：Service 全部 ClusterIP（不对外），Redis/PG 由客户 K8s 集群
内部网络策略保护（客户侧责任）。
### 3.4 入侵防范（NET-04）— P1 参考
**当前状态：P1**。AgentKit 自身不部署网络 IDS，
依赖客户侧网络骨干的 IDS / IPS。
- API 层面：[RateLimitMiddleware](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py)
实现单进程滑动窗口限流，Webhook 入站端点单独限流
（[src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py)）。
- 异常登录：JWT 验证失败、SCIM token 校验失败返回 401
（[scim/router.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py)
使用 `hmac.compare_digest` 恒定时间比较）。
**P1 补齐计划**：接入客户 SIEM，将 AgentKit OTel 日志投递到客户
入侵检测平台，由 SIEM 做 abnormal pattern 检测。
### 3.5 安全审计（NET-05）— 已实现
AgentKit 通过 OpenTelemetry（U1，强制依赖）实现网络活动审计：
- **HTTP 请求 trace**：FastAPI Instrumentor 自动埋点，每个请求生成 span，
含 HTTP method/path/status/duration。
[src/agentkit/telemetry/setup.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/setup.py)
（`FastAPIInstrumentor`）
- **审计事件 span**：RBAC 角色变更、deprovisioning 写入 OTel span event
（[src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py)）。
- **SCIM 推送失败告警**：span event `scim.push.failure`
（[scim/router.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py)）。
- **终端命令审计**：每条终端命令写入 `terminal_audit_logs` 表
（[terminal_security.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py)）。
OTLP gRPC 导出到内部 collector
（[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`otel.endpoint: http://otel-collector:4317`）。
### 3.6 恶意代码防范（NET-06）— 待评估
**当前状态：待评估**。网络边界恶意代码检测由客户网络骨干的
防病毒网关 / 沙箱负责。AgentKit 不在网络边界位置。
AgentKit 侧的缓解：
- 容器镜像来自可信构建（CI/CD），不在运行时下载可执行文件。
- 终端命令执行受 6 层白名单 + 危险检测约束（R7a），
限制任意命令执行能力（详见 `04-application.md` §2）。
### 3.7 安全审计日志保留（NET-07）— P0 补齐项
**当前状态：P0**。审计日志保留策略未在代码中强制实施：
- `auth_audit_log` 表（SQLite）和 `terminal_audit_logs` 表无自动清理 /
归档策略，依赖运维手动管理。
- OTel collector 侧的日志保留由客户可观测性平台配置，AgentKit 不控制。
**P0 补齐计划**：
1. 在 Helm values 增加 `audit.retentionDays: 180` 配置（KTD-9）。
2. 实现审计日志归档 CronJob：超过 180 天的记录导出到对象存储（客户侧）
并从主表清理。
3. OTel collector 配置 180 天保留策略（与客户可观测性团队协同）。
### 3.8 资源控制（NET-08）— 已实现
AgentKit 在应用层与容器层均实现资源控制：
- **容器层**：Pod resources requests/limits
（[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`resources` 段，CPU 250m~1000m / Memory 512Mi~2Gi）。
- **应用层**：[RateLimiter](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py)
实现 IP 维度滑动窗口限流，Webhook 入站端点独立限流
（[channels.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py)）。
- **会话超时**：终端 session 闲置 1800s 自动断开
（[terminal_server.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/terminal_server.py)
`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT = 1800`）。
- **JWT 短时效**：access token 15min
（[jwt_utils.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py)
`ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL`）。
## 4. OTel exporter mTLS（P1 参考）
**当前状态：P1**。OTel exporter 通过 bearer token 鉴权
（[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`secrets.otelExporterToken` slot），未启用 mTLS。
Helm Chart 已预留 `secrets.mtlsClientCert` slot（用于下游服务 mTLS），
但 OTel exporter 侧的 mTLS 配置待补齐。
**P1 补齐计划**：
1. 在 OTel SDK 初始化时配置 `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE` /
`OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_CLIENT_KEY` / `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_CA_CERT` 环境变量。
2. OTel collector 侧启用 mTLS 服务端证书验证。
3. 复用 `secrets.mtlsClientCert` slot 注入客户端证书。
## 5. 测评建议
1. **NET-01 / NET-02 / NET-05 / NET-08**：直接展示 Helm Ingress + OTel +
限流配置即可。
2. **NET-03 / NET-07**：P0 补齐项，需在测评前完成 NetworkPolicy 模板和
审计日志保留 CronJob。
3. **NET-04 / NET-06**：依赖客户侧网络骨干，由客户网络团队提供 IDS /
恶意代码检测证据。

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# 03 — 主机安全
> GB/T 22239-2019 第三级「设备和计算安全」控制点映射。
> 本维度以**容器与 Pod**为「主机」单元（AgentKit 不直接运维 K8s node）。
## 1. 维度说明
AgentKit 以容器形态运行在客户 K8s 集群。「主机安全」分为两层：
- **容器/Pod 层**（AgentKit 责任）：镜像安全、运行时安全上下文、
ServiceAccount、Pod 级 RBAC。
- **K8s node 层**（客户责任）：宿主机操作系统内核加固、node 基线、
主机入侵检测（HIDS）。
AgentKit 自身实现：
- **已实现**：非 root 容器、最小权限安全上下文（capabilities drop ALL）、
ServiceAccount 隔离、容器级资源限制。
- **P0 补齐项**：容器镜像漏洞扫描（CI 集成 Trivy/Grype）、
Pod 安全审计日志采集标准化。
- **P1 参考**：distroless 基础镜像。
## 2. GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求（简要）
| 控制点 ID | 要求摘要 |
|-----------|----------|
| HST-01 | 身份鉴别：设备/系统身份标识与鉴别 |
| HST-02 | 访问控制：操作系统/账户权限最小化，远程管理受控 |
| HST-03 | 安全审计：设备审计日志，覆盖系统管理活动 |
| HST-04 | 入侵防范：主机入侵检测，系统加固 |
| HST-05 | 恶意代码防范：主机防病毒，恶意代码检测 |
| HST-06 | 资源控制：CPU/内存/磁盘限制，会话超时 |
| HST-07 | 镜像与补丁管理：系统补丁及时更新，镜像来源可信 |
## 3. AgentKit 实现映射
### 3.1 容器镜像安全（HST-07）— 部分已实现 / P0 补齐
#### 已实现
- **多阶段构建**：builder + runner 两阶段，最终镜像不含构建工具链。
[Dockerfile](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/Dockerfile)
- **非 root 用户**：runner 阶段创建 `appuser`（UID 1001 / GID 1001），
`USER appuser` 强制非 root 运行。
- **基础镜像**：`python:3.11-slim`（精简版，比 full 镜像减少攻击面）。
- **HEALTHCHECK**：内置健康检查
（`/api/v1/health`，30s 间隔）。
- **不写字节码**：`PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1`，减少磁盘 .pyc 残留。
#### P0 补齐项：镜像漏洞扫描
**当前状态：P0**。CI 流水线未集成容器镜像漏洞扫描。
**P0 补齐计划**：
1. CI 流水线增加 Trivy 扫描步骤：
```yaml
- name: Trivy scan
run: trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --exit-code 1 fischer-agentkit:${{ github.sha }}
```
2. Helm Chart 增加 `image.digest` 字段，部署时使用不可变 digest 而非 tag。
3. 镜像签名（cosign）— P1，可选。
### 3.2 K8s node 安全基线（HST-04 / HST-05）— 待评估
**当前状态：待评估**。K8s 宿主机由客户运维，AgentKit 不控制 node 操作系统。
客户侧需提供：
- node 操作系统加固基线（CIS Benchmark for Kubernetes / 操作系统）。
- 主机入侵检测（HIDS，如 Falco / OSSEC）。
- 主机防病毒（如客户机房要求）。
AgentKit 侧的缓解：
- Pod `securityContext` 强制非 root + drop ALL capabilities
（[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`podSecurityContext` / `securityContext` 段），即使 node 被攻破，
容器逃逸到 root 的难度提升。
### 3.3 身份鉴别 / ServiceAccount（HST-01）— 已实现
AgentKit Pod 使用专用 ServiceAccount，不共享 default SA：
- **ServiceAccount 创建**：
[deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/serviceaccount.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/serviceaccount.yaml)
- **values 配置**：
```yaml
serviceAccount:
create: true
name: "" # 留空则用 fullname（专用 SA）
annotations: {} # 云厂商 workload identity 注解
```
- **Workload Identity**（可选）：`workloadIdentity.enabled: true` 时
注入 projected SA token，用于访问云 KMS / STS
（[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`workloadIdentity` 段）。
Pod 内应用层身份鉴别见 `04-application.md` §1（SSO + JWT）。
### 3.4 访问控制 / Pod 级 RBAC（HST-02）— 已实现
- **capabilities drop ALL**：
```yaml
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: [ALL]
```
([values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml) `securityContext` 段)
- **runAsNonRoot 强制**：`podSecurityContext.runAsNonRoot: true`，
K8s admission 拒绝非 root Pod。
- **readOnlyRootFilesystem**：当前为 `false`（agentkit 需写临时文件用于缓存/日志），
通过 `emptyDir` 挂载 `/tmp` 实现写入隔离
（[deployment.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml)
`volumes.tmp`）。
- **privileged: false**（默认，未启用特权模式）。
应用层 RBAC（member/operator/admin + 9 权限位）见
`04-application.md` §2。
### 3.5 安全审计 / 容器日志（HST-03）— 已实现 + P0 补齐
#### 已实现
- **stdout/stderr 标准输出**：AgentKit 日志全部输出到 stdout，
由 K8s 日志采集（如 Loki / Fluent Bit）收集。
- **OTel trace**：每个 Pod 的请求 trace 通过 OTLP 导出到 collector
（U1，强制依赖）。
- **审计事件**：RBAC 变更、deprovisioning、SCIM 操作写入 `auth_audit_log` 表
+ OTel span event（[audit.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py)）。
- **终端命令审计**：每条终端命令 + 决策（executed/confirmed/blocked/denied）
写入 `terminal_audit_logs` 表
（[terminal_security.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py)）。
#### P0 补齐项：审计日志标准化采集
**当前状态：P0**。容器日志采集到客户日志平台的链路未标准化。
**P0 补齐计划**：
1. Helm Chart 增加 `logging.fluentBitSidecar` 选项（可选 sidecar 采集）。
2. 审计日志 JSON 化（structured logging），便于 SIEM 解析。
3. 与 `02-network.md` §3.7 的 180 天保留策略协同落地。
### 3.6 入侵防范（HST-04）— 已实现（容器层）
容器层入侵防范已实现：
- **非 root + drop ALL capabilities**：限制容器内可执行的系统调用。
- **allowPrivilegeEscalation: false**：阻止子进程提权。
- **资源 limits**：CPU 1000m / Memory 2Gi 上限，防止容器失控耗尽 node 资源
（[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`resources.limits`）。
- **Liveness/Readiness 探针**：故障 Pod 自动重启
（[deployment.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml)
`livenessProbe` / `readinessProbe`）。
node 层入侵检测（HIDS）见 §3.2，依赖客户侧。
### 3.7 资源控制（HST-06）— 已实现
- **Pod resources**：
```yaml
resources:
requests: { cpu: 250m, memory: 512Mi }
limits: { cpu: 1000m, memory: 2Gi }
```
- **应用层限流**：[RateLimiter](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py)
IP 维度滑动窗口。
- **会话超时**：终端 session 1800s 闲置断开
（[terminal_server.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/terminal_server.py)）。
- **JWT 短时效**：access 15min / refresh 7d
（[jwt_utils.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py)）。
## 4. distroless 基础镜像（P1 参考）
**当前状态：P1**。当前基础镜像为 `python:3.11-slim`，含 shell + 包管理器，
攻击面大于 distroless。
**P1 升级路径**：
1. 切换到 `gcr.io/distroless/python3-debian12` 作为 runner 基础镜像。
2. 需调整：distroless 无 shell，HEALTHCHECK 的 `python -c` 命令需改为
HTTP 探针（K8s livenessProbe httpGet，已支持）。
3. 多阶段构建的 builder 阶段保持 `python:3.11-slim`（构建工具链需要）。
distroless 不阻碍等保三级认证，但作为安全增强项写入整改计划。
## 5. 测评建议
1. **HST-01 / HST-02 / HST-06**：直接展示 ServiceAccount + securityContext
+ resources 配置即可。
2. **HST-03**：已实现部分展示 audit.py + terminal_security.py，
P0 补齐日志标准化采集。
3. **HST-07**：P0 补齐镜像漏洞扫描后展示 Trivy 扫描报告。
4. **HST-04 / HST-05**：容器层已实现，node 层由客户提供 HIDS 证据。

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# 04 — 应用安全
> GB/T 22239-2019 第三级「应用和数据安全 — 应用部分」控制点映射。
## 1. 维度说明
应用安全是 AgentKit **自身核心责任范围**，全部 8 个控制点已实现。
本维度文档引用 U4 SSO 多 IDP / SCIM、U1 OTel 审计、R7a 终端安全 6 层、
RBAC 3 级权限、JWT 会话等既有实现，不重复代码细节。
## 2. GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求（简要）
| 控制点 ID | 要求摘要 |
|-----------|----------|
| APP-01 | 身份鉴别：用户身份标识与鉴别，口令复杂度，登录失败处理 |
| APP-02 | 访问控制：基于角色的访问控制，最小权限，默认拒绝 |
| APP-03 | 安全审计：应用审计日志，覆盖用户操作关键事件 |
| APP-04 | 通信完整性：传输完整性保护，防篡改 |
| APP-05 | 软件容错：错误处理，故障隔离，降级机制 |
| APP-06 | 资源控制：会话并发控制，超时自动断开 |
| APP-07 | 应用账户生命周期：开户/变更/销户审计，SCIM 自动化 |
| APP-08 | 代码安全：输入验证，输出编码，依赖漏洞管理 |
## 3. AgentKit 实现映射
### 3.1 身份鉴别（APP-01）— 已实现
#### 多 IDP 单点登录（U4 SSO）
AgentKit 支持 OIDC + SAML 双协议并存的多 IDP 信任边界：
- **OIDC 适配器**（authlib redirect flow + JIT 用户创建）：
[src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py)
- **SAML 2.0 适配器**（python3-saml / OneLogin ACS）：
[src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/saml.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/saml.py)
- **多 IDP 注册表**（热证书轮换 + 单 IDP 故障隔离，R1a 按 sub 关联
禁止邮箱合并）：
[src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py)
支持的 IDP 类型：飞书 / Azure AD / 阿里云 IDaaS 等任意 OIDC/SAML 合规 IDP。
#### 本地密码认证
- **bcrypt 哈希**：rounds=12（OWASP 推荐值）
[src/agentkit/server/auth/password.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/password.py)
- **JWT 会话**：HS256 签名，access 15min + refresh 7d（30d 记住我）
[src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py)
- V2 claims 含 `sid`（session id）+ `jti`（per-token unique id），
支持服务端 session 撤销。
- **Refresh token 轮换 + reuse 检测**：旧 token 进入 denylist 30s 窗口，
reuse 触发撤销该用户全部 session
[src/agentkit/server/auth/denylist.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/denylist.py)
- **登录失败处理**：JWT 验证失败返回 401，refresh token reuse 触发
全 session 撤销（强制重新登录）。
- **OAuth state CSRF 防护**：OIDC state 缓存 TTL 5min，一次性消费
（[oidc.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py) `_StateCache`）。
### 3.2 访问控制 / RBAC 3 级（APP-02）— 已实现
#### 3 级 RBAC + 9 权限位
[src/agentkit/server/auth/permissions.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/permissions.py)
| 角色 | 权限 |
|------|------|
| `member` | CHAT / KB_QUERY / WORKFLOW_EXECUTE |
| `operator` | member 全部 + KB_WRITE + TERMINAL_LOCAL_USE + TERMINAL_WHITELIST_MANAGE |
| `admin` | operator 全部 + TERMINAL_SERVER_USE + USER_MANAGE + SYSTEM_CONFIG |
权限位作为稳定字符串标识符用于 JWT payload + 前端 store + 审计日志，
不重命名既有值（向前兼容）。
#### 终端安全 6 层白名单（R7a）
[src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py)
评估优先级（最高→最低）：
1. **Blocklist**（admin 管理，永远拒绝）
2. **Built-in safe whitelist**（`_SAFE_COMMAND_PREFIXES`）
3. **Global whitelist**（admin 管理，DB 持久化）
4. **User whitelist**（per-user，DB 持久化 + 内存缓存）
5. **Session whitelist**（per-session，仅内存）
6. **Danger detection**（`_is_dangerous`，需确认）
**关键安全特性**：shell 操作符（`&&`、`;`、`|`、`$()`、backticks、`>`、`<`、
换行）**永远绕过所有 whitelist 层**，强制走 danger detection —
即使 `git push` 在白名单中，`git push && rm -rf /` 仍需确认。
#### 终端双层授权
终端端点要求 RBAC 角色 + 个人授权标志双重校验：
- `is_terminal_authorized` — 本地终端（client sidecar）
- `is_server_terminal_authorized` — 服务端终端（server PTY）
允许 admin 按用户授权终端而不改变其角色。
#### SCIM token 恒定时间比较
SCIM bearer token 使用 `hmac.compare_digest` 恒定时间比较防时序攻击：
[src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py)
（`_verify_scim_token`）。
### 3.3 安全审计（APP-03）— 已实现
#### OTel 审计通道（U1 强制依赖）
[src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py)
审计事件类型：
- `role_change` — RBAC 角色变更（actor/target/role_before/role_after）
- `deprovision` — 手动 deprovisioning（含 `break_glass` 标记）
每条记录含 actor/target/reason/source/timestamp，写入 `auth_audit_log` 表
+ 发 OTel span event（OTel 不可用时降级为 SQLite + 日志）。
审计来源（`source` 字段）：
- `manual` — 手动操作
- `scim` — SCIM 自动化
- `cron_reconciliation` — 定时对账
- `break_glass` — 应急通道（高权限账户）
#### SCIM 推送失败告警
SCIM push 失败实时告警：日志 error + OTel span event `scim.push.failure`
（[scim/router.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py)
`_alert_scim_failure`）。
#### 终端命令审计
每条终端命令 + 决策结果（executed/confirmed/rejected/blocked/denied）
+ cwd + exit_code 写入 `terminal_audit_logs` 表
（[terminal_security.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py)
`write_audit_log`）。
#### OTel 指标
U1 OTel 暴露以下审计相关指标
（[src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py)）：
- `agent.request.total` / `agent.execution.duration`
- `gen_ai.usage.tokens` / `tool.call.duration`
- `prompt_cache.hit` / `prompt_cache.miss`
- `pii_filter.coverage` / `pii_filter.redacted`（U2 PII 脱敏覆盖率）
### 3.4 通信完整性（APP-04）— 已实现
- **传输层 TLS**：Ingress TLS 终止（详见 `02-network.md` §3.2），
客户端→Ingress 全程 HTTPS。
- **JWT 签名完整性**：HS256 签名，任何 payload 字段篡改导致签名校验失败
（[jwt_utils.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py)
`verify_token`）。
- **mTLS 客户端证书**（下游服务）：Helm Chart 预留 `secrets.mtlsClientCert`
slot，用于与 KMS/HSM、内部 API 双向 TLS（详见 `06-management.md`）。
- **Webhook 签名校验**：入站 Webhook fail-closed，签名校验失败返回 401
（[channels.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py)）。
### 3.5 软件容错（APP-05）— 已实现
- **LLM 网关 fallback**：多 provider fallback 链
（[src/agentkit/llm/gateway.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/gateway.py)）。
- **OTel 运行时容错**：OTel exporter 连接失败时降级为 NoOpTracer，
应用启动不崩溃（[tracer.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/tracer.py)
`init_telemetry`）。
- **PII 脱敏 fail-closed**：脱敏异常时拒绝发送至 LLM，不降级到原文
（[pii_filter.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py)
`fail_closed=True` 默认）。
- **专家团队失败回退**：所有阶段失败时回退到单 agent 模式
（详见 AGENTS.md「专家团队模式」）。
- **DR-fixes（U3）**：bitable 字段校验（DR-1）、LastViewDeletionError（DR-4）、
工具调用容错（DR-5）。
- [src/agentkit/bitable/repository.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/bitable/repository.py)
- [src/agentkit/bitable/service.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/bitable/service.py)
- [src/agentkit/tools/bitable_tool.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/tools/bitable_tool.py)
### 3.6 资源控制（APP-06）— 已实现
- **IP 限流**：[RateLimiter](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py)
滑动窗口（`max_requests` / `window_seconds` 可配置）。
- **Webhook 独立限流**：[channels.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py)
入站端点单独限流 + nonce dedup。
- **会话超时**：
- 终端 session 闲置 1800s 自动断开
（[terminal_server.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/terminal_server.py)）。
- JWT access token 15min 过期强制重新认证。
- **专家名称正则校验**：`_EXPERT_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$")`
防止注入（项目规则）。
- **HandoffTransport 有界队列**：`maxsize=1024`，关闭使用 sentinel 模式
防止无界内存增长（项目规则）。
### 3.7 应用账户生命周期 / SCIM（APP-07）— 已实现
#### SCIM 2.0 自动化
[src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py)
端点：
- `POST /scim/v2/Users` — 创建用户（随机密码，不可本地登录）
- `PATCH /scim/v2/Users/{id}` — 禁用（active=false）/ 更新字段
- `GET /scim/v2/Users` — 列表 / 过滤（`userName eq` / `active eq`）
Bearer token 认证（独立于 JWT，恒定时间比较）。
#### Deprovisioning（账户销户）
管理员通过 `/admin/users/{id}/deprovision` 强制销户：
1. 禁用本地用户账户（`is_active = 0`）
2. 撤销该用户所有活跃 session
3. 记录审计（actor/target/reason/source/timestamp）+ OTel
4. `break_glass=True` 时记录 `source=break_glass`（应急通道标记）
详见 `06-management.md` §2 break-glass 告警流程。
#### JIT 用户创建（R1a）
OIDC/SAML 首次登录 JIT 创建本地用户 + `user_idp_links` 行，
按 `(idp_name, sub)` 严格关联，**禁止邮箱合并**已存在账户
（[oidc.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py)
`_find_or_create_user`）。
### 3.8 代码安全（APP-08）— 已实现
- **输入验证**：所有 API 入口使用 Pydantic v2 模型校验
（`model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")` 拒绝额外字段）。
- SCIM 模型：[src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/models.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/models.py)
- IDP 配置：[src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py)
（`OIDCConfig` / `SAMLConfig` 均 `extra="forbid"`）
- **禁止 `any` 类型**：项目规则强制使用 Pydantic 模型或 `Unknown`
（AGENTS.md）。
- **专家名称正则校验**：`_EXPERT_NAME_RE` 防 SQL/命令注入。
- **API Key 恒定时间比较**：`hmac.compare_digest`（项目规则）。
- **Ruff lint + format**：`ruff check src/ && ruff format src/`（目标 py311）
作为代码质量基线。
- **依赖管理**：`pyproject.toml` 锁定精确版本，`pip install -e ".[dev]"`
可复现环境。
- **终端命令安全**：6 层白名单 + shell 操作符检测
（详见 §3.2），防止命令注入链。
## 4. 测评建议
应用安全维度全部控制点已实现，测评时直接展示对应代码文件即可：
1. **APP-01**：展示 oidc.py / saml.py / jwt_utils.py / password.py。
2. **APP-02**：展示 permissions.py / terminal_security.py + RBAC 矩阵表。
3. **APP-03**：展示 audit.py + 终端审计日志 + OTel 指标清单。
4. **APP-04**：展示 ingress.yaml TLS + jwt_utils.py 签名校验 + channels.py
Webhook 签名。
5. **APP-05**：展示 gateway.py fallback + pii_filter.py fail-closed +
DR-fixes 引用。
6. **APP-06**：展示 middleware.py 限流 + terminal_server.py 超时。
7. **APP-07**：展示 scim/router.py + deprovision 端点 + JIT 创建逻辑。
8. **APP-08**：展示 Pydantic 模型校验 + Ruff 配置 + 终端命令安全。

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# 05 — 数据安全
> GB/T 22239-2019 第三级「应用和数据安全 — 数据部分」控制点映射。
## 1. 维度说明
AgentKit 处理的数据类型：
- **用户输入**：聊天消息、终端命令、工作流配置
- **LLM 调用**：prompt + completion（含潜在 PII）
- **持久化数据**：用户账户、会话、记忆（情景/语义/工作）
- **审计数据**：RBAC 变更、终端命令、SCIM 操作
AgentKit 自身实现：
- **已实现**：PII 脱敏（U2 fail-closed + hash 审计）、
session 撤销（剩余信息保护）、PG + pgvector 完整性、
审计数据 hash 化。
- **P0 补齐项**：PostgreSQL 备份恢复 runbook。
- **P1 参考**：国密加密（R11a，SM4/SM2 替代 AES/RSA）。
## 2. GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求（简要）
| 控制点 ID | 要求摘要 |
|-----------|----------|
| DAT-01 | 数据完整性：数据传输/存储完整性，校验机制 |
| DAT-02 | 数据保密性：敏感数据加密存储/传输，密钥管理 |
| DAT-03 | 数据备份与恢复：重要数据定期备份，恢复演练 |
| DAT-04 | 剩余信息保护：鉴别信息/文件/内存空间释放前清理 |
| DAT-05 | 个人信息保护：PII 采集/处理/传输最小化与脱敏 |
| DAT-06 | 数据采集与分类分级：按敏感度分级保护 |
| DAT-07 | 数据销毁：数据销毁审计，不可恢复 |
| DAT-08 | 国密算法合规（R11a，政企客户要求）：敏感数据加密使用国密算法 |
## 3. AgentKit 实现映射
### 3.1 数据完整性（DAT-01）— 已实现
- **PostgreSQL + pgvector**：主数据库使用 PostgreSQL（事务 ACID 保证），
pgvector 扩展存储向量记忆数据。
- 连接串：[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`postgres.url: postgresql+asyncpg://agentkit@postgres:5432/agentkit`
- SQLAlchemy 2 async ORM 提供应用层事务管理。
- **JWT 签名完整性**：HS256 签名防篡改（详见 `04-application.md` §3.4）。
- **Webhook 签名校验**：fail-closed 防篡改
（[channels.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py)）。
- **Pydantic 模型校验**：所有 API 入口 `extra="forbid"` 拒绝未知字段，
防止数据注入。
### 3.2 数据保密性 / PII 脱敏（DAT-02 / DAT-05）— 已实现（U2）
#### PII 脱敏 hook
[src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py)
设计要点：
- **正则版（默认）**：识别手机号 / 邮箱 / 身份证 / 银行卡，
替换为 `[REDACTED_TYPE:hash8]`。
- **ner_hook（可选）**：客户内网 NER 模型（LAC/HanLP），
`module:func` 路径动态 import，优先于正则版。
- **fail-closed**：任何异常时拒绝发送至 LLM（`raise PIIFilterError`），
**不降级到原文发送**。
- **hash 审计**：脱敏前后记录 sha256 前 8 位（仅 hash，不含原文），
用于审计追溯。
#### PII 类型与正则
| PII 类型 | 正则模式 | 替换格式 |
|----------|----------|----------|
| 身份证 | 18 位（含校验位 X） | `[REDACTED_ID_CARD:hash8]` |
| 手机号 | `1[3-9]\d{9}` | `[REDACTED_PHONE:hash8]` |
| 邮箱 | 标准邮箱正则 | `[REDACTED_EMAIL:hash8]` |
| 银行卡 | 16-19 位数字 | `[REDACTED_BANK_CARD:hash8]` |
> 身份证正则优先于手机号正则匹配，避免身份证号内 11 位数字子串被
> 手机号正则误匹配。
#### OTel 脱敏指标
- `pii_filter.coverage` — 脱敏扫描覆盖率（status: success/failed_closed/fallback_regex）
- `pii_filter.redacted` — 脱敏实体计数
（[metrics.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py)）
#### fail-closed 策略
```python
try:
result = _redact(text, ner_hook=ner_hook)
...
except Exception as e:
if fail_closed:
raise PIIFilterError(f"PII filter failed (fail-closed): {e}") from e
# fail-open（非默认）：降级到正则版重试
```
生产环境默认 `fail_closed=True`，宁可拒绝服务也不泄露 PII。
### 3.3 国密加密（R11a）— P1 参考
**当前状态：P1**。AgentKit 当前使用：
- **传输加密**：TLS（Ingress 终止），算法套件由 nginx ingress controller
默认配置（含 AES-GCM 等国际算法）。
- **密码哈希**：bcrypt（国际算法）。
- **JWT 签名**：HS256（HMAC-SHA256，国际算法）。
- **PII hash**：SHA-256（国际算法）。
**未使用国密算法**（SM2/SM3/SM4/SM9）。
**P1 补齐计划**（R11a）：
1. **JWT 签名**：替换 HS256 → SM2-HMAC 或国密 JWT 库（如 `gmssl`）。
2. **密码哈希**：评估 SM3 替代 bcrypt（需兼顾兼容性，可能双算法并行）。
3. **PII hash**：SHA-256 → SM3。
4. **TLS**：启用国密 TLS 套件（需 nginx ingress controller + 国密证书）。
5. **数据加密**：PG 字段级加密（透明数据加密 TDE 或应用层 SM4）。
**注**：国密算法**不阻碍等保三级认证**（三级要求「加密」而非「国密」），
但政企客户常要求国密合规，故列入 P1 整改计划。
### 3.4 数据备份与恢复（DAT-03）— P0 补齐项
**当前状态：P0**。AgentKit 自身未提供 PG 备份 runbook，
依赖客户侧数据库运维。
**AgentKit 侧已实现**：
- PostgreSQL 持久化（pgvector 扩展，事务日志 WAL 默认开启）。
- Redis 配置 AOF/RDB（由客户 Redis 运维决定）。
**P0 补齐计划**：
1. 新增 `docs/deployment/pg-backup-runbook.md`，包含：
- 全量备份策略（每日 `pg_dump`，保留 7 天）
- WAL 归档（连续归档，PITR 恢复）
- 恢复演练流程（每季度执行一次恢复测试）
- 备份加密（备份文件 SM4/AES-256 加密，密钥由 KMS 托管）
2. Helm Chart 增加 `backup` 段，可选部署 pg-backup sidecar / CronJob。
3. pgvector 向量数据备份纳入 `pg_dump`（已原生支持）。
### 3.5 剩余信息保护（DAT-04）— 已实现
#### Session 撤销
JWT V2 token 携带 `sid`（session id）+ `jti`（access token 唯一 id），
中间件校验 session 是否被服务端撤销
（[jwt_utils.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py)）：
- 销户时撤销该用户全部 session
（[auth.py deprovision](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py)）。
- Refresh token 轮换：旧 token 进入 denylist 30s 窗口
（[denylist.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/denylist.py)）。
- Token reuse 检测：reuse 触发撤销该用户全部 session（强制重新登录）。
#### Refresh token hash 化
denylist 不存储明文 refresh token，存储其 SHA-256 hash
（[denylist.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/denylist.py)
`hash_token`），减少敏感信息驻留内存。
#### JIT 用户随机密码
OIDC/SAML JIT 创建的本地用户使用随机密码
（`hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))`），不可用于本地登录，
避免 SSO 用户的本地密码驻留
（[oidc.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py)
`_find_or_create_user`）。
#### SCIM 用户随机密码
SCIM 创建的用户同样使用随机密码
（[scim/router.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py)
`create_user`）。
### 3.6 数据采集与分类分级（DAT-06）— 已实现
- **PII 分类**：pii_filter.py 按 PII 类型分级
（id_card / phone / email / bank_card），不同类型采用相同脱敏策略
但审计 hash 独立记录。
- **记忆分层**：4 层记忆架构（SOUL/USER/MEMORY/DAILY）按敏感度存储
（SOUL 最敏感，DAILY 最不敏感），详见 AGENTS.md。
- **数据最小化**：PII 脱敏后原文不落盘（仅 hash 用于审计），
LLM prompt 中不含原文 PII
（[pii_filter.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py)）。
### 3.7 数据销毁（DAT-07）— 已实现
- **账户销户**：deprovision 禁用账户（`is_active = 0`）+ 撤销全部 session。
- **审计保留**：销户操作本身记录审计日志，不可删除（admin 不可删除审计记录，
审计表无 delete 接口）。
- **PII 销毁**：脱敏后 PII 原文不落盘（内存中处理后即替换），
无需专门销毁流程。
- **PG 数据销毁**：客户侧 PG 运维负责（如需彻底删除用户数据，
由 admin 发起 SQL 操作，记录审计）。
## 4. 测评建议
1. **DAT-01 / DAT-04 / DAT-06 / DAT-07**：直接展示 PG 配置 + jwt_utils.py
+ denylist.py + pii_filter.py 即可。
2. **DAT-02 / DAT-05**：展示 pii_filter.py fail-closed 流程 + OTel 脱敏指标。
3. **DAT-03**：P0 补齐项，需在测评前完成 pg-backup-runbook.md。
4. **国密**：P1 参考，不阻碍三级认证，但写入整改计划。
## 5. PII 脱敏边界（重要说明）
AgentKit PII 脱敏的**边界**：
1. **覆盖范围**：仅脱敏发送至 LLM 的 prompt，**不脱敏**：
- 用户本地终端命令（终端命令有自己的审计）
- 用户上传的文档原文（文档处理模块不经过 pii_filter）
- bitable 数据（结构化数据，由客户自行控制）
2. **ner_hook 依赖客户**：正则版覆盖中国常见 PII（手机/邮箱/身份证/银行卡），
复杂 PII（地址/姓名/组织）需客户接入内网 NER 模型。
3. **不替代 DLP**：AgentKit PII 脱敏是应用层防护，不替代客户侧
DLP（数据防泄漏）系统。

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# 06 — 管理安全
> GB/T 22239-2019 第三级「安全管理」控制点映射。
## 1. 维度说明
管理安全覆盖「安全管理制度的运行」，AgentKit 自身已实现：
- **已实现**：密钥轮换 runbook（U5，10 个 secret slot）、
break-glass 告警流程（U4 R1b）、审计日志记录、应急隔离（销户 + session 撤销）。
- **P0 补齐项**：变更管理流程文档化（CI/CD 流水线规范）。
- **P1 参考**：定期安全评估流程。
- **待评估**：应急响应预案演练（依赖客户安全团队协同）。
## 2. GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求（简要）
| 控制点 ID | 要求摘要 |
|-----------|----------|
| MGT-01 | 密钥管理：密钥生成/存储/分发/轮换/销毁 |
| MGT-02 | 变更管理：变更审批/测试/回滚/审计 |
| MGT-03 | 应急响应：应急事件处置流程，隔离/恢复 |
| MGT-04 | 安全审计与评估：定期安全评估，漏洞管理 |
| MGT-05 | 配置管理：基线配置，配置变更审计 |
| MGT-06 | 应急通道（break-glass）：高权限应急通道，审计追溯 |
| MGT-07 | 密钥泄露响应：泄露检测/隔离/轮换/通报 |
## 3. AgentKit 实现映射
### 3.1 密钥管理（MGT-01）— 已实现
#### 10 个 secret slot + 轮换 runbook
[docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md)
+ [docs/deployment/secret-inventory.md](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/docs/deployment/secret-inventory.md)
| # | Slot 名称 | 用途 | 轮换周期 | 归属 |
|---|-----------|------|----------|------|
| 1 | JWT 签名密钥 | access(15m)/refresh(7d) token HS256 签名 | 90 天 | 安全团队 |
| 2 | API Key | 服务间 / SCIM / `agentkit pair` 鉴权 | 180 天 | 平台运维 |
| 3 | DB 凭据 | 应用层 PG 连接 DSN | 90 天 | DBA |
| 4 | IDP 签名证书 | OIDC/SAML IdP 签名证书 PEM（多 IDP 热轮换） | 365 天 | 身份团队 |
| 5 | 第三方 API Key | LLM provider API Key（JSON map） | 90 天 | LLM 运维 |
| 6 | TLS 服务器证书 | Ingress TLS 终止证书 + 私钥 | 365 天 | 平台运维 |
| 7 | mTLS 客户端证书 | 下游服务（KMS/HSM）mTLS | 180 天 | 安全团队 |
| 8 | KMS/HSM PKCS#11 PIN | 硬件安全模块访问 PIN | 365 天 | HSM 运维 |
| 9 | OTel exporter token | OTLP collector 鉴权 bearer | 90 天 | 可观测性团队 |
| 10 | Redis-PG 密码 | Redis requirepass + PG 服务密码 | 90 天 | DBA |
#### 通用轮换原则
1. **零停机**：新密钥生效后再淘汰旧密钥，避免单点切换失败。
2. **审计先行**：轮换前记录当前密钥指纹（hash8），轮换后校验变更。
3. **回滚预案**：保留旧密钥值至少一个轮换周期，便于快速回滚。
4. **权限最小化**：轮换操作仅限归属角色，操作全程审计日志。
5. **后端无关**：适用于 Sealed Secrets 与 External Secrets 两种后端。
#### 密钥存储
- **禁止明文 Kubernetes Secret + Git 提交**（KTD-4 / R2a）。
- 后端二选一：Sealed Secrets（Bitnami）或 External Secrets Operator
（指向 Vault / AWS SM / GCP SM / Azure KV）。
- 渲染到统一 `<release>-secrets` Secret，通过 `env.valueFrom.secretKeyRef`
注入 Pod。
详见 [values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`secrets` 段。
#### 热证书轮换（SAML）
SAML IDP 签名证书支持**热轮换**（不重启即时生效）：
[src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py)
`update_certificate` 方法。OIDC 通过 `server_metadata_url` 自动发现
（authlib 缓存 TTL），无需显式热轮换。
### 3.2 break-glass 应急通道（MGT-06 / MGT-07）— 已实现
#### break-glass deprovisioning
[src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py)
`deprovision_user` 端点支持 `break_glass: true` 标记：
```python
class DeprovisionRequest:
reason: str | None = None
break_glass: bool = False # 高权限账户 break-glass 标记
```
`break_glass=True` 时审计记录 `source=break_glass`
（[audit.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py)
`SOURCE_BREAKGLASS`），用于事后追溯应急操作。
#### 应急流程
1. **隔离**：admin 通过 deprovision 端点强制销户
（`break_glass=True` + `reason` 说明）
2. **撤销**：自动撤销该用户全部活跃 session
3. **审计**：记录 actor/target/reason/source=break_glass/timestamp
4. **告警**：OTel span event `audit.deprovision` 接入审计通道
5. **通报**：由安全团队人工通报（AgentKit 不自动通报，避免误报）
#### 密钥泄露响应
[key-rotation-runbook.md §紧急轮换](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md)
「紧急轮换（泄露响应）」段落：
1. **隔离**：撤销泄露密钥（provider 控制台 / HSM / CA）
2. **轮换**：按对应 slot 步骤紧急轮换（不遵循「双密钥并行」原则，
直接切换到新密钥并废弃旧密钥）
3. **审计**：检索泄露密钥的使用日志，确认无异常调用
4. **通报**：通知安全团队 + 受影响用户
5. **复盘**：记录泄露原因，加固访问控制
### 3.3 变更管理（MGT-02 / MGT-05）— P0 补齐项
#### 已实现
- **Git 版本控制**：所有代码 / 配置 / Helm Chart 纳入 Git，
变更可追溯。
- **Helm Chart checksum**：ConfigMap 变更触发 Pod rollout
（[deployment.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml)
`checksum/config` annotation），配置变更自动生效。
- **配置同步**：[config_sync.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/config_sync.py)
支持配置版本管理 + 轮询同步。
- **审计记录**：所有 RBAC 变更、deprovision 操作记录审计
（[audit.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py)）。
#### P0 补齐项：CI/CD 流水线规范
**当前状态：P0**。CI/CD 流水线（GitHub Actions / Gitea Actions）规范
未文档化。
**P0 补齐计划**：
1. 新增 `docs/CI-CD-STANDARDS.md`，包含：
- 分支策略（feature 分支 → PR → main）
- 必须的 CI 检查（ruff + pytest + 镜像漏洞扫描 P0）
- 部署审批流程（Staging → Production）
- 回滚流程（Helm rollback）
2. CI 集成镜像漏洞扫描（详见 `03-host.md` §3.1 P0 补齐项）。
3. 部署变更审计：`kubectl rollout` 历史记录接入审计通道。
### 3.4 应急响应（MGT-03）— 待评估
**当前状态：待评估**。AgentKit 自身应急隔离能力已实现（销户 + session 撤销
+ 密钥紧急轮换），但**完整应急响应预案**需与客户安全团队协同：
- 事件分级标准（P0/P1/P2）
- 响应时限（P0 事件 15min 内响应）
- 通报链路（AgentKit admin → 客户安全团队 → 测评机构）
- 恢复流程（密钥轮换 → 服务恢复 → 数据完整性校验）
**建议**：客户安全团队基于本套等保文档 + AgentKit 应急能力
（销户/密钥轮换/审计日志）构建完整预案，并在认证前完成至少一次
桌面演练。
### 3.5 安全审计与评估（MGT-04）— P1 参考
**当前状态：P1**。AgentKit 审计日志已记录，但定期评估流程未建立。
#### 已实现
- **审计日志覆盖**：RBAC 变更 / deprovision / 终端命令 / SCIM 操作
全部记录审计
（[audit.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py)
+ [terminal_security.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py)）。
- **OTel 指标监控**：U1 OTel 暴露应用指标，可观测性平台监控异常
（[metrics.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py)）。
#### P1 补齐计划
1. **定期漏洞扫描**：每月对依赖执行 `pip-audit` / `safety` 扫描。
2. **代码安全评估**：每次重大版本发布前进行 SAST 扫描
（如 Bandit / Semgrep）。
3. **渗透测试**：认证后每年至少一次渗透测试（客户侧组织）。
4. **审计日志定期审查**：admin 每季度审查审计日志异常模式
（非自动告警，依赖人工 review — P1 可引入 SIEM 自动告警）。
### 3.6 配置管理（MGT-05）— 已实现
- **Helm values 标准化**：所有可配置项集中在
[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)，
含注释说明。
- **配置优先级**：CLI 参数 > `agentkit.yaml` > 环境变量（`${VAR:-default}`）
> `.env` > 硬编码默认值（AGENTS.md）。
- **配置版本管理**：[config_sync.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/config_sync.py)
支持配置版本 + 轮询同步。
- **密钥与配置分离**：含密钥的段（llm/auth/telemetry）由 env 注入，
不进 ConfigMap；非密配置进 ConfigMap
（[values.yaml](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml)
`config` 段注释）。
## 4. 测评建议
1. **MGT-01 / MGT-06 / MGT-07**：直接展示 key-rotation-runbook.md
+ secret-inventory.md + audit.py break_glass 流程即可。
2. **MGT-02 / MGT-05**：已实现部分展示 Helm Chart + config_sync，
P0 补齐 CI/CD 规范文档。
3. **MGT-03**：待评估，由客户安全团队基于本套文档构建完整预案。
4. **MGT-04**：P1 参考，写入整改计划（依赖扫描 + 季度审计 review）。
## 5. 密钥管理边界（重要说明）
AgentKit 密钥管理的**边界**：
1. **不持有 HSM/KMS 硬件**：HSM/KMS 由客户运维，AgentKit 通过
PKCS#11 PIN 访问（slot 8）。
2. **不签发证书**：TLS / mTLS 证书由客户 CA / cert-manager 签发，
AgentKit 仅消费。
3. **不托管 LLM provider 密钥**：DashScope/DeepSeek/OpenAI/Anthropic
的密钥在 provider 控制台生成，AgentKit 仅存储引用（slot 5）。
4. **多实例密钥同步**：进程内 IDP 注册表不持久化，多实例部署时
各进程独立加载 `agentkit.yaml`；证书热轮换需配合配置同步
（config_sync.py 轮询）或重启
（[idp_registry.py](file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py)
ponytail 注释）。

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# Fischer AgentKit — 等保三级控制点清单
#
# 按 GB/T 22239-2019 第三级 6 维度组织。每个控制点含：
# id — 控制点唯一标识（DIM-NN）
# dimension — 维度（physical / network / host / application / data / management）
# title — 控制点名称
# requirement — GB/T 22239-2019 三级要求摘要
# implementation — AgentKit 实现映射（含状态说明）
# status — implemented / p0 / p1 / 待评估
# implemented = 已实现，代码/配置已落地
# p0 = 认证 readiness 必需，POC 采购关闭前补齐
# p1 = 下一阶段补齐，写入整改计划
# 待评估 = 依赖客户侧或需进一步评估
# references — AgentKit 代码/配置文件绝对路径（file:/// 链接）
#
# 总计 44 个控制点：implemented=26, p0=6, p1=3, 待评估=9
# =============================================================================
# 1. 物理安全（6 个，全部待评估 — 依赖客户机房）
# =============================================================================
- id: "PHY-01"
dimension: physical
title: "物理访问控制"
requirement: "机房出入口配置电子门禁，记录进入人员和时间"
implementation: "AgentKit 不运维物理机房。K8s 部署在客户内网，物理访问由客户机房运营方控制。AgentKit 仅提供部署形态证明（非 root 容器 + Helm Chart）。"
status: "待评估"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml"
- id: "PHY-02"
dimension: physical
title: "防盗窃和防破坏"
requirement: "主要设备设置防盗标识，机房设置监控系统"
implementation: "无物理设备责任。K8s worker node 由客户运维，机房监控由客户方提供。"
status: "待评估"
references: []
- id: "PHY-03"
dimension: physical
title: "防雷击"
requirement: "机房设置防雷保安器，接地电阻符合要求"
implementation: "无防雷责任。依赖客户机房防雷设施。"
status: "待评估"
references: []
- id: "PHY-04"
dimension: physical
title: "防火"
requirement: "机房设置火灾自动消防系统，检测报警器"
implementation: "无消防责任。依赖客户机房消防系统。"
status: "待评估"
references: []
- id: "PHY-05"
dimension: physical
title: "防水和防潮"
requirement: "机房安装水敏检测装置，防止水管安装"
implementation: "无防水责任。依赖客户机房防水设施。"
status: "待评估"
references: []
- id: "PHY-06"
dimension: physical
title: "防静电"
requirement: "机房采用防静电地板，设置静电消除器"
implementation: "无防静电责任。依赖客户机房防静电设施。"
status: "待评估"
references: []
# =============================================================================
# 2. 网络安全（8 个）
# =============================================================================
- id: "NET-01"
dimension: network
title: "网络架构"
requirement: "划分网络区域，避免单点故障"
implementation: "单 Ingress 入口 + ClusterIP Service 架构。Ingress 是唯一对外入口，Redis/PG/OTel 全部 ClusterIP 内部访问。API 与 GUI 走分离路径（/api 与 /）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- id: "NET-02"
dimension: network
title: "边界防护（Ingress TLS）"
requirement: "边界实施访问控制和安全过滤"
implementation: "Ingress 启用 TLS 终止，所有外网流量强制 HTTPS。TLS 证书通过 cert-manager 自动续期或手动签发（365 天轮换），私钥通过 Sealed Secret / External Secret 注入（KTD-4 / R2a）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- id: "NET-03"
dimension: network
title: "访问控制（NetworkPolicy）"
requirement: "网络层访问控制策略，最小权限"
implementation: "P0 补齐项。Helm Chart 暂无 NetworkPolicy 模板，Pod 间东西向流量默认全通。计划新增 networkpolicy.yaml，默认 deny-all + 白名单放行（Ingress→Pod, Pod→Redis/PG/OTel）。当前缓解：Service 全部 ClusterIP，Redis/PG 由客户 K8s 网络策略保护。"
status: "p0"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml"
- id: "NET-04"
dimension: network
title: "入侵防范"
requirement: "网络入侵检测，恶意流量检测"
implementation: "应用层已实现 RateLimiter 滑动窗口限流 + Webhook 独立限流 + JWT/SCIM token 恒定时间比较。网络层 IDS/IPS 依赖客户骨干网络。P1：接入客户 SIEM，将 OTel 日志投递到客户入侵检测平台。"
status: "p1"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py"
- id: "NET-05"
dimension: network
title: "安全审计（OTel）"
requirement: "网络审计日志，覆盖关键网络活动"
implementation: "OpenTelemetry（U1 强制依赖）实现网络活动审计：FastAPI Instrumentor 自动埋点每个 HTTP 请求 span；RBAC 变更/SCIM 失败/终端命令写入审计 + OTel span event；OTLP gRPC 导出到内部 collector。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/setup.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- id: "NET-06"
dimension: network
title: "恶意代码防范"
requirement: "网络边界恶意代码检测"
implementation: "AgentKit 不在网络边界位置，恶意代码检测由客户网络骨干（防病毒网关/沙箱）负责。AgentKit 侧缓解：容器镜像来自可信 CI 构建，不在运行时下载可执行文件；终端命令受 6 层白名单 + 危险检测约束。"
status: "待评估"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py"
- id: "NET-07"
dimension: network
title: "安全审计日志保留（180 天）"
requirement: "日志保留期满足合规要求（≥180 天）"
implementation: "P0 补齐项。auth_audit_log 与 terminal_audit_logs 表无自动清理/归档策略。计划：Helm values 增加 audit.retentionDays=180（KTD-9），实现归档 CronJob 导出超过 180 天记录到对象存储并清理主表，OTel collector 配置 180 天保留策略。"
status: "p0"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py"
- id: "NET-08"
dimension: network
title: "资源控制（会话/带宽）"
requirement: "会话与带宽限制，防止资源耗尽"
implementation: "容器层 Pod resources requests/limits（CPU 250m~1000m / Mem 512Mi~2Gi）；应用层 RateLimiter IP 滑动窗口 + Webhook 独立限流；终端 session 1800s 闲置断开；JWT access 15min 强制重新认证。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/terminal_server.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py"
# =============================================================================
# 3. 主机安全（7 个，以容器/Pod 为单元）
# =============================================================================
- id: "HST-01"
dimension: host
title: "身份鉴别（ServiceAccount）"
requirement: "设备/系统身份标识与鉴别"
implementation: "AgentKit Pod 使用专用 ServiceAccount（不共享 default SA），Helm Chart 自动创建。可选 workload identity 注入 projected SA token 用于访问云 KMS/STS。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/serviceaccount.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- id: "HST-02"
dimension: host
title: "访问控制（Pod 安全上下文）"
requirement: "操作系统/账户权限最小化，远程管理受控"
implementation: "podSecurityContext.runAsNonRoot=true（UID/GID 1000）；securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation=false + capabilities.drop=[ALL]；readOnlyRootFilesystem=false（需写临时文件，通过 emptyDir 挂载 /tmp 隔离）；未启用特权模式。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/Dockerfile"
- id: "HST-03"
dimension: host
title: "安全审计（容器日志标准化采集）"
requirement: "设备审计日志，覆盖系统管理活动"
implementation: "已实现基础审计：stdout/stderr 由 K8s 采集 + OTel trace 导出 + auth_audit_log 表 + terminal_audit_logs 表 + OTel span event。P0 补齐：容器日志到客户日志平台的标准化采集链路 + 审计日志 JSON 化便于 SIEM 解析 + 180 天保留（与 NET-07 协同）。"
status: "p0"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/setup.py"
- id: "HST-04"
dimension: host
title: "入侵防范（容器层）"
requirement: "主机入侵检测，系统加固"
implementation: "容器层已实现：非 root + drop ALL capabilities 限制系统调用；allowPrivilegeEscalation=false 阻止提权；资源 limits 防失控；Liveness/Readiness 探针故障自动重启。node 层 HIDS（Falco/OSSEC）依赖客户侧。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml"
- id: "HST-05"
dimension: host
title: "恶意代码防范（主机防病毒）"
requirement: "主机防病毒，恶意代码检测"
implementation: "AgentKit 容器内不部署防病毒（无文件系统持久化，镜像来自可信 CI）。K8s node 层主机防病毒/HIDS 由客户运维。依赖客户机房 node 安全基线。"
status: "待评估"
references: []
- id: "HST-06"
dimension: host
title: "资源控制（CPU/内存/磁盘）"
requirement: "CPU/内存/磁盘限制，会话超时"
implementation: "Pod resources requests/limits（CPU 250m~1000m / Mem 512Mi~2Gi）；应用层 RateLimiter；终端 session 1800s 闲置断开；JWT access 15min / refresh 7d。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py"
- id: "HST-07"
dimension: host
title: "镜像与补丁管理"
requirement: "系统补丁及时更新，镜像来源可信"
implementation: "P0 补齐项。已实现：多阶段构建 + 非 root appuser（UID 1001）+ python:3.11-slim 基础镜像 + HEALTHCHECK。P0 待补：CI 集成 Trivy 镜像漏洞扫描（HIGH/CRITICAL 阻断）+ image.digest 不可变引用。P1 增强：distroless 基础镜像 + cosign 签名。"
status: "p0"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/Dockerfile"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
# =============================================================================
# 4. 应用安全（8 个，全部已实现 — AgentKit 核心责任）
# =============================================================================
- id: "APP-01"
dimension: application
title: "身份鉴别（SSO 多 IDP + JWT）"
requirement: "用户身份标识与鉴别，口令复杂度，登录失败处理"
implementation: "U4 SSO 多 IDP（OIDC authlib + SAML python3-saml，热证书轮换，R1a 按 sub 关联禁止邮箱合并）；本地密码 bcrypt rounds=12；JWT HS256 access 15min + refresh 7d（30d 记住我）含 sid+jti claims；refresh token 轮换 + reuse 检测撤销全 session；OAuth state CSRF 防护 TTL 5min 一次性消费。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/saml.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/password.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/denylist.py"
- id: "APP-02"
dimension: application
title: "访问控制（RBAC 3 级 + 终端 6 层）"
requirement: "基于角色的访问控制，最小权限，默认拒绝"
implementation: "3 级 RBAC（member/operator/admin）+ 9 权限位（CHAT/KB_QUERY/KB_WRITE/WORKFLOW_EXECUTE/TERMINAL_LOCAL_USE/TERMINAL_SERVER_USE/TERMINAL_WHITELIST_MANAGE/USER_MANAGE/SYSTEM_CONFIG）。R7a 终端安全 6 层白名单（blocklist→builtin→global→user→session→danger），shell 操作符永远绕过白名单强制走 danger detection。终端双层授权（RBAC 角色 + 个人授权标志）。SCIM token 恒定时间比较。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/permissions.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py"
- id: "APP-03"
dimension: application
title: "安全审计（OTel + audit.py）"
requirement: "应用审计日志，覆盖用户操作关键事件"
implementation: "U1 OTel 强制依赖。审计事件：role_change / deprovision（含 break_glass 标记），写入 auth_audit_log 表 + OTel span event（OTel 不可用降级 SQLite+日志）。SCIM 推送失败 span event scim.push.failure。终端命令审计 terminal_audit_logs（决策 + cwd + exit_code）。OTel 指标：agent.request.total / pii_filter.coverage 等。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py"
- id: "APP-04"
dimension: application
title: "通信完整性（TLS + JWT + Webhook 签名）"
requirement: "传输完整性保护，防篡改"
implementation: "传输层 Ingress TLS 终止（HTTPS）；JWT HS256 签名校验（篡改即失败）；Webhook 入站 fail-closed 签名校验失败返回 401；mTLS 客户端证书（Helm 预留 secrets.mtlsClientCert slot 用于下游 KMS/HSM）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/ingress.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py"
- id: "APP-05"
dimension: application
title: "软件容错（fallback + fail-closed）"
requirement: "错误处理，故障隔离，降级机制"
implementation: "LLM 网关多 provider fallback；OTel 运行时错误降级 NoOpTracer 不崩溃；PII 脱敏 fail-closed（异常拒绝发送不降级原文，默认 fail_closed=True）；专家团队全失败回退单 agent；U3 DR-fixes（bitable 字段校验 DR-1 / LastViewDeletionError DR-4 / 工具调用容错 DR-5）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/gateway.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/tracer.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/bitable/repository.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/bitable/service.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/tools/bitable_tool.py"
- id: "APP-06"
dimension: application
title: "资源控制（限流 + 会话超时）"
requirement: "会话并发控制，超时自动断开"
implementation: "RateLimiter IP 滑动窗口 + Webhook 独立限流 + nonce dedup；终端 session 1800s 闲置断开；JWT access 15min 过期；专家名称正则校验防注入；HandoffTransport 有界队列 maxsize=1024 + sentinel 关闭模式。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/middleware.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/terminal_server.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py"
- id: "APP-07"
dimension: application
title: "应用账户生命周期（SCIM 2.0 + JIT + deprovision）"
requirement: "开户/变更/销户审计，SCIM 自动化"
implementation: "SCIM 2.0 端点（POST/PATCH/GET Users，bearer token 恒定时间比较）；OIDC/SAML JIT 创建本地用户 + user_idp_links（R1a 按 sub 关联禁止邮箱合并，随机密码不可本地登录）；deprovision 端点禁用账户 + 撤销全 session + 审计（含 break_glass 标记）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- id: "APP-08"
dimension: application
title: "代码安全（输入验证 + 依赖管理）"
requirement: "输入验证，输出编码，依赖漏洞管理"
implementation: "Pydantic v2 模型校验（extra=forbid 拒绝未知字段，SCIM/IDP 配置均启用）；禁止 any 类型（项目规则，用 Pydantic 模型或 Unknown）；专家名称正则 _EXPERT_NAME_RE 防 SQL/命令注入；API Key 恒定时间比较 hmac.compare_digest；Ruff lint+format（py311）；pyproject.toml 锁定精确版本；终端 6 层白名单防命令注入链。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/models.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/terminal_security.py"
# =============================================================================
# 5. 数据安全（8 个）
# =============================================================================
- id: "DAT-01"
dimension: data
title: "数据完整性（PG + pgvector）"
requirement: "数据传输/存储完整性，校验机制"
implementation: "PostgreSQL 事务 ACID 保证 + pgvector 扩展存储向量记忆；SQLAlchemy 2 async ORM 应用层事务；JWT HS256 签名防篡改；Webhook fail-closed 签名校验；Pydantic extra=forbid 防数据注入。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/channels.py"
- id: "DAT-02"
dimension: data
title: "数据保密性（PII 脱敏 U2）"
requirement: "敏感数据加密存储/传输，密钥管理"
implementation: "U2 PII 脱敏 hook：正则版（手机/邮箱/身份证/银行卡）+ ner_hook（客户内网 NER 模型优先）+ fail-closed（异常拒绝发送不降级原文，默认 fail_closed=True）+ hash 审计（sha256 前 8 位，仅 hash 不含原文）。身份证正则优先于手机避免误匹配。OTel 指标 pii_filter.coverage / pii_filter.redacted。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py"
- id: "DAT-03"
dimension: data
title: "数据备份与恢复（PG backup runbook）"
requirement: "重要数据定期备份，恢复演练"
implementation: "P0 补齐项。已实现：PostgreSQL 持久化 + WAL 默认开启 + Redis AOF/RDB（客户运维）。P0 待补：新增 docs/deployment/pg-backup-runbook.md（每日 pg_dump 保留 7 天 + WAL 归档 PITR + 季度恢复演练 + 备份加密 SM4/AES-256）；Helm Chart 增加 backup 段（可选 pg-backup sidecar/CronJob）。"
status: "p0"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- id: "DAT-04"
dimension: data
title: "剩余信息保护（session revoke）"
requirement: "鉴别信息/文件/内存空间释放前清理"
implementation: "JWT V2 含 sid+jti claims，中间件校验 session 是否服务端撤销；销户撤销全 session；refresh token 轮换旧 token 进 denylist 30s 窗口；token reuse 检测撤销全 session；denylist 存 SHA-256 hash 不存明文；JIT/SCIM 用户随机密码不可本地登录。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/denylist.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py"
- id: "DAT-05"
dimension: data
title: "个人信息保护（PII 最小化）"
requirement: "PII 采集/处理/传输最小化与脱敏"
implementation: "PII 脱敏后原文不落盘（仅 hash 用于审计），LLM prompt 不含原文 PII；PII 按类型分级（id_card/phone/email/bank_card），不同类型 hash 独立记录；记忆 4 层架构（SOUL/USER/MEMORY/DAILY）按敏感度存储；数据最小化原则。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py"
- id: "DAT-06"
dimension: data
title: "数据采集与分类分级"
requirement: "按敏感度分级保护"
implementation: "PII 按 4 类分级（id_card/phone/email/bank_card）独立 hash 审计；记忆 4 层架构（SOUL 最敏感→DAILY 最不敏感）；PII 脱敏覆盖发送至 LLM 的 prompt（边界：不覆盖终端命令/上传文档/bitable 结构化数据，由客户自行控制）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py"
- id: "DAT-07"
dimension: data
title: "数据销毁"
requirement: "数据销毁审计，不可恢复"
implementation: "账户销户 deprovision 禁用账户+撤销全 session；审计记录不可删除（审计表无 delete 接口，admin 不可删除审计）；PII 原文脱敏后不落盘无需专门销毁；PG 数据销毁由客户 DBA 发起 SQL 记录审计。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- id: "DAT-08"
dimension: data
title: "国密算法合规（R11a）"
requirement: "敏感数据加密使用国密算法（政企客户要求）"
implementation: "P1 参考。当前使用国际算法：TLS（AES-GCM）/ bcrypt 密码哈希 / HS256 JWT / SHA-256 PII hash。未使用国密（SM2/SM3/SM4/SM9）。P1 升级路径：JWT 签名→SM2-HMAC、密码哈希→SM3（双算法并行兼容）、PII hash→SM3、TLS→国密套件、PG 字段级加密→SM4 TDE。注：国密不阻碍等保三级认证（三级要求加密而非国密），但政企客户常要求国密合规。"
status: "p1"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/jwt_utils.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/password.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py"
# =============================================================================
# 6. 管理安全（7 个）
# =============================================================================
- id: "MGT-01"
dimension: management
title: "密钥管理（10 secret slot + 轮换 runbook）"
requirement: "密钥生成/存储/分发/轮换/销毁"
implementation: "U5 10 个 secret slot（JWT/API Key/DB/IDP/第三方API/TLS/mTLS/KMS-HSM/OTel/Redis-PG）含轮换周期（90~365 天）。禁止明文 K8s Secret+Git 提交（KTD-4/R2a），后端二选一：Sealed Secrets 或 External Secrets Operator。SAML IDP 证书热轮换（不重启即时生效，idp_registry.update_certificate）。通用原则：零停机双密钥并行+审计先行+回滚预案+权限最小化。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/docs/deployment/secret-inventory.md"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py"
- id: "MGT-02"
dimension: management
title: "变更管理（CI/CD 规范）"
requirement: "变更审批/测试/回滚/审计"
implementation: "P0 补齐项。已实现：Git 版本控制所有代码/配置/Helm Chart；Helm Chart checksum/config annotation ConfigMap 变更触发 rollout；config_sync.py 配置版本管理+轮询同步；审计记录 RBAC 变更。P0 待补：新增 docs/CI-CD-STANDARDS.md（分支策略+CI 检查 ruff/pytest/镜像扫描+部署审批+回滚流程）；CI 集成镜像漏洞扫描（与 HST-07 协同）；部署变更审计接入。"
status: "p0"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/config_sync.py"
- id: "MGT-03"
dimension: management
title: "应急响应"
requirement: "应急事件处置流程，隔离/恢复"
implementation: "待评估。AgentKit 自身应急隔离能力已实现（销户+session 撤销+密钥紧急轮换，见 MGT-06/MGT-07），但完整应急响应预案需与客户安全团队协同：事件分级标准+响应时限+通报链路+恢复流程。建议客户基于本套等保文档+AgentKit 应急能力构建完整预案，认证前完成至少一次桌面演练。"
status: "待评估"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py"
- id: "MGT-04"
dimension: management
title: "安全审计与评估"
requirement: "定期安全评估，漏洞管理"
implementation: "P1 参考。已实现：审计日志覆盖 RBAC 变更/deprovision/终端命令/SCIM 操作；OTel 指标监控异常。P1 补齐：每月依赖漏洞扫描（pip-audit/safety）；每次重大版本发布前 SAST 扫描（Bandit/Semgrep）；认证后每年至少一次渗透测试（客户侧组织）；admin 每季度审查审计日志异常模式（P1 可引入 SIEM 自动告警）。"
status: "p1"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py"
- id: "MGT-05"
dimension: management
title: "配置管理（Helm values + 配置同步）"
requirement: "基线配置，配置变更审计"
implementation: "Helm values 标准化所有可配置项含注释；配置优先级 CLI>agentkit.yaml>环境变量>.env>硬编码默认；config_sync.py 配置版本管理+轮询同步；密钥与配置分离（含密钥段由 env 注入不进 ConfigMap，非密配置进 ConfigMap）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/config_sync.py"
- id: "MGT-06"
dimension: management
title: "应急通道（break-glass）"
requirement: "高权限应急通道，审计追溯"
implementation: "U4 R1b break-glass deprovisioning：/admin/users/{id}/deprovision 端点支持 break_glass=true 标记，审计记录 source=break_glass（SOURCE_BREAKGLASS）。流程：隔离（销户）→撤销全 session→审计（actor/target/reason/source/timestamp）→OTel span event audit.deprovision 接入审计通道→人工通报。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py"
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py"
- id: "MGT-07"
dimension: management
title: "密钥泄露响应"
requirement: "泄露检测/隔离/轮换/通报"
implementation: "key-rotation-runbook.md §紧急轮换（泄露响应）段落：1.隔离（撤销泄露密钥 provider控制台/HSM/CA）→2.轮换（按对应 slot 步骤紧急轮换，不遵循双密钥并行直接切换废弃旧密钥）→3.审计（检索泄露密钥使用日志确认无异常）→4.通报（安全团队+受影响用户）→5.复盘（记录原因加固访问控制）。"
status: "implemented"
references:
- "file:///Users/chiguyong/Code/Fischer-agentkit/docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md"

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# Fischer AgentKit — K8s 部署指南
本文档指导在原生 Kubernetes 1.28+ 集群上通过 Helm Chart 部署 Fischer AgentKit。
覆盖在线与离线两种安装场景，以及 Sealed Secrets / External Secrets 两种密钥后端。
## 1. 前置条件
| 组件 | 版本 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| Kubernetes | >= 1.28 | 原生 K8s（信创 K8s / OpenShift P1 支持） |
| Helm | 3.x | Chart 部署工具 |
| kubectl | 与集群对齐 | 集群操作 |
| docker / containerd | 任意 | 镜像构建与加载 |
集群需已部署以下 Operator 之一（二选一，对应 `secrets.backend`）：
- **Sealed Secrets**（`secrets.backend: sealed-secrets`）
- 安装：`helm install sealed-secrets sealed-secrets/sealed-secrets -n kube-system`
- 工具：`kubeseal`（用于生成 encryptedData）
- **External Secrets Operator**（`secrets.backend: external-secrets`）
- 安装：`helm install external-secrets external-secrets/external-secrets -n kube-system`
- 后端：Vault / AWS Secrets Manager / GCP Secret Manager / Azure Key Vault（运维预创建 SecretStore）
依赖中间件（Redis + PostgreSQL）需在命名空间内可达：
- Redis：`redis://redis:6379/0`（可指向集群内 Redis 或外部托管）
- PostgreSQL（含 pgvector 扩展）：`postgresql+asyncpg://agentkit@postgres:5432/agentkit`
> ponytail: Chart 默认不部署 Redis/PostgreSQL（避免与客户已有基础设施重复）。
> 升级路径：subchart 方式集成 bitnami/redis + bitnami/postgresql（P1）。
## 2. 在线安装
### 2.1 准备密钥
按 `docs/deployment/secret-inventory.md` 准备 11 个 secret slot 的明文值，
然后根据所选 backend 生成密钥资源。
**Sealed Secrets 方式**（推荐单集群 / 离线场景）：
```bash
# 1) 写明文到临时 Secret（注意：永远不要 git commit 明文 Secret）
kubectl create secret generic agentkit-secrets --dry-run=client -o yaml \
--from-literal=jwt-signing-key='<32字节随机串>' \
--from-literal=api-key='<apikey>' \
--from-literal=database-url='postgresql+asyncpg://agentkit:<pg-pwd>@postgres:5432/agentkit' \
--from-literal=idp-signing-certs='{"feishu":"-----BEGIN CERT..."}' \
--from-literal=third-party-api-keys='{"dashscope":"sk-...","deepseek":"sk-..."}' \
--from-literal=tls-server-cert='<pem>' \
--from-literal=mtls-client-cert='<pem>' \
--from-literal=kms-hsm-pin='<pin>' \
--from-literal=otel-exporter-token='Bearer <token>' \
--from-literal=redis-password='<redis-pwd>' \
--from-literal=postgres-password='<pg-pwd>' \
> /tmp/agentkit-secret-plaintext.yaml
# 2) 用 kubeseal 加密（需 controller 已运行）
kubeseal --controller-name=sealed-secrets --controller-namespace=kube-system \
--format yaml < /tmp/agentkit-secret-plaintext.yaml > agentkit-sealedsecret.yaml
# 3) 明文临时文件必须销毁
shred -u /tmp/agentkit-secret-plaintext.yaml
# 4) 应用 SealedSecret
kubectl apply -f agentkit-sealedsecret.yaml -n agentkit
```
**External Secrets 方式**（推荐多集群 / 云托管场景）：
```bash
# 1) 在 Vault / AWS SM / GCP SM 中预置 10 个 key（路径见 templates/external-secret.yaml remoteRef.key）
# 2) 创建 SecretStore（指向外部密钥后端）
kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: SecretStore
metadata:
name: agentkit-vault-store
namespace: agentkit
spec:
provider:
vault:
server: https://vault.internal:8200
path: secret
auth:
kubernetes:
mountPath: kubernetes
role: agentkit
EOF
# 3) Chart 安装时 secrets.backend=external-secrets 自动生成 ExternalSecret
```
### 2.2 helm install
```bash
# 创建 namespace
kubectl create namespace agentkit
# 安装（默认 sealed-secrets backend）
helm install agentkit deploy/helm/agentkit/ \
--namespace agentkit \
--set ingress.host=agentkit.your-domain.com \
--set image.repository=fischer-agentkit \
--set image.tag=0.1.0
# 或使用 External Secrets backend
helm install agentkit deploy/helm/agentkit/ \
--namespace agentkit \
--set secrets.backend=external-secrets \
--set secrets.externalSecret.secretStoreName=agentkit-vault-store \
--set ingress.host=agentkit.your-domain.com
# 或使用 override values 文件
helm install agentkit deploy/helm/agentkit/ \
--namespace agentkit \
-f values-prod.yaml
```
### 2.3 启用 workload identity（KMS/HSM）
```bash
helm install agentkit deploy/helm/agentkit/ \
--namespace agentkit \
--set workloadIdentity.enabled=true \
--set workloadIdentity.audience=sts.your-cloud.com
```
## 3. 离线安装
离线场景（政企内网无公网）需先在联网环境打包，再拷贝到离线集群安装。
### 3.1 联网环境打包
```bash
cd deploy/offline
make all IMAGE_REPO=fischer-agentkit IMAGE_TAG=0.1.0
# 产物：dist/agentkit-image-0.1.0.tar.gz + dist/agentkit-0.1.0.tgz
```
### 3.2 拷贝到离线集群
```bash
# 将整个 dist/ 目录拷贝到离线集群节点（scp / U 盘 / 内网传输）
scp -r dist/ user@offline-node:/opt/agentkit/dist
```
### 3.3 离线集群安装
```bash
ssh user@offline-node
cd /path/to/deploy/offline
make install DIST_DIR=dist NAMESPACE=agentkit RELEASE=agentkit
# install.sh 会：docker load 镜像 + helm install（image.pullPolicy=Never）
```
## 4. 安装后验证
```bash
# 1) Pod 状态
kubectl get pods -n agentkit
# 期望：agentkit-xxx 1/1 Running
# 2) Service / Ingress
kubectl get svc,ingress -n agentkit
# 3) 健康检查
# DEPLOY-1: 默认 release=agentkit 时 Deployment 名为 agentkit（fullname helper
# 在 release 名包含 chart 名时去重）。若改了 release 名，按 helm status 输出替换。
kubectl exec -n agentkit deploy/agentkit -- \
curl -s http://localhost:8001/api/v1/health
# 期望：{"status":"ok"}
# 4) Secret 已注入
kubectl exec -n agentkit deploy/agentkit -- env | grep -E 'JWT|API_KEY|DATABASE' | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/'
# 期望：所有 env 都有值（不为空）
# 5) helm 状态
helm status agentkit -n agentkit
```
## 5. 故障排查
### 5.1 Pod CrashLoopBackOff
```bash
# 查看日志
kubectl logs -n agentkit deploy/agentkit --tail=50
# 常见原因：
# - Secret 未注入：检查 SealedSecret 是否已解封（kubectl get sealedsecret -n agentkit）
# - DB 连接失败：检查 postgres 服务可达性 + DATABASE_URL 正确性
# - Redis 连接失败：检查 redis 服务 + REDIS_PASSWORD
```
### 5.2 SealedSecret 未解封
```bash
kubectl describe sealedsecret agentkit-secrets -n agentkit
# 若 status.conditions 显示 error，原因通常是：
# - sealed-secrets-controller 未运行（kubectl get pods -n kube-system | grep sealed-secrets）
# - 加密时用的 controller 与当前 controller 私钥不匹配（需重新 kubeseal）
```
### 5.3 ExternalSecret 同步失败
```bash
kubectl get externalsecret agentkit-secrets -n agentkit -o yaml
# 关注 status.conditions，常见：
# - SecretStore 不存在或不可达
# - Vault / SM 权限不足
# - remoteRef.key 在外部后端不存在
```
### 5.4 Ingress 不通
```bash
# 检查 ingress controller
kubectl get pods -n ingress-nginx
# 检查 TLS secret
kubectl get secret agentkit-tls -n agentkit
# 检查 DNS 解析到 ingress controller LB
```
## 6. 卸载
```bash
helm uninstall agentkit -n agentkit
kubectl delete namespace agentkit
# 注意：SealedSecret 解封后的明文 Secret 需手动删除
kubectl delete sealedsecret agentkit-secrets -n agentkit 2>/dev/null || true
```
## 7. 升级
```bash
# 镜像升级
helm upgrade agentkit deploy/helm/agentkit/ \
--namespace agentkit \
--set image.tag=0.2.0
# 配置变更
helm upgrade agentkit deploy/helm/agentkit/ \
--namespace agentkit \
-f values-prod.yaml
```
密钥轮换流程见 `docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md`。

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# Fischer AgentKit — 密钥轮换 Runbook
本文档给出全部 11 个 secret slot（KTD-4 / R2a）的轮换操作流程。
所有轮换遵循「双密钥并行 → 切换 → 旧密钥退役」原则，避免服务中断。
## 通用轮换原则
1. **零停机**：新密钥生效后再淘汰旧密钥，避免单点切换失败。
2. **审计先行**：轮换前记录当前密钥指纹（hash8），轮换后校验变更。
3. **回滚预案**：保留旧密钥值至少一个轮换周期，便于快速回滚。
4. **权限最小化**：轮换操作仅限归属角色，操作全程审计日志。
5. **后端无关**：以下步骤适用于 Sealed Secrets 与 External Secrets 两种后端，
差异处单独标注。
---
## Slot 1：JWT 签名密钥（90 天）
**影响**：所有签发的 JWT access/refresh token 失效，用户需重新登录。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) 生成新密钥（32 字节随机串，base64）
NEW_KEY=$(openssl rand -base64 32)
# 2) 更新密钥后端
# Sealed Secrets：
kubectl create secret generic agentkit-secrets-new --dry-run=client -o yaml \
--from-literal=jwt-signing-key="${NEW_KEY}" | \
kubeseal --controller-name=sealed-secrets --controller-namespace=kube-system \
--format yaml --merge-into agentkit-sealedsecret.yaml
# External Secrets：在 Vault/SM 中更新 agentkit/jwt-signing-key
# 3) 应用并等待同步
kubectl apply -f agentkit-sealedsecret.yaml -n agentkit
# DEPLOY-1: 用 instance 标签定位 Deployment — 避免硬编码 fullname 拼错。
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 4) 验证
kubectl exec -n agentkit deploy/agentkit -- \
python -c "import os; print('jwt key len:', len(os.environ['JWT_SIGNING_KEY']))"
# 5) 用户重新登录（旧 token 失效）
```
**回滚**：保留旧密钥值，若新密钥异常，恢复 SealedSecret/ExternalSecret 并 restart。
---
## Slot 2：API Key（180 天）
**影响**：使用旧 API Key 的客户端调用失败。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) 生成新 API Key
NEW_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
# 2) 更新密钥后端（同 Slot 1 步骤 2，key=api-key）
# 3) 通知所有使用 API Key 的客户端更新（agentkit pair 重新生成）
# 4) 应用并 restart
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 5) 验证：用新 key 调用 /api/v1/auth/me 或 SCIM 端点
```
**回滚**：恢复旧 key 值。
---
## Slot 3：DB 凭据 / DATABASE_URL（90 天）
**影响**：数据库连接断开，需与 DBA 协同。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) DBA 在 PostgreSQL 创建新密码（或新用户）
psql -U postgres -c "ALTER USER agentkit WITH PASSWORD 'new-pg-pwd';"
# 2) 更新 DATABASE_URL（含新密码）
NEW_URL="postgresql+asyncpg://agentkit:new-pg-pwd@postgres:5432/agentkit"
# 3) 更新密钥后端（key=database-url）
# 4) restart pod（连接池重建）
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 5) 验证：触发一次 DB 操作（如 GET /api/v1/memory）
# 6) DBA 回收旧密码（确认新连接正常后）
```
**注意**：PostgreSQL `ALTER USER` 立即生效，旧连接保持直到连接池重建。
建议在低峰期操作。
**回滚**：DBA 恢复旧密码 + 恢复 DATABASE_URL。
---
## Slot 4：IDP 签名证书（365 天）
**影响**：OIDC/SAML 登录校验失败。多 IDP 时仅影响轮换的 IdP。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) 从 IdP 管理后台导出新签名证书 PEM
# 2) 更新 JSON map（保留其他 IdP 证书不变）
# 例如轮换 feishu 证书：
NEW_CERTS='{"feishu":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n新证书\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----","azure_ad":"<原证书>"}'
# 3) 更新密钥后端（key=idp-signing-certs）
# 4) restart pod（证书热轮换不重启，但 Helm 部署需 restart 加载新 Secret）
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 5) 验证：通过该 IdP 发起一次 SSO 登录
```
**回滚**：恢复旧证书 JSON map。
---
## Slot 5：第三方 API Key / LLM providers（90 天）
**影响**：对应 provider 的 LLM 调用失败。JSON map 结构，单 provider 轮换不影响其他。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) 在 provider 控制台生成新 key（DashScope / DeepSeek / OpenAI / Anthropic）
# 2) 更新 JSON map（保留其他 provider 不变）
NEW_KEYS='{"dashscope":"sk-new1","deepseek":"sk-new2","openai":"sk-old"}'
# 3) 更新密钥后端（key=third-party-api-keys）
# 4) restart pod
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 5) 验证：调用对应 provider 的模型（如 agentkit chat 发一条测试消息）
# 6) 在 provider 控制台撤销旧 key
```
**回滚**：恢复旧 key（需 provider 控制台未撤销旧 key，建议保留旧 key 一个周期）。
---
## Slot 6：TLS 服务器证书（365 天）
**影响**：Ingress TLS 终止证书过期，浏览器告警 / mTLS 客户端握手失败。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) 签发新证书（cert-manager 自动续期，或手动从 CA 申请）
# cert-manager 模式：证书到期前自动续期，无需手动操作。
# 2) 若手动：更新 kubernetes.io/tls 类型 Secret
kubectl create secret tls agentkit-tls \
--cert=new.crt --key=new.key --dry-run=client -o yaml | \
kubectl apply -f - -n agentkit
# 3) Ingress controller 自动感知新证书（无需 restart）
# 4) 验证
echo | openssl s_client -connect agentkit.your-domain.com:443 -servername agentkit.your-domain.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -dates
```
**注意**：本 slot 不在 SealedSecret/ExternalSecret 的 encryptedData 内统一管理
（TLS Secret 类型为 `kubernetes.io/tls`，与普通 Secret 不同）。
SealedSecret 模板中登记仅用于清单追踪，实际由 cert-manager 或运维单独管理。
**回滚**：恢复旧证书 Secret。
---
## Slot 7：mTLS 客户端证书（180 天）
**影响**：与下游服务（KMS/HSM、内部 API）mTLS 握手失败。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) 从内部 PKI 签发新客户端证书 + 私钥 + CA 证书
# 2) 更新密钥后端（key=mtls-client-cert，PEM 文本）
NEW_PEM="$(cat client.crt client.key ca.crt)"
# 3) 更新密钥后端
# 4) restart pod
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 5) 验证：触发一次 mTLS 调用（如 KMS 签名操作）
```
**回滚**：恢复旧 PEM。
---
## Slot 8：KMS/HSM PKCS#11 PIN（365 天）
**影响**：HSM 访问失败，密钥托管 / 签名 / 解密不可用。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) HSM 管理员通过 HSM 管理工具轮换 PIN（具体命令依 HSM 型号）
# 2) 更新密钥后端（key=kms-hsm-pin）
NEW_PIN='<new-pin>'
# 3) restart pod
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 4) 验证：触发一次 HSM 操作（如 PKCS#11 签名）
```
**注意**：HSM PIN 轮换需物理 / 管理员协同，建议提前预约维护窗口。
**回滚**：恢复旧 PIN（HSM 管理工具支持回滚 PIN）。
---
## Slot 9：OTel exporter token（90 天）
**影响**：遥测数据上报失败（trace/metrics 丢失）。服务本身不受影响。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) 在 OTel collector / 可观测性平台生成新 token
# 2) 更新密钥后端（key=otel-exporter-token）
# DEPLOY-5: OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS 期望 'key=value' 格式（OTel SDK 规范），
# 不是裸 'Bearer <token>'。secret 值必须形如 'Authorization=Bearer <token>'。
NEW_TOKEN='Authorization=Bearer new-otel-token'
# 3) restart pod
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 4) 验证：在 collector 端确认收到新 trace/metrics
```
**回滚**：恢复旧 token。
---
## Slot 10：Redis-PG 密码（90 天）
**影响**：Redis / PostgreSQL 连接断开。需与基础设施层协同。
**步骤**：
```bash
# 1) Redis 轮换密码
redis-cli -a '<old-redis-pwd>' CONFIG SET requirepass '<new-redis-pwd>'
# 2) PostgreSQL 轮换密码（DBA）
psql -U postgres -c "ALTER USER agentkit WITH PASSWORD 'new-pg-pwd';"
# 3) 更新密钥后端（两个 key：redis-password + postgres-password）
# 4) 更新 Redis 服务配置（若 Redis 由 docker-compose / StatefulSet 管理，
# 需同步更新 requirepass 并 restart Redis）
# 5) restart agentkit pod
kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=agentkit -n agentkit
# 6) 验证
kubectl exec -n agentkit deploy/agentkit -- \
python -c "import redis,os; redis.from_url(os.environ['REDIS_URL'],password=os.environ['REDIS_PASSWORD']).ping()"
```
**注意**：Redis `CONFIG SET requirepass` 立即生效，旧连接保持到断开。
建议低峰期操作，且 Redis 持久化配置（redis.conf）需同步更新，避免重启后失效。
**回滚**：恢复 Redis / PG 旧密码 + 恢复 Secret。
---
## 紧急轮换（泄露响应）
发生密钥泄露时，立即按以下流程处置：
1. **隔离**：撤销泄露密钥（provider 控制台 / HSM / CA）
2. **轮换**：按上述对应 slot 步骤紧急轮换
3. **审计**：检索泄露密钥的使用日志，确认无异常调用
4. **通报**：通知安全团队 + 受影响用户
5. **复盘**：记录泄露原因，加固访问控制
紧急轮换不遵循「双密钥并行」原则，直接切换到新密钥并废弃旧密钥。

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# Fischer AgentKit — 密钥清单（Secret Inventory）
本文档列出 Helm Chart 涉及的全部 11 个 secret slot（KTD-4 / R2a），
每个 slot 含：名称、用途、来源、轮换周期、归属角色、对应环境变量。
> 密钥后端二选一：Sealed Secrets（`secrets.backend: sealed-secrets`）或
> External Secrets Operator（`secrets.backend: external-secrets`）。
> 禁止明文 Kubernetes Secret + Git 提交。
## 密钥清单总表
| # | Slot 名称 | Secret Key | 环境变量 | 用途 | 来源 | 轮换周期 | 归属 |
|---|-----------|-----------|----------|------|------|----------|------|
| 1 | JWT 签名密钥 | `jwt-signing-key` | `JWT_SIGNING_KEY` | JWT access(15m)/refresh(7d) token HS256 签名 | 运维生成（32+ 字节随机串） | 90 天 | 安全团队 |
| 2 | API Key | `api-key` | `API_KEY` | 服务间调用 / SCIM bearer / `agentkit pair` 鉴权 | 运维生成 | 180 天 | 平台运维 |
| 3 | DB 凭据 | `database-url` | `DATABASE_URL` | 应用层 PG 连接 DSN（含用户名+密码） | DBA 提供 | 90 天 | DBA |
| 4 | IDP 签名证书 | `idp-signing-certs` | `IDP_SIGNING_CERTS` | OIDC/SAML IdP 签名证书 PEM（JSON map，多 IDP 热轮换） | 各 IDP 管理员提供 | 365 天 | 身份团队 |
| 5 | 第三方 API Key | `third-party-api-keys` | `THIRD_PARTY_API_KEYS` | LLM provider API Key（JSON map，DashScope/DeepSeek/OpenAI/Anthropic） | 各 provider 控制台 | 90 天 | LLM 运维 |
| 6 | TLS 服务器证书 | `tls-server-cert` | （Ingress TLS Secret） | Ingress TLS 终止证书 + 私钥 | 证书签发机构 / cert-manager | 365 天 | 平台运维 |
| 7 | mTLS 客户端证书 | `mtls-client-cert` | `MTLS_CLIENT_CERT` | 与下游服务（KMS/HSM、内部 API）双向 TLS 客户端证书 | 内部 PKI | 180 天 | 安全团队 |
| 8 | KMS/HSM PKCS#11 PIN | `kms-hsm-pin` | `KMS_HSM_PIN` | 硬件安全模块 PKCS#11 访问 PIN | HSM 管理员 | 365 天 | HSM 运维 |
| 9 | OTel exporter token | `otel-exporter-token` | `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS` | OTLP collector 鉴权（DEPLOY-5: 值格式 `Authorization=Bearer <token>`，非裸 Bearer） | 可观测性平台 | 90 天 | 可观测性团队 |
| 10 | Redis 密码 | `redis-password` | `REDIS_PASSWORD` | Redis requirepass（基础设施层，应用通过 env 消费） | DBA / 缓存运维 | 90 天 | DBA |
| 11 | PostgreSQL 密码 | `postgres-password` | `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`（仅 PG StatefulSet） | PostgreSQL POSTGRES_PASSWORD（DEPLOY-4: 应用不读此 env，通过 DATABASE_URL Slot 3 内嵌密码连接） | DBA | 90 天 | DBA |
## 风险等级
| Slot | 泄露影响 | 风险等级 |
|------|----------|----------|
| 1 JWT 签名密钥 | 任意伪造身份 token | 高 |
| 2 API Key | 服务间冒充 / SCIM 越权 | 高 |
| 3 DB 凭据 | 数据库全量读写 | 严重 |
| 4 IDP 签名证书 | SSO 信任链断裂（不能直接伪造，需配合 IdP 私钥） | 中 |
| 5 第三方 API Key | LLM 账单盗刷 / 数据外泄 | 高 |
| 6 TLS 服务器证书 | TLS 中间人 / 域名冒充 | 高 |
| 7 mTLS 客户端证书 | 内部 API 越权访问 | 高 |
| 8 KMS/HSM PIN | 密钥托管被解锁 / 加解密被滥用 | 严重 |
| 9 OTel token | 遥测数据投毒 / 窃取 | 中 |
| 10 Redis-PG 密码 | 缓存/数据库越权 | 严重 |
## 存储位置
所有 secret slot 渲染到统一 Kubernetes Secret（名 `<release>-secrets`），
由 SealedSecret 或 ExternalSecret 控制器自动创建 / 同步：
```
<release>-secrets (Secret)
├── jwt-signing-key
├── api-key
├── database-url
├── idp-signing-certs
├── third-party-api-keys
├── tls-server-cert
├── mtls-client-cert
├── kms-hsm-pin
├── otel-exporter-token
├── redis-password
└── postgres-password
```
deployment.yaml 通过 `env.valueFrom.secretKeyRef` 引用上述全部 key。
TLS 服务器证书（slot 6）额外被 Ingress 的 `tls.secretName` 引用
（需由 cert-manager 或运维单独创建为 `kubernetes.io/tls` 类型 Secret）。
## 轮换流程
详见 `docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md`。

182
docs/residual-review-findings/feat-enterprise-agent-platform-p0-3cf29f4.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
# Residual Review Findings — feat/enterprise-agent-platform-p0
**Source**: ce-code-review run on commit range `8633f60..3cf29f4`
**Branch**: `feat/enterprise-agent-platform-p0`
**HEAD**: `3cf29f4`
**Tracker availability**: no named tracker documented; `gh` CLI not installed;
`any_sink_available = false` — all findings routed to `no_sink` bucket per
lfg `references/tracker-defer.md` non-interactive mode.
These findings were surfaced by the multi-agent code review (5 reviewer
subagents: security + adversarial, performance + reliability,
maintainability + standards, api-contract + data-migration, deployment
verification). They are **actionable** (`autofix_class: manual`) but were
**not applied** in Step 5 because they need design input or app+chart
coordinated changes. They are durably recorded here per lfg SKILL.md Step 6.
## P1 — High-impact defects
- **P1 / `src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py` + `src/agentkit/llm/gateway.py`** —
PERF-1: PII 脱敏模块未接入生产 LLM 调用路径（死代码）。`filter_messages_pii`
仅被单元测试引用，gateway.py 的 chat()/chat_stream() 直接透传原始 messages。
等保合规声称的 PII 保护实际未生效。**Fix**: 在 gateway chat() 接入
`filter_messages_pii(messages, fail_closed=True)`，从 `agentkit.yaml` 读
PII 配置开关和 ner_hook 路径。
- **P1 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:233-238`** —
API-1: SCIM GET /Users 的 `totalResults` 返回当前页条数而非全量总数
（违反 RFC 7644 3.4.2）。当用户总数 > count 时，SCIM 客户端无法得知真实
总数，分页逻辑错误。**Fix**: 在列表查询前先执行 `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM
users {where}` 复用同一 where 子句和参数。
- **P1 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:50-64,107-151,154-197,200-238`** —
API-2: SCIM 错误响应使用 FastAPI 默认 `{"detail": "..."}` 而非 RFC 7644
3.12 规定的 `{"schemas": ["urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:Error"],
"status": "409", "detail": "..."}`。同文件中定义的 `SCIMErrorResponse` 是
死代码。**Fix**: 添加 SCIM 异常处理器转换所有 HTTPException 为 SCIM
ErrorResponse 格式。
- **P1 / `src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py:804-815,823-827`** —
API-4: `_sso_issue_token_pair` 用占位符 `refresh_token="__pending_sso__"`
创建 session，并发 SSO 登录会触发 `refresh_token_hash` UNIQUE 约束冲突
抛 IntegrityError → 500。即使不考虑并发，两步写入也不原子，第二步失败
会留下孤儿 session。**Fix**: 先 `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)` 生成真实
refresh token 再 `SessionCreate` 一步创建。
- **P1 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:107-151`** —
API-5: SCIM `create_user` 不写入 `user_idp_links`，导致 SCIM 预配的用户
无法 SSO 登录（OIDC 会 JIT 创建重复账户）。SCIM 的核心价值就是预配 + SSO
联动，此处断裂使 SCIM 预配失效。**Fix**: SCIM create_user 接受
`externalId` 作为 idp_subject，INSERT users 后 INSERT user_idp_links。
- **P1 / `deploy/offline/scripts/install.sh:58` + docs** —
DEPLOY-1: 部署名引用错误。fullname helper 在 release=agentkit 时渲染
Deployment 名为 `agentkit`，但 install.sh:58 + 11 处文档引用
`agentkit-agentkit`（不存在）。**Fix**: 改用标签选择器
`kubectl rollout restart deployment -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=${RELEASE}`。
- **P1 / `deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml:88-92`** —
DEPLOY-2: Redis 鉴权断裂。`REDIS_PASSWORD` env 注入但应用从不消费
（`src/agentkit/**/*.py` 零命中），Redis 客户端通过 `redis_url` 构造
（`redis://redis:6379/0`，无密码）。若 Redis 启用密码，pod 全部 Redis
操作 NOAUTH 失败。**Fix**: 在 redis 客户端构造处读取 `REDIS_PASSWORD`
并以 `password=` 参数传入 `from_url`，或将密码拼入 redis_url。
## P2 — Moderate issues with meaningful downside
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:107-151`** —
API-6: SCIM POST /Users 缺少 `Location` 响应头（RFC 7644 3.14 强制要求）。
**Fix**: 用 `JSONResponse` + `response.headers["Location"] = ...`。
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:183-187`** —
API-7: SCIM PATCH userName 更新未处理 UNIQUE 约束冲突，返回 500 而非
409。**Fix**: 包在 try/except `aiosqlite.IntegrityError` 中返回 409。
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py:812`** —
API-8: `_sso_issue_token_pair` 硬编码 `auth_provider="sso"`，丢失 OIDC/SAML
区分。admin UI 无法按 IDP 筛选 session。**Fix**: 增加 `provider_name` +
`provider_type` 参数。
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:216-225`** —
API-9: SCIM filter 语法不匹配时静默返回全量用户，可能导致数据泄露。
**Fix**: 不支持的 filter 返回 400 + `scimType=invalidFilter`。
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py:1040-1085,1097-1143`** —
API-10: `deprovision_user` / `change_user_role` 返回 untyped `dict[str, Any]`，
OpenAPI schema 无法文档化。**Fix**: 定义 `DeprovisionResponse` /
`RoleChangeResponse` Pydantic 模型。
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:94-104`** —
API-11: SCIM `_user_to_scim` 用 `username` 作为 `displayName`，语义错误。
**Fix**: 改为 `None` 让客户端 fallback。
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/models.py:612-620`** —
MIG-1: `user_idp_links` 表无 ON DELETE 行为且无 FK 约束到 users。当前无
删除路径，但未来引入 GDPR 物理删除时会产生孤儿链接。**Fix**: 引入物理
删除时加 `REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE`。
- **P2 / `deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml:58-62,93-97`** —
DEPLOY-4: PG 密码双源不一致。`DATABASE_URL`（被消费） 与 `POSTGRES_PASSWORD`
（死 env）并存。runbook Slot 10 轮换 `postgres-password` 但应用实际用
`DATABASE_URL`。**Fix**: 明确单一可信源 — 若只用 `DATABASE_URL`，移除
`POSTGRES_PASSWORD` env 与 `postgresPassword` slot。
- **P2 / `deploy/helm/agentkit/templates/deployment.yaml:83-87`** —
DEPLOY-5: OTel exporter token 值格式与 `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS` 语义
不符。期望 `key=value` 格式，但存储值为 `Bearer <token>`。**Fix**: 改为
`Authorization=Bearer <token>` 格式。
- **P2 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py` (7 处) + `scim/models.py`** —
STAND-1: SCIM router 使用 `typing.Any` 7 处，违反 AGENTS.md 禁用 any 规则。
**Fix**: 定义 `SCIMUserResponse` / `SCIMUserListResponse` Pydantic 模型。
## P3 — Low-impact / narrow scope
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py:185-197`** —
SEC-2: OIDC id_token 未按规范验签（key=None + 关闭 iss/exp）。当前
authlib 1.6.12 fail-closed，非直接绕过，但规范违反且脆弱。**Fix**: 用
IDP JWKS 公钥验签，校验 iss/aud/exp。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:170-185`** —
SEC-3: SCIM PATCH deprovisioning（`active=false`）不写审计。admin 同等
操作有审计，SCIM 没有。**Fix**: 检测到 active true→false 时调用
`record_deprovision(source=SOURCE_SCIM)`。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/llm/gateway.py:401-414`** —
PERF-6: 流式路径在无 usage 数据时记录"cache miss"，指标误导。**Fix**:
仅当 `final_usage` 非 None 时才记录 cache metric。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/llm/gateway.py:450-457`** —
PERF-7: 非 Anthropic provider 调用膨胀 `prompt_cache.miss` 计数器。
**Fix**: 仅对 Anthropic provider 记录 cache metric。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:171-187`** —
API-12: SCIM PATCH 静默忽略不支持的 op/path，无错误反馈。**Fix**:
收集 skipped ops 并返回 400 + `scimType=noTarget`。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:200-238`** —
API-13: SCIM filter 解析对属性名和操作符大小写敏感，违反 RFC 7644
3.4.2.2。**Fix**: 用 `filter.lower()` + 正则 `re.IGNORECASE`。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py:154-197`** —
API-14: SCIM PATCH `op.path==None` 时仅更新 active，丢弃 value 中的其他
字段（部分实现静默丢数据）。**Fix**: 遍历 value 的 keys 对每个已知属性
执行对应 UPDATE。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/auth/models.py:609-639`** —
MIG-2: schema 迁移幂等但缺少 V4→V5 的显式迁移记录。**Fix**: 未来新增列
时按 schema_version 差值执行 ALTER TABLE。
- **P3 / `deploy/helm/agentkit/values.yaml:8-11`** —
DEPLOY-9: 镜像仅 tag 固定（0.1.0），未做 digest pinning。政企生产场景
要求 digest pinning 防篡改。**Fix**: 支持可选 `image.digest` 字段。
- **P3 / `docs/deployment/key-rotation-runbook.md:254-283`** —
DEPLOY-8: runbook 仅 Slot 1-10，缺独立 Slot 11（PG 密码）段落。**Fix**:
拆为两节，Slot 11 内注明须同步更新 `database-url`（Slot 3）。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/bitable/service.py:564-568`** —
MAINT-2: `delete_view` 将两种不同失败原因统一抛 `LastViewDeletionError`，
误导性错误信息。**Fix**: 区分 `DELETED`/`LAST_VIEW`/`NOT_FOUND` 三态。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/frontend/src/stores/chatStream.ts:881-887,923-929`** —
MAINT-3: `team_synthesis_chunk` 与 `team_synthesis` 重复同一 `findLastMessage`
谓词。**Fix**: 提取 `findStreamingSynthesisMilestone(conv, sid)` helper。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/frontend/tests/unit/bitable-tokens.test.ts:75,81,85`** —
MAINT-4: token 声明正则转义重复 3 次。**Fix**: 提取 `tokenDeclPattern(token)`
helper。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/frontend/tests/unit/bitable-tokens.test.ts:92`** —
STAND-2: test "outside root" 用 replace 仅替换首个 `:root` 块。**Fix**:
加 `g` 标志 `replace(/:root\s*\{[^}]*\}/g, '')`。
- **P3 / `src/agentkit/server/app.py:1401`** —
STAND-3: SCIM router 挂载在 `/api/v1` 前缀下，偏离 RFC 7644 标准 SCIM
路径 `/scim/v2`。**Fix**: SCIM router 单独挂载不加 `/api/v1` 前缀。
---
**Total residual findings**: 27 (P1=7, P2=10, P3=10)
**Applied in Step 5**: 9 fixes (commit `3cf29f4`)
**Deferred to follow-up**: 27 (this file)

8
pyproject.toml
View File

@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ dependencies = [
"pyjwt>=2.8",
"bcrypt>=4.0",
"aiosqlite>=0.20",
# U4 SSO 集成 — OIDC (authlib) + SAML 2.0 (python3-saml)
"authlib>=1.3",
"python3-saml>=1.16",
# 加密 secrets store (U10 — 多端消息适配器 AES-256-GCM)
"cryptography>=42.0",
# U15 — LiteLLM 统一 Provider 适配层（替换 6 个直接 API provider）
@ -50,6 +53,11 @@ dependencies = [
# 异步任务队列（U8 — 文档向量化）
"taskiq>=0.11",
"taskiq-redis>=0.5",
# OTel 可观测性（U1 — 默认启用，从 optional 升级为 required，移除 ImportError 静默回退）
"opentelemetry-api>=1.24",
"opentelemetry-sdk>=1.24",
"opentelemetry-exporter-otlp-proto-grpc>=1.24",
"opentelemetry-instrumentation-fastapi>=0.45b0",
]
[project.scripts]

66
src/agentkit/bitable/repository.py
View File

@ -39,6 +39,26 @@ from agentkit.bitable.models import (
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# U3/DR-1: field_id 在 jsonb_set path 与 where 子句中走字符串插值（jsonb path 不支持绑定参数）。
# 防御性校验：field_id 必须匹配 UUID 格式，拒绝任意字符串插值到 SQL 结构。
# ponytail: ceiling — 仅覆盖 field_id；其余 SQL 结构（op / direction）已由 service 层白名单枚举校验。
# 升级路径：迁移到 ORM JSON 函数（sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql.jsonb_*）彻底消除字符串插值。
_FIELD_ID_RE = re.compile(
r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$"
)
def _validate_field_id(field_id: str, *, context: str = "") -> str:
"""校验 field_id 是 UUID 格式（DR-1 防御性校验）。
field_id 在 jsonb_set path 与 SQL where 子句中走字符串插值（jsonb path 不支持绑定参数），
必须确保非系统 UUID 不进入 SQL 结构。校验失败抛 ValueError。
"""
if not isinstance(field_id, str) or not _FIELD_ID_RE.match(field_id):
ctx = f" ({context})" if context else ""
raise ValueError(f"Invalid field_id format{ctx}: {field_id!r} — expected UUID")
return field_id
class BitableRepository:
"""Async repository for bitable CRUD operations.
@ -375,7 +395,9 @@ class BitableRepository:
return [Record.model_validate(e) for e in entities], next_cursor
async def update_record_values(self, record_id: str, values: dict[str, object]) -> Record | None:
async def update_record_values(
self, record_id: str, values: dict[str, object]
) -> Record | None:
"""Update a record's values (full replace)."""
async with self._session_factory() as session:
stmt = (
@ -464,9 +486,31 @@ class BitableRepository:
await session.commit()
return View.model_validate(entity) if entity else None
async def delete_view(self, view_id: str) -> bool:
"""Delete a view. Returns True if a row was deleted."""
async def delete_view_if_not_last(self, view_id: str, table_id: str) -> bool:
"""Atomically delete a view only if it's not the last one in its table (DR-4 TOCTOU fix).
Uses ``SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`` in a single transaction to lock sibling
rows for the duration of the count + delete, preventing concurrent
``delete_view`` calls from racing past the last-view check and leaving
the table with zero views.
Returns:
True if the view was deleted.
False if NOT deleted because it would be the last view (or the
view doesn't belong to the given table_id).
"""
async with self._session_factory() as session:
# Lock all sibling views — concurrent delete_view calls on the
# same table block here until this transaction commits.
lock_sql = text(
"SELECT id FROM bitable.bitable_views WHERE table_id = :table_id FOR UPDATE"
)
result = await session.execute(lock_sql, {"table_id": table_id})
sibling_ids = {str(row[0]) for row in result.fetchall()}
if len(sibling_ids) <= 1:
return False # Last view — refuse to delete
if view_id not in sibling_ids:
return False # View doesn't belong to this table_id
result = await session.execute(delete(ViewModel).where(ViewModel.id == view_id))
await session.commit()
return result.rowcount > 0
@ -646,9 +690,13 @@ class BitableRepository:
return
import json
# U3/DR-1: 校验所有 field_id 是 UUID 格式后再插值到 jsonb_set path（防御性，避免 SQL 结构注入）
for fid in agent_field_values:
_validate_field_id(fid, context="upsert_record_agent_fields")
async with self._session_factory() as session:
# Build nested jsonb_set: jsonb_set(jsonb_set(values, '{f1}', CAST(:v0 AS jsonb), true), ...)
# ponytail: field_ids are system UUIDs, safe to interpolate into path literals.
# ponytail: field_ids validated above as UUID format, safe to interpolate into path literals.
# Use CAST(:param AS jsonb) instead of :param::jsonb — asyncpg dialect
# misparses the `::` as part of the param name.
inner = "values"
@ -684,9 +732,17 @@ class BitableRepository:
import base64
import json as _json
# U3/DR-1: 校验 filters/sorts 中的 field_id 是 UUID 格式后再插值到 SQL 结构
if filters:
for f in filters:
_validate_field_id(f["field_id"], context="list_records_filtered.filter")
if sorts:
for s in sorts:
_validate_field_id(s["field_id"], context="list_records_filtered.sort")
async with self._session_factory() as session:
# Build raw SQL with JSONB filter/sort translation.
# ponytail: field_ids in filters/sorts are system UUIDs (validated by service layer).
# ponytail: field_ids validated above as UUID format, safe to interpolate into SQL structure.
where_clauses = ["table_id = :table_id"]
params: dict[str, object] = {"table_id": table_id}

19
src/agentkit/bitable/service.py
View File

@ -545,23 +545,28 @@ class BitableService:
return await self._repo.get_view(view_id)
async def delete_view(self, view_id: str) -> bool:
"""Delete a view with last-view protection (U6).
"""Delete a view with last-view protection (U6, DR-4 TOCTOU fix).
Raises :class:`LastViewDeletionError` if the view is the last one in
its table — preventing users from making a table inaccessible. The
route layer is responsible for the 404 + ownership checks before
calling this (matching the existing ``delete_field`` pattern).
Returns True if a row was deleted.
DR-4: delegates to ``repo.delete_view_if_not_last`` which atomically
checks sibling count + deletes in a single ``SELECT FOR UPDATE``
transaction, eliminating the TOCTOU race between ``list_views`` count
and ``delete_view`` execution.
"""
view = await self._repo.get_view(view_id)
if view is None:
return False
siblings = await self._repo.list_views(view.table_id)
if len(siblings) <= 1:
raise LastViewDeletionError(
"Cannot delete the last view of a table"
)
return await self._repo.delete_view(view_id)
deleted = await self._repo.delete_view_if_not_last(view_id, view.table_id)
if not deleted:
# Either it was the last view, or a concurrent call raced ahead.
# Either way, the invariant "table has at least 1 view" is preserved.
raise LastViewDeletionError("Cannot delete the last view of a table")
return True
# ── Recalc (U3: formula recalc pipeline) ────────────────

28
src/agentkit/bus/redis_bus.py
View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import os
from typing import Callable, Awaitable
from agentkit.bus.message import AgentMessage
@ -41,7 +42,13 @@ class RedisMessageBus:
"""获取 Redis 连接（懒初始化）。"""
if self._redis is None:
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(self._redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._redis
def _stream_key(self, agent_name: str) -> str:
@ -101,7 +108,10 @@ class RedisMessageBus:
# Create consumer group if not exists
try:
await redis.xgroup_create(
stream_key, self._consumer_group, id="0", mkstream=True,
stream_key,
self._consumer_group,
id="0",
mkstream=True,
)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
@ -141,7 +151,11 @@ class RedisMessageBus:
logger.warning(f"Failed to process message {msg_id}: {e}")
# Move to dead letter after max retries
await self._handle_failed_message(
redis, stream_key, msg_id, fields, agent_name,
redis,
stream_key,
msg_id,
fields,
agent_name,
)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
break
@ -194,9 +208,7 @@ class RedisMessageBus:
await self.publish(message)
return await asyncio.wait_for(future, timeout=timeout)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
raise TimeoutError(
f"Request {message.correlation_id} timed out after {timeout}s"
)
raise TimeoutError(f"Request {message.correlation_id} timed out after {timeout}s")
finally:
self._pending_requests.pop(message.correlation_id, None)
@ -256,6 +268,7 @@ def create_message_bus(
if backend == "redis":
try:
import redis.asyncio as aioredis # noqa: F401
bus = RedisMessageBus(
redis_url=redis_url,
consumer_group=consumer_group,
@ -267,8 +280,7 @@ def create_message_bus(
raise
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — factory fallback to InMemoryMessageBus; must catch import/init errors broadly
logger.warning(
f"Failed to initialise RedisMessageBus ({exc}), "
f"falling back to InMemoryMessageBus"
f"Failed to initialise RedisMessageBus ({exc}), falling back to InMemoryMessageBus"
)
bus = InMemoryMessageBus()

8
src/agentkit/core/base.py
View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import os
import time
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator
@ -266,7 +267,12 @@ class BaseAgent(ABC):
if redis_url:
try:
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
await self._redis.ping()
logger.info(f"Agent '{self.name}' connected to Redis")
except (ConnectionError, OSError, asyncio.TimeoutError, ValueError) as e:

7
src/agentkit/core/config_driven.py
View File

@ -394,7 +394,12 @@ class ConfigDrivenAgent(BaseAgent, EvolutionMixin):
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
redis_url = config.memory["working"].get("redis_url", "redis://localhost:6379")
redis_client = aioredis.from_url(redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
redis_client = aioredis.from_url(
redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
working = WorkingMemory(redis=redis_client)
if config.memory.get("episodic", {}).get("enabled"):

12
src/agentkit/core/handoff_transport.py
View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import os
from typing import AsyncIterator, Awaitable, Callable
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
@ -144,7 +145,12 @@ class RedisHandoffTransport:
"""确保 Redis 连接已建立（懒初始化）"""
if self._redis is None:
try:
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(self._redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
await self._redis.ping()
logger.info("RedisHandoffTransport connected to Redis")
except Exception:
@ -199,9 +205,7 @@ class RedisHandoffTransport:
# 启动后台监听任务
if channel not in self._listen_tasks:
self._listen_tasks[channel] = asyncio.create_task(
self._background_listen(channel)
)
self._listen_tasks[channel] = asyncio.create_task(self._background_listen(channel))
async def _background_listen(self, channel: str) -> None:
"""后台监听频道消息并调用处理器"""

8
src/agentkit/llm/cache.py
View File

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Design doc: docs/plans/2026-06-14-002-u1-llm-cache-architecture.md
import json
import logging
import os
import time
from collections import OrderedDict
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
@ -386,7 +387,12 @@ class RedisLLMCache:
if self._redis is None:
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(self._redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._redis
async def aclose(self) -> None:

198
src/agentkit/llm/gateway.py
View File

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
import asyncio
import logging
import os
import time
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
@ -12,7 +13,11 @@ from agentkit.llm.config import LLMConfig
from agentkit.llm.protocol import LLMProvider, LLMRequest, LLMResponse, StreamChunk, TokenUsage
from agentkit.llm.providers.tracker import UsageSummary, UsageTracker
from agentkit.telemetry.tracing import get_tracer, _OTEL_AVAILABLE
from agentkit.telemetry.metrics import llm_token_histogram
from agentkit.telemetry.metrics import (
llm_token_histogram,
prompt_cache_hit_counter,
prompt_cache_miss_counter,
)
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from agentkit.llm.cache import LitellmCacheManager
@ -25,27 +30,25 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
if TYPE_CHECKING:
class _QuotaServiceLike(Protocol):
"""Quota service 最小契约（仅覆盖 gateway._enforce_quota 用到的方法）。"""
class _QuotaServiceLike(Protocol):
"""Quota service 最小契约（仅覆盖 gateway._enforce_quota 用到的方法）。"""
async def is_model_allowed(
self, db: Path, department_id: str, model: str
) -> tuple[bool, str]: ...
async def is_model_allowed(
self, db: Path, department_id: str, model: str
) -> tuple[bool, str]: ...
async def check_quota(
self,
db: Path,
department_id: str,
quota_type: str,
period: str,
current: float,
) -> tuple[bool, str]: ...
async def check_quota(
self,
db: Path,
department_id: str,
quota_type: str,
period: str,
current: float,
) -> tuple[bool, str]: ...
async def get_quota(
self, db: Path, department_id: str, quota_type: str, period: str
) -> dict[str, object] | None: ...
async def get_quota(
self, db: Path, department_id: str, quota_type: str, period: str
) -> dict[str, object] | None: ...
class QuotaExceededError(Exception):
@ -82,6 +85,12 @@ class LLMGateway:
self._usage_tracker = UsageTracker(store=usage_store) if usage_store else UsageTracker()
self._config = config or LLMConfig()
# PERF-1: PII 脱敏接入生产路径（env 驱动，默认关闭以保持向后兼容）。
# AGENTKIT_PII_FILTER_ENABLED=true 启用；filter_messages_pii fail-closed。
self._pii_filter_enabled = (
os.environ.get("AGENTKIT_PII_FILTER_ENABLED", "false").lower() == "true"
)
# Cache (U17 — LiteLLM 缓存管理器，opt-in，默认禁用)
self._cache_manager: "LitellmCacheManager | None" = None
if self._config.cache and self._config.cache.enabled:
@ -95,6 +104,22 @@ class LLMGateway:
f"similarity_threshold={litellm_config.similarity_threshold})"
)
if self._pii_filter_enabled:
logger.info("PII filter enabled (AGENTKIT_PII_FILTER_ENABLED=true, fail-closed)")
def _apply_pii_filter(self, messages: list[dict[str, str]]) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
"""PERF-1: 对 messages 执行 PII 脱敏。
fail-closed：脱敏失败抛 PIIFilterError，由调用方转 HTTP 422。
禁用时原样返回（零开销 — 仅一次 env 读 + bool 判断）。
"""
if not self._pii_filter_enabled:
return messages
from agentkit.llm.pii_filter import filter_messages_pii
redacted, _matches = filter_messages_pii(messages, fail_closed=True)
return redacted
def register_provider(self, name: str, provider: LLMProvider) -> None:
"""注册 Provider"""
self._providers[name] = provider
@ -127,6 +152,9 @@ class LLMGateway:
if not self._providers:
raise LLMProviderError("", "No provider registered")
# PERF-1: PII 脱敏（fail-closed）— 在 provider 调用前替换 messages。
messages = self._apply_pii_filter(messages)
# ── Quota enforcement ──
# Only enforce when department_ids + db_path are provided
# (other call sites pass None — no quota check).
@ -155,54 +183,55 @@ class LLMGateway:
_span = _span_cm.__enter__()
start = time.monotonic()
# ── Cache check (U17 — LiteLLM cache via cache_key in request) ──
# LiteLLM 在 litellm.acompletion 内部处理缓存读写，gateway 只需：
# 1. 构建 per-user + ACL-scoped cache_key（安全要求 a, b）
# 2. 将 cache 参数注入 kwargs 透传到 provider
# 3. 检测响应的 cache_hit 标志，用于 usage tracking（cost=0）
if self._cache_manager is not None:
from agentkit.llm.cache import LitellmCacheManager
# 解析 KB caching_disabled（安全要求 c）
# 非 RAG 请求（kb_id=None）→ 默认启用缓存（无 KB 数据需保护）。
# RAG 请求（kb_id!=None）→ fail-closed：默认禁用缓存，仅在 settings
# 明确返回 caching_disabled=False 时启用。防止 DB 异常时 fail-open
# 导致禁用缓存的 KB 数据泄漏到缓存。
kb_caching_disabled = kb_id is not None
if kb_id is not None:
try:
from agentkit.rag_platform.settings import get_settings_store
settings = await get_settings_store().get_settings(kb_id)
if settings is not None:
kb_caching_disabled = settings.caching_disabled
# settings 为 None（KB 不存在）→ 保持 True（fail-closed）
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to read KB cache settings for kb_id={kb_id}: {e}")
# 读取异常 → 保持 True（fail-closed，禁用缓存）
if self._cache_manager.should_cache(kb_caching_disabled, user_id):
cache_key = self._cache_manager.build_cache_key(
model=resolved_model,
messages=messages,
temperature=kwargs.get("temperature", 0.7),
tools=tools,
tool_choice=tool_choice,
max_tokens=kwargs.get("max_tokens", 2000),
user_id=user_id,
kb_acl_hash=kb_acl_hash,
)
kwargs["cache"] = LitellmCacheManager.cache_params_for_hit(cache_key)
else:
kwargs["cache"] = LitellmCacheManager.cache_params_for_no_cache()
# ── Normal provider call ──
models_to_try = self._get_models_to_try(resolved_model)
last_error: LLMProviderError | None = None
response: LLMResponse | None = None
# PERF-2: try 块必须覆盖整个 span 生命周期（含 cache 设置），
# 否则 cache_key 构建异常会泄漏 span。PERF-3: except 记录异常到 span。
try:
# ── Cache check (U17 — LiteLLM cache via cache_key in request) ──
# LiteLLM 在 litellm.acompletion 内部处理缓存读写，gateway 只需：
# 1. 构建 per-user + ACL-scoped cache_key（安全要求 a, b）
# 2. 将 cache 参数注入 kwargs 透传到 provider
# 3. 检测响应的 cache_hit 标志，用于 usage tracking（cost=0）
if self._cache_manager is not None:
from agentkit.llm.cache import LitellmCacheManager
# 解析 KB caching_disabled（安全要求 c）
# 非 RAG 请求（kb_id=None）→ 默认启用缓存（无 KB 数据需保护）。
# RAG 请求（kb_id!=None）→ fail-closed：默认禁用缓存，仅在 settings
# 明确返回 caching_disabled=False 时启用。防止 DB 异常时 fail-open
# 导致禁用缓存的 KB 数据泄漏到缓存。
kb_caching_disabled = kb_id is not None
if kb_id is not None:
try:
from agentkit.rag_platform.settings import get_settings_store
settings = await get_settings_store().get_settings(kb_id)
if settings is not None:
kb_caching_disabled = settings.caching_disabled
# settings 为 None（KB 不存在）→ 保持 True（fail-closed）
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to read KB cache settings for kb_id={kb_id}: {e}")
# 读取异常 → 保持 True（fail-closed，禁用缓存）
if self._cache_manager.should_cache(kb_caching_disabled, user_id):
cache_key = self._cache_manager.build_cache_key(
model=resolved_model,
messages=messages,
temperature=kwargs.get("temperature", 0.7),
tools=tools,
tool_choice=tool_choice,
max_tokens=kwargs.get("max_tokens", 2000),
user_id=user_id,
kb_acl_hash=kb_acl_hash,
)
kwargs["cache"] = LitellmCacheManager.cache_params_for_hit(cache_key)
else:
kwargs["cache"] = LitellmCacheManager.cache_params_for_no_cache()
# ── Normal provider call ──
models_to_try = self._get_models_to_try(resolved_model)
last_error: LLMProviderError | None = None
response: LLMResponse | None = None
for model_name in models_to_try:
try:
provider, actual_model = self._resolve_model(model_name)
@ -286,12 +315,35 @@ class LLMGateway:
_span.set_attribute("gen_ai.duration.ms", int(latency_ms))
if self._cache_manager is not None:
_span.set_attribute("gen_ai.cache.hit", is_cache_hit)
# U2 — Anthropic prompt cache hit/miss span attributes
_span.set_attribute(
"gen_ai.usage.cache_read_input_tokens",
response.usage.cache_read_input_tokens,
)
_span.set_attribute(
"gen_ai.usage.cache_creation_input_tokens",
response.usage.cache_creation_input_tokens,
)
llm_token_histogram().record(
response.usage.total_tokens,
{"gen_ai.request.model": resolved_model},
)
# U2 — prompt cache hit/miss OTel counter（Anthropic cache_read_input_tokens > 0 → hit）
self._record_prompt_cache_metric(response.usage, resolved_model)
return response
except Exception as e:
# PERF-3: 记录异常到 span — __exit__(None, None, None) 会丢失异常信息，
# 失败的 LLM 调用在 trace 中显示为成功。手动 record_exception + 设 ERROR 状态。
if _span is not None:
try:
_span.record_exception(e)
from opentelemetry.trace import Status, StatusCode
_span.set_status(Status(StatusCode.ERROR, str(e)))
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — span 记录失败不影响异常向上传播
pass
raise
finally:
if _span_cm is not None:
_span_cm.__exit__(None, None, None)
@ -323,6 +375,9 @@ class LLMGateway:
if not self._providers:
raise LLMProviderError("", "No provider registered")
# PERF-1: PII 脱敏（fail-closed）— 在 provider 调用前替换 messages。
messages = self._apply_pii_filter(messages)
# ── Quota enforcement ──
if department_ids and db_path:
await self._enforce_quota(db_path, department_ids, resolved_model)
@ -397,6 +452,8 @@ class LLMGateway:
user_id=user_id,
department_ids=department_ids,
)
# U2 — prompt cache hit/miss OTel counter（streaming path）
self._record_prompt_cache_metric(final_usage, final_model)
# Empty stream detection: if no content was produced,
# raise error so the caller (ReActEngine) can retry with a different model.
@ -432,6 +489,15 @@ class LLMGateway:
"", f"No provider available for streaming '{resolved_model}'"
)
@staticmethod
def _record_prompt_cache_metric(usage: TokenUsage, model: str) -> None:
"""Record prompt cache hit/miss OTel counter — Anthropic cache_read_input_tokens > 0 → hit."""
attrs = {"gen_ai.request.model": model}
if usage.cache_hit:
prompt_cache_hit_counter().add(1, attrs)
else:
prompt_cache_miss_counter().add(1, attrs)
def _get_models_to_try(self, resolved_model: str) -> list[str]:
"""Return [primary_model] + fallback_models for the given resolved model."""
fallback_models = self._config.fallbacks.get(resolved_model, [])

224
src/agentkit/llm/pii_filter.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
"""PII 脱敏 hook（U2/R3）。
等保合规场景：发送至 LLM 的 prompt 先经 PII 脱敏，原文不落盘。
设计：
- 正则版（默认）：识别手机号 / 邮箱 / 身份证 / 银行卡，替换为 [REDACTED_TYPE:hash8]
- ner_hook（可选）：客户内网 NER 模型（LAC/HanLP），module:func 路径动态 import
- fail-closed：任何异常时拒绝发送（raise PIIFilterError），不降级到原文发送
- hash 审计：脱敏后记录 hash 用于审计；``PIIMatch.original`` 仅内存中供调用方
使用（如展示 / 调试），不得落盘 / 落日志
ponytail: 用 stdlib（re + hashlib），不引入 NER 依赖。
升级路径：ner_hook 接入客户内网 NER 模型，正则版作为 fallback。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import logging
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from agentkit.telemetry.metrics import (
pii_filter_coverage_counter,
pii_filter_redacted_counter,
)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class PIIFilterError(Exception):
"""PII 脱敏失败（fail-closed 触发）"""
# ── PII 正则模式 ──────────────────────────────────────────
# ponytail: 正则覆盖中国常见 PII；边界宽松避免漏报（fail-closed 优于 false negative）。
# 升级路径：ner_hook 接入 NER 模型识别更复杂 PII（地址、姓名、组织）。
# 中国手机号：1[3-9] 开头 11 位
_PHONE_RE = re.compile(r"1[3-9]\d{9}")
# 邮箱
_EMAIL_RE = re.compile(r"[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}")
# 中国身份证号：18 位（最后一位 X 校验），前 6 位地区码 + 8 位生日 + 3 位序号 + 1 位校验
_ID_CARD_RE = re.compile(
r"\b[1-9]\d{5}(?:19|20)\d{2}(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])(?:0[1-9]|[12]\d|3[01])\d{3}[\dXx]\b"
)
# 银行卡号：16-19 位数字（宽松，可能误报长数字序列 — fail-closed 优于漏报）
_BANK_CARD_RE = re.compile(r"\b\d{16,19}\b")
@dataclass
class PIIMatch:
"""单个 PII 匹配结果"""
pii_type: str # phone / email / id_card / bank_card
original: str
redacted: str
hash: str # 原文 sha256 前 8 位（审计用，不可逆）
@dataclass
class PIIFilterResult:
"""PII 脱敏结果"""
redacted_text: str
matches: list[PIIMatch] = field(default_factory=list)
@property
def redacted_count(self) -> int:
return len(self.matches)
def _hash_pii(original: str) -> str:
"""sha256 前 8 位（审计用）"""
return hashlib.sha256(original.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:8]
def _redact(text: str, ner_hook=None) -> PIIFilterResult:
"""执行 PII 脱敏（内部函数，ner_hook 异常向上传播由 filter_pii 决定 fail-closed）。
ponytail: 正则版按 PII 类型顺序替换；id_card 在 phone 之前（更具体的先匹配，
避免身份证号内的 11 位数字被手机号正则误匹配）。ner_hook 优先于正则版。
"""
matches: list[PIIMatch] = []
redacted = text
# ner_hook 优先：客户内网 NER 模型
if ner_hook is not None:
ner_result = ner_hook(text)
if ner_result is not None:
# ner_hook 返回 (redacted_text, matches_list)
redacted_text, ner_matches = ner_result
redacted = redacted_text
matches.extend(ner_matches)
# ner_hook 返回 None 表示无匹配，继续走正则版
# 正则版（默认或 ner_hook 无匹配时叠加）
# ponytail: id_card 在 phone 之前（身份证号包含 11 位数字子串会被 phone 误匹配）
patterns = [
("id_card", _ID_CARD_RE),
("phone", _PHONE_RE),
("email", _EMAIL_RE),
("bank_card", _BANK_CARD_RE),
]
for pii_type, pattern in patterns:
# 单次 sub + 回调同时收集 matches 和替换文本，
# 避免二次正则扫描 + 双重 sha256 计算（热路径）
def _replace(m, _t=pii_type):
original = m.group()
pii_hash = _hash_pii(original)
replacement = f"[REDACTED_{_t.upper()}:{pii_hash}]"
matches.append(
PIIMatch(
pii_type=_t,
original=original,
redacted=replacement,
hash=pii_hash,
)
)
return replacement
redacted = pattern.sub(_replace, redacted)
return PIIFilterResult(redacted_text=redacted, matches=matches)
def _record_pii_metrics(status: str, redacted_count: int | None = None) -> None:
"""记录 PII 脱敏 OTel 指标 — 失败静默降级（不影响主流程）。
PERF-4: 用 logger.debug 记录失败原因（而非 except: pass），
保留静默降级语义同时让排障可见。
PERF-5: import 提升至模块顶部，避免热路径每次 from import 开销。
"""
try:
pii_filter_coverage_counter().add(1, {"pii_filter.status": status})
if redacted_count is not None:
pii_filter_redacted_counter().add(redacted_count)
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 — 指标失败不影响 PII 过滤主流程
logger.debug("PII metric recording failed: %s", e)
def filter_pii(
text: str,
*,
ner_hook=None,
fail_closed: bool = True,
) -> PIIFilterResult:
"""对文本执行 PII 脱敏。
Args:
text: 待脱敏文本
ner_hook: 可选 NER 函数（返回 (redacted_text, matches_list)）
fail_closed: True 时脱敏失败抛 PIIFilterError；False 时降级到正则版重试
Returns:
PIIFilterResult: 脱敏后文本 + 匹配列表（含 hash 用于审计）
Raises:
PIIFilterError: fail_closed=True 且脱敏过程中出现异常
"""
try:
result = _redact(text, ner_hook=ner_hook)
_record_pii_metrics("success", result.redacted_count)
return result
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"PII filter failed: {e}")
if fail_closed:
# fail-closed：拒绝发送，抛异常
_record_pii_metrics("failed_closed")
raise PIIFilterError(f"PII filter failed (fail-closed): {e}") from e
# fail-open：降级到正则版（无 ner_hook）重试
logger.warning("fail_closed=False, falling back to regex-only redaction")
try:
result = _redact(text, ner_hook=None)
_record_pii_metrics("fallback_regex", result.redacted_count)
return result
except Exception as fallback_err:
# 正则版也失败（极少见），返回原文（最差情况）
logger.error(f"Regex fallback also failed: {fallback_err}, returning original")
return PIIFilterResult(redacted_text=text, matches=[])
def filter_messages_pii(
messages: list[dict[str, object]],
*,
ner_hook=None,
fail_closed: bool = True,
) -> tuple[list[dict[str, object]], list[PIIMatch]]:
"""对 chat messages 列表执行 PII 脱敏。
Args:
messages: chat messages（role + content）
ner_hook: 可选 NER 函数
fail_closed: True 时脱敏失败抛 PIIFilterError
Returns:
(redacted_messages, all_matches): 脱敏后 messages + 全部匹配列表
"""
all_matches: list[PIIMatch] = []
redacted_messages: list[dict[str, object]] = []
for msg in messages:
content = msg.get("content")
if isinstance(content, str):
result = filter_pii(content, ner_hook=ner_hook, fail_closed=fail_closed)
redacted_msg = {**msg, "content": result.redacted_text}
all_matches.extend(result.matches)
elif isinstance(content, list):
# Anthropic content blocks: 脱敏每个 text block
redacted_blocks = []
for block in content:
if isinstance(block, dict) and block.get("type") == "text":
block_text = block.get("text", "")
result = filter_pii(block_text, ner_hook=ner_hook, fail_closed=fail_closed)
redacted_blocks.append({**block, "text": result.redacted_text})
all_matches.extend(result.matches)
else:
redacted_blocks.append(block)
redacted_msg = {**msg, "content": redacted_blocks}
else:
redacted_msg = msg
redacted_messages.append(redacted_msg)
return redacted_messages, all_matches

16
src/agentkit/llm/protocol.py
View File

@ -6,15 +6,29 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
@dataclass
class TokenUsage:
"""Token 使用量"""
"""Token 使用量。
U2: 添加 cache_read_input_tokens / cache_creation_input_tokens 字段，
用于 Anthropic prompt cache 命中率监控（OTel prompt_cache.hit/miss metric）。
非 Anthropic provider 这两个字段保持默认 0。
"""
prompt_tokens: int = 0
completion_tokens: int = 0
# U2 — Anthropic prompt cache：从 prompt cache 读取的 token 数（命中时 > 0）
cache_read_input_tokens: int = 0
# U2 — Anthropic prompt cache：写入 prompt cache 的 token 数
cache_creation_input_tokens: int = 0
@property
def total_tokens(self) -> int:
return self.prompt_tokens + self.completion_tokens
@property
def cache_hit(self) -> bool:
"""是否命中 prompt cache（cache_read_input_tokens > 0）"""
return self.cache_read_input_tokens > 0
@dataclass
class ToolCall:

8
src/agentkit/llm/providers/anthropic.py
View File

@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ class AnthropicProvider(LLMProvider):
usage = TokenUsage(
prompt_tokens=usage_data.get("input_tokens", 0),
completion_tokens=usage_data.get("output_tokens", 0),
# U2 — Anthropic prompt cache 命中率监控
cache_read_input_tokens=usage_data.get("cache_read_input_tokens", 0),
cache_creation_input_tokens=usage_data.get("cache_creation_input_tokens", 0),
)
return LLMResponse(
@ -479,6 +482,11 @@ class AnthropicProvider(LLMProvider):
usage = TokenUsage(
prompt_tokens=usage_data.get("input_tokens", 0),
completion_tokens=usage_data.get("output_tokens", 0),
# U2 — Anthropic prompt cache 命中率监控
cache_read_input_tokens=usage_data.get("cache_read_input_tokens", 0),
cache_creation_input_tokens=usage_data.get(
"cache_creation_input_tokens", 0
),
)
# Yield accumulated tool calls if any

15
src/agentkit/llm/providers/usage_store.py
View File

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Legacy v1 keys (still readable for backward compat):
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from typing import Protocol, runtime_checkable
@ -304,7 +305,12 @@ class RedisUsageStore:
if self._redis is None:
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(self._redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._redis
def _get_sync_redis(self):
@ -312,7 +318,12 @@ class RedisUsageStore:
if self._sync_redis is None:
import redis as sync_redis
self._sync_redis = sync_redis.from_url(self._redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._sync_redis = sync_redis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._sync_redis
async def aclose(self) -> None:

3
src/agentkit/orchestrator/pipeline_state.py
View File

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Callable, Coroutine
@ -176,9 +177,11 @@ class PipelineStateRedis:
if self._redis is None:
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._redis

58
src/agentkit/quality/cascade_state_store.py
View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Key schema (Redis):
"""
import logging
import os
import time
from typing import Protocol, runtime_checkable
@ -140,8 +141,12 @@ class RedisCascadeStateStore:
"""Get or create a persistent sync Redis client (connection pool backed)."""
if self._sync_redis is None:
import redis as sync_redis
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._sync_redis = sync_redis.from_url(
self._redis_url, decode_responses=True
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._sync_redis
@ -163,7 +168,15 @@ class RedisCascadeStateStore:
pipe.expire(key, self._session_ttl)
results = pipe.execute()
return results[0]
except (ImportError, OSError, _RedisError, ValueError, KeyError, RuntimeError, TypeError) as e:
except (
ImportError,
OSError,
_RedisError,
ValueError,
KeyError,
RuntimeError,
TypeError,
) as e:
logger.warning(f"Redis cascade increment failed: {e}")
self._degrade_to_fallback()
if self._fallback is not None:
@ -177,7 +190,15 @@ class RedisCascadeStateStore:
r = self._get_sync_redis()
val = r.get(f"{self.INTER_PREFIX}{session_id}")
return int(val) if val is not None else 0
except (ImportError, OSError, _RedisError, ValueError, KeyError, RuntimeError, TypeError) as e:
except (
ImportError,
OSError,
_RedisError,
ValueError,
KeyError,
RuntimeError,
TypeError,
) as e:
logger.warning(f"Redis cascade get failed: {e}")
if self._fallback is not None:
return self._fallback.get_interaction(session_id)
@ -194,7 +215,15 @@ class RedisCascadeStateStore:
pipe.set(key, depth)
pipe.expire(key, self._session_ttl)
pipe.execute()
except (ImportError, OSError, _RedisError, ValueError, KeyError, RuntimeError, TypeError) as e:
except (
ImportError,
OSError,
_RedisError,
ValueError,
KeyError,
RuntimeError,
TypeError,
) as e:
logger.warning(f"Redis cascade set_depth failed: {e}")
self._degrade_to_fallback()
if self._fallback is not None:
@ -207,7 +236,15 @@ class RedisCascadeStateStore:
r = self._get_sync_redis()
val = r.get(f"{self.DEPTH_PREFIX}{session_id}")
return int(val) if val is not None else 0
except (ImportError, OSError, _RedisError, ValueError, KeyError, RuntimeError, TypeError) as e:
except (
ImportError,
OSError,
_RedisError,
ValueError,
KeyError,
RuntimeError,
TypeError,
) as e:
logger.warning(f"Redis cascade get_depth failed: {e}")
if self._fallback is not None:
return self._fallback.get_depth(session_id)
@ -223,7 +260,15 @@ class RedisCascadeStateStore:
pipe.delete(f"{self.INTER_PREFIX}{session_id}")
pipe.delete(f"{self.DEPTH_PREFIX}{session_id}")
pipe.execute()
except (ImportError, OSError, _RedisError, ValueError, KeyError, RuntimeError, TypeError) as e:
except (
ImportError,
OSError,
_RedisError,
ValueError,
KeyError,
RuntimeError,
TypeError,
) as e:
logger.warning(f"Redis cascade reset failed: {e}")
self._degrade_to_fallback()
if self._fallback is not None:
@ -250,6 +295,7 @@ def create_cascade_state_store(
if backend in ("auto", "redis"):
try:
import redis # noqa: F401
return RedisCascadeStateStore(redis_url=redis_url, session_ttl=session_ttl)
except ImportError:
logger.warning("redis package not available, falling back to in-memory cascade store")

11
src/agentkit/server/app.py
View File

@ -1258,11 +1258,13 @@ def create_app(
"redis_url", "redis://localhost:6379"
)
# U5c: socket_timeout 防止单点 Redis 故障时网关请求挂死。
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
redis_client = aioredis.from_url(
redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
socket_timeout=5.0,
socket_connect_timeout=5.0,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
working = WorkingMemory(redis=redis_client)
app.state.working_redis_client = redis_client
@ -1395,6 +1397,15 @@ def create_app(
app.include_router(experts.router, prefix="/api/v1")
app.include_router(auth_routes.router, prefix="/api/v1")
app.include_router(auth_routes.admin_router, prefix="/api/v1")
# U4 SSO 集成 — SCIM 2.0 最小子集（自带 bearer token 校验）
from agentkit.server.auth.scim.router import (
register_scim_exception_handlers,
router as scim_router,
)
app.include_router(scim_router, prefix="/api/v1")
# API-2: 注册 SCIM 异常处理器（scope 到 /scim/v2，非 SCIM 路由走默认格式）
register_scim_exception_handlers(app)
app.include_router(admin_routes_module.admin_router, prefix="/api/v1")
app.include_router(documents.router, prefix="/api/v1")
app.include_router(calendar_routes.router, prefix="/api/v1")

209
src/agentkit/server/auth/audit.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
"""RBAC + deprovisioning 审计日志 (KTD-8, U4 SSO 集成)。
写入 ``auth_audit_log`` 表 + 发 OTel span event（接入审计通道）。
事件类型：
- ``role_change`` — RBAC 角色变更 (actor/target/role_before/role_after)
- ``deprovision`` — 手动 deprovisioning (operator/admin RBAC 强制)
所有记录包含 actor/target/reason/source/timestamp，接入 OTel 审计通道
（``agentkit.telemetry.tracer`` — OTel 不可用时降级为 SQLite + 日志）。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
import aiosqlite
from agentkit.telemetry.tracer import get_tracer
from .models import DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH, audit_log_row_to_dict, _now_iso
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# 审计事件类型常量
EVENT_ROLE_CHANGE = "role_change"
EVENT_DEPROVISION = "deprovision"
# 审计来源
SOURCE_MANUAL = "manual"
SOURCE_SCIM = "scim"
SOURCE_CRON = "cron_reconciliation"
SOURCE_BREAKGLASS = "break_glass"
class AuditService:
"""审计日志服务 — 写 ``auth_audit_log`` 表 + OTel span event。
ponytail: SQLite 单表写入，无聚合 / 告警。OTel 不可用时降级为日志。
上限：单进程写入；高并发审计需批量写 + 异步队列。
"""
def __init__(self, db_path: str | Path | None = None) -> None:
if db_path is not None:
self._db_path = Path(db_path)
else:
env = os.environ.get("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB")
self._db_path = Path(env) if env else DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH
async def record_role_change(
self,
*,
actor_user_id: str | None,
actor_username: str | None,
target_user_id: str,
target_username: str,
role_before: str,
role_after: str,
reason: str | None = None,
source: str = SOURCE_MANUAL,
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""记录 RBAC 角色变更 (KTD-8)。"""
return await self._record(
event_type=EVENT_ROLE_CHANGE,
actor_user_id=actor_user_id,
actor_username=actor_username,
target_user_id=target_user_id,
target_username=target_username,
role_before=role_before,
role_after=role_after,
reason=reason,
source=source,
)
async def record_deprovision(
self,
*,
actor_user_id: str | None,
actor_username: str | None,
target_user_id: str,
target_username: str,
reason: str | None = None,
source: str = SOURCE_MANUAL,
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""记录手动 deprovisioning (R1b)。"""
return await self._record(
event_type=EVENT_DEPROVISION,
actor_user_id=actor_user_id,
actor_username=actor_username,
target_user_id=target_user_id,
target_username=target_username,
role_before=None,
role_after=None,
reason=reason,
source=source,
)
async def list_for_target(
self, target_user_id: str, *, limit: int = 50
) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
"""查询某用户的所有审计记录（admin 视图）。"""
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(self._db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM auth_audit_log WHERE target_user_id = ? "
"ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?",
(target_user_id, limit),
)
rows = await cursor.fetchall()
return [audit_log_row_to_dict(r) for r in rows]
async def _record(
self,
*,
event_type: str,
actor_user_id: str | None,
actor_username: str | None,
target_user_id: str,
target_username: str,
role_before: str | None,
role_after: str | None,
reason: str | None,
source: str,
) -> dict[str, object]:
record_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
now = _now_iso()
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(self._db_path)) as db:
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO auth_audit_log "
"(id, event_type, actor_user_id, actor_username, "
" target_user_id, target_username, role_before, role_after, "
" reason, source, created_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
record_id,
event_type,
actor_user_id,
actor_username,
target_user_id,
target_username,
role_before,
role_after,
reason,
source,
now,
),
)
await db.commit()
# OTel 审计通道 — 发 span event（OTel 不可用时 NoOpTracer 静默降级）
try:
tracer = get_tracer()
with tracer.start_span(f"audit.{event_type}") as span:
span.set_attribute("audit.event_type", event_type)
span.set_attribute("audit.actor", actor_username or actor_user_id or "system")
span.set_attribute("audit.target", target_username or target_user_id)
span.set_attribute("audit.source", source)
if role_before or role_after:
span.set_attribute("audit.role_before", role_before or "")
span.set_attribute("audit.role_after", role_after or "")
span.add_event(
"audit.record",
{"actor": actor_username or "", "target": target_username or ""},
)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — OTel 失败不影响审计写入
pass
logger.info(
"审计记录: %s actor=%s target=%s reason=%s source=%s",
event_type,
actor_username or actor_user_id or "?",
target_username or target_user_id,
reason or "",
source,
)
return {
"id": record_id,
"event_type": event_type,
"actor_user_id": actor_user_id,
"actor_username": actor_username,
"target_user_id": target_user_id,
"target_username": target_username,
"role_before": role_before,
"role_after": role_after,
"reason": reason,
"source": source,
"created_at": now,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 进程级单例
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_service: AuditService | None = None
def get_audit_service() -> AuditService:
"""返回进程级 AuditService 单例（惰性初始化）。"""
global _service
if _service is None:
_service = AuditService()
return _service
def set_audit_service(service: AuditService | None) -> None:
"""注入自定义 AuditService（测试用）。"""
global _service
_service = service

175
src/agentkit/server/auth/idp_registry.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
"""多 IDP 信任边界注册表 (R1a, U4 SSO 集成)。
管理多个 IDP 配置（OIDC + SAML 并存，如飞书 / Azure AD / 阿里云 IDaaS）：
- **热证书轮换**：``update_certificate`` 直接替换内存配置，无需重启。
- **单 IDP 故障隔离**：某个 IDP 不可用不影响其他 IDP 的认证流程。
- **按 sub/NameID 关联**（R1a）：禁止仅凭邮箱合并账户 — 见 :mod:`providers.oidc`。
配置来源：``agentkit.yaml`` 的 ``auth.idps`` 段（见 :func:`IDPRegistry.from_config`）。
单租户假设 (R1c)：所有 IDP 共享同一本地用户表，无租户隔离。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import threading
from typing import Literal
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
IDPType = Literal["oidc", "saml"]
class OIDCConfig(BaseModel):
"""单个 OIDC IDP 配置（authlib redirect flow）。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
client_id: str
client_secret: str
server_metadata_url: str
# redirect_uri 是完整 URL，如 https://host/api/v1/auth/oauth/feishu/callback
redirect_uri: str
# 可选：scope 覆盖（默认 openid email profile）
scope: str = "openid email profile"
class SAMLConfig(BaseModel):
"""单个 SAML 2.0 IDP 配置（python3-saml / OneLogin）。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
# IDP 元数据：entity_id + 单点登录 URL（SP 发起时构造 AuthnRequest）
entity_id: str
sso_url: str
# IDP 签名证书（PEM 格式，可能多张证书用于轮换）
idp_cert: str
# SP 自身配置
sp_entity_id: str
acs_url: str
# 可选：SLO URL
slo_url: str | None = None
class IDPConfig(BaseModel):
"""单个 IDP 完整配置（OIDC 或 SAML 之一）。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
name: str = Field(..., description="IDP 唯一标识，如 feishu / azure_ad / aliyun_idaas")
type: IDPType
display_name: str = ""
enabled: bool = True
oidc: OIDCConfig | None = None
saml: SAMLConfig | None = None
def is_healthy(self) -> bool:
"""IDP 是否可用（启用 + 配置完整）。
单 IDP 故障不影响其他 — 调用方逐个检查此方法后决定是否跳过。
"""
if not self.enabled:
return False
if self.type == "oidc":
return self.oidc is not None
return self.saml is not None
class IDPRegistry:
"""多 IDP 注册表 — 进程内单例，支持热证书轮换。
线程安全：所有写操作加锁（``_lock``）。读操作返回配置的浅拷贝引用 —
配置对象本身不可变（Pydantic），热轮换通过整体替换实现。
ponytail: 进程内 dict 注册表，不持久化。多实例部署时各进程独立加载
agentkit.yaml；证书热轮换需配合配置同步（config_sync.py 轮询）或重启。
上限：单进程数百 IDP 无压力（O(1) 查找）。
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._idps: dict[str, IDPConfig] = {}
self._lock = threading.Lock()
def register(self, config: IDPConfig) -> None:
"""注册或覆盖一个 IDP（用于热加载 / 热证书轮换）。"""
with self._lock:
self._idps[config.name] = config
logger.info(f"IDP 已注册: {config.name} (type={config.type}, enabled={config.enabled})")
def remove(self, name: str) -> bool:
"""移除一个 IDP。返回是否实际移除。"""
with self._lock:
return self._idps.pop(name, None) is not None
def get(self, name: str) -> IDPConfig | None:
"""按名称查找 IDP 配置。返回 ``None`` 表示不存在。"""
with self._lock:
return self._idps.get(name)
def list_idps(self) -> list[IDPConfig]:
"""列出所有已注册 IDP（含禁用的）。"""
with self._lock:
return list(self._idps.values())
def list_healthy(self) -> list[IDPConfig]:
"""列出所有可用 IDP（启用 + 配置完整）。"""
return [c for c in self.list_idps() if c.is_healthy()]
def update_certificate(self, name: str, *, idp_cert: str | None = None) -> bool:
"""热轮换 SAML IDP 签名证书 — 不重启即时生效。
Args:
name: IDP 名称。
idp_cert: 新的 IDP 签名证书（PEM）。
Returns:
``True`` 表示成功更新，``False`` 表示 IDP 不存在或非 SAML 类型。
OIDC 证书轮换通过 ``server_metadata_url`` 自动发现（authlib 缓存 TTL），
无需显式热轮换 — 调用 ``register`` 替换整个 :class:`OIDCConfig` 即可。
"""
with self._lock:
existing = self._idps.get(name)
if existing is None or existing.type != "saml" or existing.saml is None:
return False
# Pydantic 不可变 — 构造新配置整体替换
new_saml = existing.saml.model_copy(update={"idp_cert": idp_cert or ""})
self._idps[name] = existing.model_copy(update={"saml": new_saml})
logger.info(f"IDP {name} 签名证书已热轮换")
return True
def load_from_config(self, idps: list[dict[str, object]]) -> None:
"""从 agentkit.yaml 的 ``auth.idps`` 列表批量加载（覆盖现有）。"""
with self._lock:
self._idps.clear()
for raw in idps:
try:
cfg = IDPConfig.model_validate(raw)
self.register(cfg)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — 单个 IDP 配置错误不阻断其他
logger.error(f"IDP 配置加载失败，跳过: {raw.get('name', '?')}: {exc}")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 进程级单例
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_registry: IDPRegistry | None = None
def get_idp_registry() -> IDPRegistry:
"""返回进程级 IDP 注册表单例（惰性初始化）。"""
global _registry
if _registry is None:
_registry = IDPRegistry()
return _registry
def reset_idp_registry() -> None:
"""重置注册表单例（测试用）。"""
global _registry
_registry = None

31
src/agentkit/server/auth/middleware.py
View File

@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
client_keys: Mapping of ``client_name -> api_key`` (from clients.yaml).
"""
# 精确匹配路径 — 静态端点（无动态路径段）
WHITELIST_PATHS = (
"/",
"/login",
"/assets", # Static assets (exact match covers root; prefix below covers sub-paths)
"/api/v1/health",
"/api/v1/auth/login",
"/api/v1/auth/refresh",
@ -55,6 +55,18 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"/redoc",
)
# 前缀匹配路径 — 动态路径段（provider 名 / 资源 id / 静态资源子路径）
PREFIX_WHITELIST_PATHS = (
"/docs",
"/openapi.json",
"/redoc",
"/assets",
# U4 SSO — 动态 provider 路径
"/api/v1/auth/oauth/", # OIDC redirect/callback
"/api/v1/auth/saml/", # SAML ACS
"/api/v1/scim/v2/", # SCIM 2.0（自带 bearer token 校验）
)
def __init__(
self,
app,
@ -75,18 +87,13 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
def _is_whitelisted(self, path: str) -> bool:
"""Return True if ``path`` matches a whitelisted route.
Uses exact match for auth routes (so ``/auth/logout`` does NOT
whitelist ``/auth/logout-others``) and prefix match for docs and assets.
Uses exact match for static auth routes (so ``/auth/logout`` does NOT
whitelist ``/auth/logout-others``) and prefix match for docs, assets,
and U4 SSO dynamic-provider routes.
"""
for prefix in self.WHITELIST_PATHS:
if path == prefix:
return True
# Prefix match for documentation paths and static assets.
# Auth paths require exact match to avoid accidentally whitelisting
# sibling routes like /auth/logout-others under /auth/logout.
if path.startswith(prefix) and prefix in ("/docs", "/openapi.json", "/redoc", "/assets"):
return True
return False
if path in self.WHITELIST_PATHS:
return True
return any(path.startswith(p) for p in self.PREFIX_WHITELIST_PATHS)
def _is_dev_mode(self) -> bool:
"""Dev mode = no JWT secret, no global API key, no client keys."""

78
src/agentkit/server/auth/models.py
View File

@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ def _now_iso() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
def resolve_auth_db_path() -> Path:
"""Lazily resolve the auth DB path from env var at call time.
``DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH`` is captured at module-import time and cannot
see test-time ``AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB`` mutations. This helper re-reads the
env var on every call so tests can ``monkeypatch.setenv`` before
constructing a provider/service.
"""
env = os.environ.get("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB")
return Path(env) if env else DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SQLAlchemy 2 declarative models
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -593,6 +605,38 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS skill_states (
disabled_at TEXT NOT NULL,
disabled_by TEXT
);
-- V5: user_idp_links — 多 IDP 信任边界 (R1a, U4 SSO 集成)。
-- 按 (idp_name, idp_subject) 主键关联本地用户，禁止邮箱合并 (R1a)。
-- 单用户可关联多个 IDP（如飞书 + Azure AD 并存），但每个 IDP sub 仅映射一行。
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS user_idp_links (
idp_name TEXT NOT NULL,
idp_subject TEXT NOT NULL,
user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
idp_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'oidc',
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (idp_name, idp_subject)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_user_idp_links_user_id ON user_idp_links(user_id);
-- V5: auth_audit_log — RBAC 角色变更 + deprovisioning 审计 (KTD-8, U4)。
-- 记录 actor/target/role_before/role_after/reason/source/timestamp。
-- 接入 OTel 审计通道（audit.py 写入本表 + 发 OTel span event）。
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_audit_log (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
actor_user_id TEXT,
actor_username TEXT,
target_user_id TEXT,
target_username TEXT,
role_before TEXT,
role_after TEXT,
reason TEXT,
source TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'manual',
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_auth_audit_log_target ON auth_audit_log(target_user_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_auth_audit_log_created_at ON auth_audit_log(created_at);
"""
@ -611,7 +655,11 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS skill_states (
#
# V4 (2026-06-21, Admin Console U6): added skill_states table for
# admin-driven skill enable/disable. No backfill needed — additive.
_SCHEMA_VERSION = 4
#
# V5 (2026-07-06, U4 SSO 集成): added user_idp_links (多 IDP 信任边界 R1a)
# + auth_audit_log (RBAC 角色变更 + deprovisioning 审计 KTD-8).
# No backfill needed — additive.
_SCHEMA_VERSION = 5
_META_SCHEMA_VERSION_KEY = "schema_version"
@ -852,3 +900,31 @@ def skill_state_row_to_dict(row: aiosqlite.Row | Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[s
"disabled_at": row["disabled_at"],
"disabled_by": row["disabled_by"],
}
def idp_link_row_to_dict(row: aiosqlite.Row | Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Convert a ``user_idp_links`` row into a JSON-safe dict (U4 SSO)."""
return {
"idp_name": row["idp_name"],
"idp_subject": row["idp_subject"],
"user_id": row["user_id"],
"idp_type": row["idp_type"],
"created_at": row["created_at"],
}
def audit_log_row_to_dict(row: aiosqlite.Row | Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Convert an ``auth_audit_log`` row into a JSON-safe dict (U4 审计)."""
return {
"id": row["id"],
"event_type": row["event_type"],
"actor_user_id": row["actor_user_id"],
"actor_username": row["actor_username"],
"target_user_id": row["target_user_id"],
"target_username": row["target_username"],
"role_before": row["role_before"],
"role_after": row["role_after"],
"reason": row["reason"],
"source": row["source"],
"created_at": row["created_at"],
}

12
src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/__init__.py
View File

@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
from functools import lru_cache
from pathlib import Path
from .base import AuthProvider
from .exceptions import AuthProviderError, InvalidCredentials, ProviderNotImplemented
from .local import LocalAuthProvider
from .oidc_stub import StubOIDCProvider
from .user import User
from ..models import resolve_auth_db_path as _resolve_db_path
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@ -71,16 +71,6 @@ def _resolve_provider_name() -> str:
return name
def _resolve_db_path() -> Path:
"""Return the auth DB path (overridable for tests via env var)."""
from ..models import DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH
env = os.environ.get("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB")
if env:
return Path(env)
return DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH
@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def get_auth_provider() -> AuthProvider:
"""Return the configured :class:`AuthProvider` (memoized singleton).

29
src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/local.py
View File

@ -21,34 +21,22 @@ implementation.
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
import aiosqlite
from ..models import DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH, user_row_to_dict
from ..models import (
resolve_auth_db_path as _resolve_db_path,
_now_iso,
user_row_to_dict,
)
from ..password import hash_password, verify_password
from .user import User
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _resolve_db_path() -> Path:
"""Resolve the auth DB path with runtime env-var priority.
The :data:`models.DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH` constant is captured at
module-import time and therefore cannot see test-time env mutations.
Re-reading ``AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB`` here keeps the provider
"test-friendly" (tests can ``monkeypatch.setenv`` before constructing
the provider) without giving up the default path when no env is set.
"""
env = os.environ.get("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB")
if env:
return Path(env)
return DEFAULT_AUTH_DB_PATH
class LocalAuthProvider:
"""AuthProvider backed by the local SQLite ``users`` table + bcrypt.
@ -242,10 +230,3 @@ def _row_to_user(row: aiosqlite.Row) -> User:
last_login_at=row["last_login_at"],
created_by=row["created_by"],
)
def _now_iso() -> str:
"""Return current UTC time as ISO 8601 string."""
from datetime import datetime, timezone
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()

306
src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/oidc.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
"""OIDC 认证适配器 (authlib) — U4 SSO 集成。
redirect flow（KTD-2）：
1. ``get_redirect_url`` → IDP authorize URL（含 state）
2. ``handle_callback`` → code 换 token + 拉取 userinfo → 按 (idp_name, sub) 关联本地用户
**账户关联按 IDP ``sub`` 主键（R1a）**：禁止仅凭邮箱合并账户。
首次登录 JIT 创建本地用户 + ``user_idp_links`` 行；后续登录按 sub 查找现有用户。
``authenticate(username, password)`` 抛 ``ProviderNotImplemented`` — OIDC 是重定向流程，
不走密码 POST。AuthProvider Protocol 的其他方法（get_user_by_id 等）走本地 users 表。
state 缓存：进程内 dict + TTL 5min。ponytail: 多实例部署需 Redis 共享 state，
否则跨实例回调会失败。上限：单进程内存，state 量受并发登录数限制。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import secrets
import time
import uuid
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlencode
import aiosqlite
from authlib.integrations.httpx_client import AsyncOAuth2Client
from ..idp_registry import get_idp_registry
from ..models import user_row_to_dict, _now_iso, resolve_auth_db_path as _resolve_db_path
from ..password import hash_password
from .exceptions import ProviderNotImplemented
from .local import _row_to_user
from .user import User
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# state 缓存 TTL（秒）— OAuth 授权码流程的标准窗口
_STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
class _StateCache:
"""进程内 OAuth state 缓存（TTL 5min）。
ponytail: 多实例部署需替换为 Redis 共享 state，否则跨实例回调失败。
上限：单进程，state 条目数 = 并发登录数（通常 <100）。
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._store: dict[str, float] = {} # state -> expire_timestamp
def put(self, state: str) -> None:
self._evict()
self._store[state] = time.time() + _STATE_TTL_SECONDS
def consume(self, state: str) -> bool:
"""验证并消费 state（一次性，防 CSRF）。"""
self._evict()
exp = self._store.pop(state, None)
if exp is None:
return False
return exp > time.time()
def _evict(self) -> None:
now = time.time()
self._store = {s: e for s, e in self._store.items() if e > now}
_state_cache = _StateCache()
def get_state_cache() -> _StateCache:
"""返回进程级 state 缓存单例（测试可 monkeypatch）。"""
return _state_cache
class OIDCProvider:
"""OIDC 认证适配器 — authlib redirect flow + JIT 用户创建。
一个实例服务所有 OIDC IDP（按 ``provider_name`` 路由到不同 IDP 配置）。
"""
name = "oidc"
async def authenticate(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> User:
"""OIDC 是重定向流程，不走密码 POST — 直接抛 NotImplemented。"""
raise ProviderNotImplemented(
"OIDC 走重定向流程，请使用 /auth/oauth/{provider}/redirect 而非密码登录。"
)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Redirect flow
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
async def get_redirect_url(self, provider_name: str, state: str | None = None) -> str:
"""构造 IDP authorize URL 并缓存 state（CSRF 防护）。"""
registry = get_idp_registry()
idp = registry.get(provider_name)
if idp is None or idp.type != "oidc" or idp.oidc is None:
raise ValueError(f"OIDC IDP 未配置或不可用: {provider_name}")
cfg = idp.oidc
state = state or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
_state_cache.put(state)
async with AsyncOAuth2Client(
client_id=cfg.client_id,
client_secret=cfg.client_secret,
redirect_uri=cfg.redirect_uri,
) as client:
url, _ = client.create_authorization_url(
cfg.server_metadata_url, # authorize endpoint URL 或 discovery URL
state=state,
scope=cfg.scope,
)
return url
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Callback — code 换 token + userinfo + JIT 用户关联
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
async def handle_callback(self, provider_name: str, code: str, state: str) -> dict[str, object]:
"""处理 OIDC callback：code 换 token + 拉 userinfo + 关联/创建本地用户。
返回 user dict（via :func:`user_row_to_dict`）供路由签发 JWT。
Raises:
ValueError: state 无效 / IDP 未配置 / token 交换失败。
"""
if not _state_cache.consume(state):
raise ValueError("无效或过期的 OAuth state（CSRF 校验失败）")
registry = get_idp_registry()
idp = registry.get(provider_name)
if idp is None or idp.type != "oidc" or idp.oidc is None:
raise ValueError(f"OIDC IDP 未配置或不可用: {provider_name}")
cfg = idp.oidc
async with AsyncOAuth2Client(
client_id=cfg.client_id,
client_secret=cfg.client_secret,
redirect_uri=cfg.redirect_uri,
) as client:
token = await client.fetch_token(
cfg.server_metadata_url, # token endpoint URL 或 discovery URL
authorization_response=code,
body=urlencode(
{
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code": code,
"redirect_uri": cfg.redirect_uri,
}
),
)
# 拉取 userinfo（OIDC discovery 的标准端点）
userinfo = await self._fetch_userinfo(client, token, cfg.server_metadata_url)
sub = str(userinfo.get("sub", ""))
if not sub:
raise ValueError("OIDC userinfo 缺少 sub 字段（无法关联用户）")
# R1a: 按 (idp_name, sub) 关联 — 禁止邮箱合并
user = await self._find_or_create_user(
provider_name=provider_name,
sub=sub,
email=str(userinfo.get("email", "")),
name=str(userinfo.get("name", userinfo.get("preferred_username", ""))),
)
return user
async def _fetch_userinfo(
self,
client: AsyncOAuth2Client,
token: dict[str, Any],
metadata_url: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""从 OIDC userinfo endpoint 拉取用户信息。
ponytail: 直接 GET metadata_url（假定其即为 userinfo endpoint）。
生产环境应通过 discovery 文档解析 userinfo_endpoint；此处简化为直接请求。
上限：若 IDP 的 userinfo 端点与 discovery URL 不同需补充 discovery 解析。
"""
# authlib 的 token 已自动设置到 client 的 token_auth，可直接 GET
resp = await client.get(metadata_url)
if resp.status_code != 200:
# 退回 token 中的 id_token 解码（authlib 已校验签名）
id_token = token.get("id_token")
if id_token:
from authlib.jose import jwt as authlib_jwt # 局部导入避免硬依赖
claims = authlib_jwt.decode(
id_token,
None,
claims_options={"iss": {"essential": False}, "exp": {"essential": False}},
) # type: ignore[arg-type]
return dict(claims)
raise ValueError(f"拉取 userinfo 失败: HTTP {resp.status_code}")
data = resp.json()
return dict(data) if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
async def _find_or_create_user(
self,
*,
provider_name: str,
sub: str,
email: str,
name: str,
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""按 (idp_name, sub) 查找用户；未找到则 JIT 创建本地用户 + idp_link。
R1a: 严格按 sub 关联，绝不按邮箱合并已存在的本地账户。
"""
db_path = _resolve_db_path()
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
# 1. 按 (idp_name, sub) 查 idp_link
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT u.* FROM users u "
"JOIN user_idp_links l ON l.user_id = u.id "
"WHERE l.idp_name = ? AND l.idp_subject = ?",
(provider_name, sub),
)
row = await cursor.fetchone()
if row is not None:
return user_row_to_dict(row)
# 2. JIT 创建 — 用户名 / 邮箱来自 IDP，密码随机（不可用于本地登录）
user_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
# 用户名：优先 name，否则 provider:sub 前缀
username = (name or f"{provider_name}:{sub[:24]}")[:64]
# 保证 username 唯一：冲突时追加 sub 后缀
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ?", (username,))
if await cursor.fetchone() is not None:
username = f"{username[:55]}_{sub[:8]}"
# R1a: 邮箱冲突时不合并本地用户，改用 fallback 邮箱（保留 UNIQUE 约束）
user_email = email or f"{sub[:24]}@sso.{provider_name}.local"
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ?", (user_email,))
if await cursor.fetchone() is not None:
user_email = f"{sub[:24]}@sso.{provider_name}.local"
now = _now_iso()
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO users "
"(id, username, email, password_hash, role, is_active, "
" is_terminal_authorized, is_server_terminal_authorized, "
" created_at, updated_at, created_by) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
user_id,
username,
user_email,
hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(32)), # 不可用于本地登录
"member",
1,
0,
0,
now,
now,
None,
),
)
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO user_idp_links (idp_name, idp_subject, user_id, idp_type, created_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, 'oidc', ?)",
(provider_name, sub, user_id, now),
)
await db.commit()
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
assert row is not None
logger.info(
f"JIT 创建 OIDC 用户: idp={provider_name} sub={sub[:12]}... user={username}"
)
return user_row_to_dict(row)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# AuthProvider Protocol 其余方法（走本地 users 表）
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: str) -> User | None:
db_path = _resolve_db_path()
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? AND is_active = 1", (user_id,)
)
row = await cursor.fetchone()
return _row_to_user(row) if row else None
async def sync_user_attributes(self, user_id: str) -> None:
"""OIDC 属性同步：ponytail 暂为 no-op。
上限：生产应在此拉取最新 IDP profile（部门/职位）回写本地表。
"""
return None
async def revoke_user(self, user_id: str) -> None:
"""禁用本地用户账户（IDP 侧禁用需调用 IDP 管理 API，此处仅本地）。"""
db_path = _resolve_db_path()
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
await db.execute(
"UPDATE users SET is_active = 0, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(_now_iso(), user_id),
)
await db.commit()
logger.info(f"OIDC provider 禁用用户 {user_id}")

248
src/agentkit/server/auth/providers/saml.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
"""SAML 2.0 认证适配器 (python3-saml / OneLogin) — U4 SSO 集成。
ACS（Assertion Consumer Service）端点消费 SAMLResponse：
1. ``handle_acs`` → 解析 assertion + 提取 NameID
2. 按 (idp_name, NameID) 关联本地用户（R1a: 禁止邮箱合并）
3. 未找到则 JIT 创建本地用户 + ``user_idp_links`` 行
``authenticate(username, password)`` 抛 ``ProviderNotImplemented`` — SAML 是重定向流程。
OneLogin_Saml2_Auth 是同步库，``process_response`` 在线程池中执行避免阻塞事件循环。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import logging
import secrets
import uuid
from typing import Any
import aiosqlite
from ..idp_registry import get_idp_registry
from ..models import user_row_to_dict, _now_iso, resolve_auth_db_path as _resolve_db_path
from ..password import hash_password
from .exceptions import ProviderNotImplemented
from .local import _row_to_user
from .user import User
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class SAMLProvider:
"""SAML 2.0 认证适配器 — OneLogin python3-saml ACS 消费。
一个实例服务所有 SAML IDP（按 ``provider_name`` 路由到不同 IDP 配置）。
"""
name = "saml"
async def authenticate(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> User:
"""SAML 是重定向流程，不走密码 POST — 直接抛 NotImplemented。"""
raise ProviderNotImplemented(
"SAML 走重定向流程，请使用 /auth/saml/{provider}/acs 而非密码登录。"
)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# ACS — 消费 SAMLResponse + JIT 用户关联
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
async def handle_acs(
self,
provider_name: str,
saml_response: str,
*,
request_url: str = "",
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""处理 SAML ACS：解析 assertion + 提取 NameID + 关联/创建本地用户。
Args:
provider_name: IDP 名称（用于查找 IDP 配置 + idp_link）。
saml_response: base64 编码的 SAMLResponse。
request_url: 原始请求 URL（构造 OneLogin req dict 用）。
Returns:
本地用户 dict（via :func:`user_row_to_dict`）。
Raises:
ValueError: IDP 未配置 / SAML 解析失败 / 缺少 NameID。
"""
registry = get_idp_registry()
idp = registry.get(provider_name)
if idp is None or idp.type != "saml" or idp.saml is None:
raise ValueError(f"SAML IDP 未配置或不可用: {provider_name}")
cfg = idp.saml
# OneLogin req dict — 仅需 post_data 中的 SAMLResponse 即可解析
req: dict[str, Any] = {
"https": "on" if request_url.startswith("https://") else "off",
"http_host": _extract_host(request_url) or "localhost",
"server_port": "443" if request_url.startswith("https://") else "80",
"script_name": "",
"request_uri": "",
"get_data": {},
"post_data": {"SAMLResponse": saml_response},
}
# SAML 解析是同步 CPU 密集 — 放线程池避免阻塞事件循环
nameid, attributes = await asyncio.to_thread(self._process_saml, req, cfg, provider_name)
if not nameid:
raise ValueError("SAML assertion 缺少 NameID（无法关联用户）")
# R1a: 按 (idp_name, NameID) 关联 — 禁止邮箱合并
email = str(attributes.get("email", attributes.get("User.email", "")) or "")
name = str(attributes.get("name", attributes.get("cn", "")) or "")
return await self._find_or_create_user(
provider_name=provider_name,
nameid=nameid,
email=email,
name=name,
)
def _process_saml(
self,
req: dict[str, Any],
cfg: Any,
provider_name: str,
) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
"""同步解析 SAML response — 在线程池中执行。
返回 (NameID, attributes_dict)。
ponytail: OneLogin_Saml2_Auth 需要 SP 配置 dict。
此处构造最小 SP settings（cert/x509cert 为 IDP 签名证书）。
上限：生产 SAML SP 配置更完整（SP 私钥 / NameIDFormat 等），
此处只校验签名 + 提取 NameID 的最小集。
"""
from onelogin.saml2.auth import OneLogin_Saml2_Auth # 局部导入
settings = {
"strict": True,
"sp": {
"entityId": cfg.sp_entity_id,
"assertionConsumerService": {
"url": cfg.acs_url,
"binding": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST",
},
},
"idp": {
"entityId": cfg.entity_id,
"singleSignOnService": {
"url": cfg.sso_url,
"binding": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect",
},
"x509cert": cfg.idp_cert,
},
}
auth = OneLogin_Saml2_Auth(req, old_settings=settings)
auth.process_response()
errors = auth.get_errors()
if errors:
raise ValueError(f"SAML 解析失败 (idp={provider_name}): {errors}")
nameid = auth.get_nameid() or ""
attrs = dict(auth.get_attributes()) if auth.get_attributes() else {}
return str(nameid), attrs
async def _find_or_create_user(
self,
*,
provider_name: str,
nameid: str,
email: str,
name: str,
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""按 (idp_name, NameID) 查找用户；未找到则 JIT 创建。R1a: 禁止邮箱合并。"""
db_path = _resolve_db_path()
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT u.* FROM users u "
"JOIN user_idp_links l ON l.user_id = u.id "
"WHERE l.idp_name = ? AND l.idp_subject = ?",
(provider_name, nameid),
)
row = await cursor.fetchone()
if row is not None:
return user_row_to_dict(row)
user_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
username = (name or f"{provider_name}:{nameid[:24]}")[:64]
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = ?", (username,))
if await cursor.fetchone() is not None:
username = f"{username[:55]}_{nameid[:8]}"
# R1a: 邮箱冲突时不合并本地用户，改用 fallback 邮箱（保留 UNIQUE 约束）
user_email = email or f"{nameid[:24]}@sso.{provider_name}.local"
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = ?", (user_email,))
if await cursor.fetchone() is not None:
user_email = f"{nameid[:24]}@sso.{provider_name}.local"
now = _now_iso()
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO users "
"(id, username, email, password_hash, role, is_active, "
" is_terminal_authorized, is_server_terminal_authorized, "
" created_at, updated_at, created_by) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
user_id,
username,
user_email,
hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(32)),
"member",
1,
0,
0,
now,
now,
None,
),
)
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO user_idp_links (idp_name, idp_subject, user_id, idp_type, created_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, 'saml', ?)",
(provider_name, nameid, user_id, now),
)
await db.commit()
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
assert row is not None
logger.info(
f"JIT 创建 SAML 用户: idp={provider_name} nameid={nameid[:12]}... user={username}"
)
return user_row_to_dict(row)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# AuthProvider Protocol 其余方法
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: str) -> User | None:
db_path = _resolve_db_path()
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? AND is_active = 1", (user_id,)
)
row = await cursor.fetchone()
return _row_to_user(row) if row else None
async def sync_user_attributes(self, user_id: str) -> None:
"""SAML 属性同步：ponytail 暂为 no-op。"""
return None
async def revoke_user(self, user_id: str) -> None:
db_path = _resolve_db_path()
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
await db.execute(
"UPDATE users SET is_active = 0, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(_now_iso(), user_id),
)
await db.commit()
logger.info(f"SAML provider 禁用用户 {user_id}")
def _extract_host(url: str) -> str:
"""从 URL 中提取 host（ponytail: 不引入 urllib 解析，简单切分）。"""
if "://" in url:
url = url.split("://", 1)[1]
return url.split("/", 1)[0] if url else ""

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src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/__init__.py Normal file
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"""SCIM 2.0 最小子集 (U4 SSO 集成)。
- POST /scim/v2/Users — 创建用户
- PATCH /scim/v2/Users/{id} — 禁用 (active=false) / 更新
- GET /scim/v2/Users — 列表 / 过滤
SCIM push 失败触发实时告警（日志 error + OTel event）。
Bearer token 认证（SCIM token 独立于 JWT，配置于 agentkit.yaml auth.scim_token）。
"""

84
src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/models.py Normal file
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"""SCIM 2.0 用户 schema (Pydantic v2) — U4 最小子集。
仅实现 RFC 7643 / 7644 中创建 / 禁用 / 查询所需的字段：
``id``, ``userName``, ``active``, ``emails``, ``displayName``, ``externalId``。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, EmailStr, Field
class SCIMEmail(BaseModel):
"""SCIM email 多值条目。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
value: EmailStr
type: str = "work"
primary: bool = False
class SCIMUser(BaseModel):
"""SCIM 2.0 User 资源（最小子集）。
STAND-1: 移除 ``Any`` — ``externalId`` 是 RFC 7643 标准 attribute，
用于 SCIM 预配的用户与 SSO IDP subject 关联（API-5）。
"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
id: str | None = None
userName: str
active: bool = True
displayName: str | None = None
externalId: str | None = None
emails: list[SCIMEmail] = Field(default_factory=list)
class SCIMPatchOp(BaseModel):
"""SCIM 2.0 PATCH 操作（最小子集，仅支持 replace）。
STAND-1: ``value`` 用 ``object`` 替代 ``Any``（Pydantic v2 中 ``object`` 等价
于旧 ``Any`` 但更明确表达"任意 JSON 值"的语义）。
"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
op: str = "replace"
path: str | None = None
value: object = None
class SCIMPatchRequest(BaseModel):
"""SCIM PATCH 请求体（RFC 7644）。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
Operations: list[SCIMPatchOp] = Field(default_factory=list)
class SCIMListResponse(BaseModel):
"""SCIM 2.0 列表响应。
STAND-1: ``Resources`` 用 ``list[dict[str, object]]`` 替代 ``list[dict[str, Any]]``。
"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
schemas: list[str] = Field(
default_factory=lambda: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:ListResponse"]
)
totalResults: int = 0
startIndex: int = 1
itemsPerPage: int = 0
Resources: list[dict[str, object]] = Field(default_factory=list)
class SCIMErrorDetail(BaseModel):
"""SCIM 2.0 错误响应。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="allow")
status: str
detail: str | None = None

381
src/agentkit/server/auth/scim/router.py Normal file
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"""SCIM 2.0 路由 (U4 最小子集) — handler 内联，不拆 handlers.py。
端点：
- POST /scim/v2/Users — 创建用户（同步写 user_idp_links 供 SSO 联动）
- PATCH /scim/v2/Users/{id} — 禁用 (active=false) / 更新
- GET /scim/v2/Users — 列表 / 过滤
Bearer token 认证（独立于 JWT — ``auth.scim_token`` 配置项）。
SCIM push 失败触发实时告警（日志 error + OTel span event）。
RFC 7643/7644 合规：错误响应用 SCIMErrorResponse 格式 + Location 头 + totalResults 全量总数。
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hmac
import logging
import os
import secrets
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
import aiosqlite
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Request, status
from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from ...auth.audit import SOURCE_SCIM, get_audit_service
from ...auth.models import (
init_auth_db,
resolve_auth_db_path as _resolve_default_db_path,
user_row_to_dict,
_now_iso,
)
from ...auth.password import hash_password
from .models import SCIMListResponse, SCIMPatchRequest, SCIMUser
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/scim/v2", tags=["scim"])
_SCIM_USER_SCHEMA = "urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"
_SCIM_ERROR_SCHEMA = "urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:Error"
def _resolve_db_path(request: Request) -> Path:
path = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_db_path", None)
# API-3: 用 resolve_auth_db_path() 在调用时读取 env var，
# 让测试 monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB", tmp) 可见。
return Path(path) if path else _resolve_default_db_path()
def _resolve_scim_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
"""从 app.state 或环境变量解析 SCIM bearer token。"""
token = getattr(request.app.state, "scim_token", None)
if token:
return token
return os.environ.get("AGENTKIT_SCIM_TOKEN")
async def _verify_scim_token(request: Request) -> str:
"""SCIM bearer token 校验 — 恒定时间比较防时序攻击。"""
expected = _resolve_scim_token(request)
if not expected:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="SCIM 未配置 bearer token（auth.scim_token）",
)
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
if not auth_header.startswith("Bearer "):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="缺少 SCIM Bearer token")
provided = auth_header[7:]
if not hmac.compare_digest(provided, expected):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="SCIM token 无效")
return provided
def _alert_scim_failure(operation: str, detail: str, user_id: str | None = None) -> None:
"""SCIM 推送失败实时告警 — 日志 error + OTel span event。
ponytail: 仅日志 + OTel event。生产可扩展为 webhook / 告警通道。
上限：告警去重 / 限流需在告警通道侧实现。
"""
logger.error("SCIM 推送失败 [op=%s user=%s]: %s", operation, user_id or "?", detail)
try:
from agentkit.telemetry.tracer import get_tracer
tracer = get_tracer()
with tracer.start_span("scim.push.failure") as span:
span.set_attribute("scim.operation", operation)
span.set_attribute("scim.error", detail)
if user_id:
span.set_attribute("scim.user_id", user_id)
span.add_event("scim.alert", {"operation": operation, "detail": detail})
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — OTel 不可用不阻断主流程
pass
async def _ensure_db(request: Request) -> Path:
db_path = _resolve_db_path(request)
await init_auth_db(db_path)
return db_path
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# RFC 7644 3.12 — SCIM 错误响应格式
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _scim_error_response(status_code: int, detail: str) -> JSONResponse:
"""API-2: 构造 RFC 7644 3.12 规定的 SCIM 错误响应格式。"""
return JSONResponse(
status_code=status_code,
content={
"schemas": [_SCIM_ERROR_SCHEMA],
"status": str(status_code),
"detail": detail,
},
)
# API-2: APIRouter 在旧版 FastAPI 无 exception_handler 方法，改为导出注册函数
# 由 app.py 在挂载 SCIM router 后调用，scope 到 /scim/v2 路径。
def register_scim_exception_handlers(app) -> None:
"""注册 SCIM 异常处理器 — 仅对 /scim/v2 路径生效，不影响其他路由。
API-2: APIRouter 在旧版 FastAPI 无 exception_handler 方法，改为在 app 上注册
并通过 request.url.path scope 到 SCIM 路径。非 SCIM 路由走 FastAPI 默认格式。
"""
@app.exception_handler(HTTPException)
async def _scim_http_handler(request: Request, exc: HTTPException):
path = request.url.path
is_scim = path.startswith("/scim/v2") or path.startswith("/api/v1/scim/v2")
if not is_scim:
# 非 SCIM 路由 — 复制 FastAPI 默认 HTTPException handler 行为（含 headers）
headers = getattr(exc, "headers", None)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=exc.status_code,
content={"detail": exc.detail},
headers=headers,
)
return _scim_error_response(exc.status_code, str(exc.detail))
@app.exception_handler(RequestValidationError)
async def _scim_validation_handler(request: Request, exc: RequestValidationError):
path = request.url.path
is_scim = path.startswith("/scim/v2") or path.startswith("/api/v1/scim/v2")
if not is_scim:
# 非 SCIM 路由 — 复制 FastAPI 默认 RequestValidationError handler 行为
from fastapi.encoders import jsonable_encoder
return JSONResponse(
status_code=422,
content={"detail": jsonable_encoder(exc.errors())},
)
return _scim_error_response(400, f"请求体校验失败: {exc}")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SCIM User 资源转换 — STAND-1: 用 dict[str, object] 替代 Any
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _user_to_scim(row: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
"""本地 user dict → SCIM 2.0 User JSON。
API-11: displayName 改为 None（让客户端用 userName fallback），
因为 users 表无 name/full_name 列，username 不是 displayName 的合理来源。
"""
email = str(row.get("email", "") or "")
return {
"schemas": [_SCIM_USER_SCHEMA],
"id": str(row["id"]),
"userName": str(row["username"]),
"active": bool(row.get("is_active", True)),
"displayName": None,
"emails": [{"value": email, "type": "work", "primary": True}] if email else [],
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SCIM 端点
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@router.post("/Users", status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def create_user(
payload: SCIMUser,
request: Request,
_token: str = Depends(_verify_scim_token),
) -> JSONResponse:
"""SCIM POST /Users — 创建本地用户（随机密码，不可本地登录）。
API-5: 同时写 user_idp_links 行，让 SCIM 预配的用户能通过 SSO 登录，
避免 OIDC JIT 创建重复账户。externalId 作为 idp_subject，
缺省时用 userName。
"""
db_path = await _ensure_db(request)
user_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
now = _now_iso()
email = payload.emails[0].value if payload.emails else f"{user_id}@scim.local"
# externalId 是 RFC 7643 标准 attribute，作为 IDP subject 关联本地用户
external_id = getattr(payload, "externalId", None) or payload.userName
try:
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO users "
"(id, username, email, password_hash, role, is_active, "
" is_terminal_authorized, is_server_terminal_authorized, "
" created_at, updated_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
user_id,
payload.userName,
str(email),
hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(32)),
"member",
1 if payload.active else 0,
0,
0,
now,
now,
),
)
# API-5: 写 user_idp_links 行，idp_name='scim'，idp_subject=externalId
# 表无 id 列（PK = idp_name + idp_subject），省去 uuid 生成。
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO user_idp_links "
"(idp_name, idp_subject, user_id, idp_type, created_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
("scim", external_id, user_id, "scim", now),
)
await db.commit()
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
assert row is not None
logger.info(
"SCIM 创建用户 userName=%s id=%s externalId=%s", payload.userName, user_id, external_id
)
# API-6: RFC 7644 3.14 强制要求 Location 头
body = _user_to_scim(user_row_to_dict(row))
response = JSONResponse(status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED, content=body)
response.headers["Location"] = f"/scim/v2/Users/{user_id}"
return response
except aiosqlite.IntegrityError as exc:
_alert_scim_failure("create", f"用户名或邮箱冲突: {exc}", user_id)
return _scim_error_response(409, "userName 或 email 已存在")
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
_alert_scim_failure("create", str(exc), user_id)
return _scim_error_response(500, "SCIM 创建失败")
@router.patch("/Users/{user_id}")
async def patch_user(
user_id: str,
payload: SCIMPatchRequest,
request: Request,
_token: str = Depends(_verify_scim_token),
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""SCIM PATCH /Users/{id} — 禁用 (active=false) 或更新字段。
API-7: userName UNIQUE 冲突时返回 409（而非 500）。
SEC-3: active true→false 触发审计记录（与 admin deprovision 对齐）。
"""
db_path = await _ensure_db(request)
now = _now_iso()
# SEC-3: 收集 deprovision 审计信息，在事务提交后调用（避免 SQLite 写锁竞争）
_pending_audit: dict[str, object] | None = None
try:
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
if row is None:
return _scim_error_response(404, "用户不存在")
prev_active = bool(row["is_active"])
for op in payload.Operations:
if op.op.lower() == "replace":
if op.path in (None, "active"):
active = (
bool(op.value)
if not isinstance(op.value, dict)
else bool(op.value.get("active", True))
)
await db.execute(
"UPDATE users SET is_active = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(1 if active else 0, now, user_id),
)
# SEC-3: active true→false 写审计（延后到事务提交后）
if prev_active and not active:
_pending_audit = {
"target_user_id": user_id,
"target_username": str(row["username"]),
}
elif op.path == "userName":
try:
await db.execute(
"UPDATE users SET username = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(str(op.value)[:64], now, user_id),
)
except aiosqlite.IntegrityError:
# API-7: UNIQUE 冲突返回 409
return _scim_error_response(409, "userName 已存在")
await db.commit()
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
assert row is not None
# SEC-3: 事务提交后写审计（避免 SQLite "database is locked"）
if _pending_audit is not None:
await get_audit_service().record_deprovision(
actor_user_id=None,
actor_username="scim",
target_user_id=str(_pending_audit["target_user_id"]),
target_username=str(_pending_audit["target_username"]),
reason="scim_patch_active_false",
source=SOURCE_SCIM,
)
return _user_to_scim(user_row_to_dict(row))
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
_alert_scim_failure("patch", str(exc), user_id)
return _scim_error_response(500, "SCIM 更新失败")
@router.get("/Users")
async def list_users(
request: Request,
filter: str | None = Query(default=None, alias="filter"),
startIndex: int = Query(default=1, ge=1),
count: int = Query(default=100, ge=1, le=200),
_token: str = Depends(_verify_scim_token),
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""SCIM GET /Users — 列表 / 过滤。
API-1: totalResults 返回全量总数（COUNT 查询），而非当前页条数。
API-9: 不支持的 filter 语法返回 400 + invalidFilter，不静默全量返回。
API-13: filter 解析大小写不敏感（RFC 7644 3.4.2.2）。
"""
db_path = await _ensure_db(request)
where = ""
params: list[object] = []
if filter:
filter_lower = filter.lower()
# API-13: 大小写不敏感匹配
if "username eq" in filter_lower:
# 从原 filter 中提取引号内的值（保留原大小写）
val = filter.split(" eq", 1)[1].strip().strip('"').strip("'")
where = "WHERE username = ?"
params.append(val)
elif "active eq" in filter_lower:
val = filter.split(" eq", 1)[1].strip().strip('"').strip("'").lower()
where = "WHERE is_active = ?"
params.append(1 if val in ("true", "1") else 0)
else:
# API-9: 不支持的 filter 返回 400
return _scim_error_response(
400, f"Unsupported filter syntax (scimType=invalidFilter): {filter}"
)
# API-1: 先 COUNT 全量总数
count_sql = f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users {where}"
list_sql = f"SELECT * FROM users {where} ORDER BY created_at ASC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?"
list_params = [*params, count, startIndex - 1]
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
# totalResults
cursor = await db.execute(count_sql, tuple(params))
total_results = (await cursor.fetchone())[0]
# 当前页
cursor = await db.execute(list_sql, tuple(list_params))
rows = await cursor.fetchall()
resources = [_user_to_scim(user_row_to_dict(r)) for r in rows]
return SCIMListResponse(
totalResults=total_results,
startIndex=startIndex,
itemsPerPage=len(resources),
Resources=resources,
).model_dump()

9
src/agentkit/server/frontend/src/stores/chatStream.ts
View File

@ -869,7 +869,8 @@ export function dispatchWsEvent(
case "team_synthesis_chunk": {
// U4: 团队综合流式 chunk — 首次创建 streaming 占位，后续累加。
// P2 fix: 用 synthesis_id 去重，避免 chunk 附身到上一次孤儿 streaming milestone。
// P2 fix: 用 synthesis_id 精确去重 — sid 存在时仅匹配相同 synthesis_id 的 milestone，
// 不再兜底附身到 undefined synthesis_id 的旧孤儿占位（避免跨重试附身 bug）。
const conversationId = state.resolveIncomingConvId();
if (!conversationId) break;
const conv = state.conversations.value.find(
@ -882,13 +883,11 @@ export function dispatchWsEvent(
(m) =>
m.message_type === "milestone" &&
m.status === "streaming" &&
(sid ? m.synthesis_id === sid || m.synthesis_id === undefined : true),
(sid ? m.synthesis_id === sid : true),
);
if (existing) {
state.updateMessage(conversationId, existing.id, {
content: (existing.content || "") + (event.data.chunk || ""),
// 首次附身到无 synthesis_id 的 milestone 时，标记上 synthesis_id
...(sid && !existing.synthesis_id ? { synthesis_id: sid } : {}),
});
} else {
const synthMsg: IChatMessage = {
@ -926,7 +925,7 @@ export function dispatchWsEvent(
(m) =>
m.message_type === "milestone" &&
m.status === "streaming" &&
(sid ? m.synthesis_id === sid || m.synthesis_id === undefined : true),
(sid ? m.synthesis_id === sid : true),
);
if (existing) {
state.updateMessage(conversationId, existing.id, {

97
src/agentkit/server/frontend/tests/unit/bitable-tokens.test.ts Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
/**
* DR-3: Bitable design tokens — static structural assertion.
*
* Parses `bitable-tokens.css` and asserts all required `--bitable-*` tokens
* are defined inside `:root`. Prevents accidental token removal/renaming
* that would silently break var() references in bitable components.
*
* ponytail: pure regex parse — no CSS parser dependency. Ceiling: doesn't
* validate token values (only presence). Upgrade path: postcss + stylelint
* custom rules for value-level validation.
*/
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { resolve } from 'node:path'
const CSS_PATH = resolve(
__dirname,
'../../src/styles/bitable-tokens.css',
)
const cssContent: string = readFileSync(CSS_PATH, 'utf-8')
/**Extract the first `:root { ... }` block content (without the selector).*/
function extractRootBlock(css: string): string {
const match = /:root\s*\{([^}]*)\}/.exec(css)
if (!match || match[1] === undefined) {
throw new Error('No :root block found in bitable-tokens.css')
}
return match[1]
}
const rootBlock = extractRootBlock(cssContent)
/**Required token names grouped by category (mirrors the CSS file structure).*/
const REQUIRED_TOKENS = {
color: [
'--bitable-color-primary',
'--bitable-color-bg',
'--bitable-color-bg-secondary',
'--bitable-color-bg-tertiary',
'--bitable-color-text',
'--bitable-color-text-secondary',
'--bitable-color-text-tertiary',
'--bitable-color-text-placeholder',
'--bitable-color-border',
'--bitable-color-border-hover',
'--bitable-color-border-split',
],
cf: [
'--bitable-cf-red-bg',
'--bitable-cf-red-fg',
'--bitable-cf-orange-bg',
'--bitable-cf-orange-fg',
'--bitable-cf-yellow-bg',
'--bitable-cf-yellow-fg',
'--bitable-cf-green-bg',
'--bitable-cf-green-fg',
'--bitable-cf-blue-bg',
'--bitable-cf-blue-fg',
'--bitable-cf-purple-bg',
'--bitable-cf-purple-fg',
'--bitable-cf-gray-bg',
'--bitable-cf-gray-fg',
'--bitable-cf-neutral-bg',
'--bitable-cf-neutral-fg',
],
drawer: ['--bitable-drawer-width', '--bitable-drawer-width-wide'],
} as const
describe('bitable-tokens.css — DR-3 design token contract', () => {
it('defines a :root block', () => {
expect(rootBlock.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
})
it.each(REQUIRED_TOKENS.color)('defines color token %s in :root', (token) => {
// Match `--token-name:` (declaration), not just substring presence.
const declPattern = new RegExp(`${token.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\s*:`)
expect(declPattern.test(rootBlock)).toBe(true)
})
it.each(REQUIRED_TOKENS.cf)('defines conditional-format token %s in :root', (token) => {
const declPattern = new RegExp(`${token.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\s*:`)
expect(declPattern.test(rootBlock)).toBe(true)
})
it.each(REQUIRED_TOKENS.drawer)('defines drawer token %s in :root', (token) => {
const declPattern = new RegExp(`${token.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\s*:`)
expect(declPattern.test(rootBlock)).toBe(true)
})
it('does not hardcode tokens outside :root (no component-level overrides)', () => {
// ponytail: bitable tokens are exclusively :root-scoped; component-level
// overrides would break the single-source-of-truth invariant.
const outsideRoot = cssContent.replace(/:root\s*\{[^}]*\}/, '')
expect(outsideRoot).not.toMatch(/--bitable-[a-z-]+\s*:/)
})
})

299
src/agentkit/server/routes/auth.py
View File

@ -23,9 +23,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import hmac
import logging
import secrets
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from typing import Any, Literal
import aiosqlite
import jwt
@ -780,6 +781,162 @@ async def change_password(
return {"changed": True, "revoked_other_sessions": revoked}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SSO routes — OIDC redirect/callback + SAML ACS (U4)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class SSORedirectResponse(BaseModel):
"""SSO 重定向响应 — 返回 IDP authorize URL 供前端跳转。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
redirect_url: str
state: str
async def _sso_issue_token_pair(
request: Request,
user_dict: dict[str, object],
*,
provider_type: str = "sso",
provider_name: str | None = None,
) -> TokenResponse:
"""SSO 登录成功后签发 JWT pair + 创建 session（复用 login 流程）。
API-4: 一次性生成真实 refresh_token 再创建 session（避免占位符并发冲突）。
API-8: auth_provider 携带 provider_type + provider_name（如 'oidc-keycloak'），
供 admin session 列表按 IDP 筛选 + 审计追溯。
SEC-1: 与本地 login 一致地校验 is_active。
"""
# SEC-1: SSO 流程必须与本地 login（auth.py:377）一致地校验 is_active，
# 否则已 deprovision 的用户可通过 IDP 回调重新拿到 JWT + session。
if not bool(user_dict.get("is_active", True)):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Account is disabled")
db_path = await _ensure_db(request)
secret = _resolve_jwt_secret(request)
svc: SessionService = get_session_service()
info = _client_info(request)
# API-4: 先生成真实 refresh_token，避免占位符 "__pending_sso__" 在并发 SSO
# 登录时触发 refresh_token_hash UNIQUE 约束冲突。
refresh_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
# API-8: auth_provider 形如 "oidc-keycloak" / "saml-azuread" / "sso"
auth_provider = f"{provider_type}-{provider_name}" if provider_name else provider_type
session = await svc.create(
SessionCreate(
user_id=str(user_dict["id"]),
refresh_token=refresh_token,
device_fingerprint=info["fingerprint"],
device_label=info["label"],
ip=info["ip"],
user_agent=info["user_agent"],
auth_provider=auth_provider,
ttl_seconds=_refresh_ttl_seconds(False),
)
)
token_pair = create_token_pair(
user_id=str(user_dict["id"]),
username=str(user_dict["username"]),
role=str(user_dict["role"]),
secret=secret,
session_id=session.id,
)
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
await db.execute(
"UPDATE users SET last_login_at = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(_now_iso(), _now_iso(), str(user_dict["id"])),
)
await db.commit()
return TokenResponse(
access_token=token_pair.access_token,
refresh_token=token_pair.refresh_token,
expires_in=int(ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL.total_seconds()),
user=UserResponse(
id=str(user_dict["id"]),
username=str(user_dict["username"]),
email=str(user_dict["email"]),
role=str(user_dict["role"]),
is_active=bool(user_dict.get("is_active", True)),
is_terminal_authorized=bool(user_dict.get("is_terminal_authorized", False)),
is_server_terminal_authorized=bool(
user_dict.get("is_server_terminal_authorized", False)
),
),
session_id=session.id,
)
@router.get("/oauth/{provider}/redirect", response_model=SSORedirectResponse)
async def oidc_redirect(provider: str, request: Request) -> SSORedirectResponse:
"""OIDC 重定向 — 返回 IDP authorize URL（前端跳转）。"""
from agentkit.server.auth.providers.oidc import OIDCProvider
try:
url = await OIDCProvider().get_redirect_url(provider)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=str(exc)) from exc
# state 已由 provider 写入 _state_cache，从 URL 中提取回传前端
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
parsed = urlparse(url)
state_values = parse_qs(parsed.query).get("state", [])
state = state_values[0] if state_values else ""
return SSORedirectResponse(redirect_url=url, state=state)
@router.get("/oauth/{provider}/callback", response_model=TokenResponse)
async def oidc_callback(
provider: str,
code: str,
state: str,
request: Request,
) -> TokenResponse:
"""OIDC callback — code 换 token + userinfo + JIT 用户关联 → JWT pair。"""
await _ensure_db(request)
from agentkit.server.auth.providers.oidc import OIDCProvider
try:
user_dict = await OIDCProvider().handle_callback(provider, code, state)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
return await _sso_issue_token_pair(
request, user_dict, provider_type="oidc", provider_name=provider
)
class SAMLACSRequest(BaseModel):
"""SAML ACS 请求体。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
SAMLResponse: str
RelayState: str | None = None
@router.post("/saml/{provider}/acs", response_model=TokenResponse)
async def saml_acs(
provider: str,
payload: SAMLACSRequest,
request: Request,
) -> TokenResponse:
"""SAML ACS — 消费 SAMLResponse + NameID 提取 + JIT 用户关联 → JWT pair。"""
await _ensure_db(request)
from agentkit.server.auth.providers.saml import SAMLProvider
request_url = str(request.url)
try:
user_dict = await SAMLProvider().handle_acs(
provider, payload.SAMLResponse, request_url=request_url
)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
return await _sso_issue_token_pair(
request, user_dict, provider_type="saml", provider_name=provider
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Admin routes
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -889,6 +1046,146 @@ async def admin_revoke_user_session(
return {"revoked": ok}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Admin deprovisioning + RBAC role change (U4 — R1b / KTD-8)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class DeprovisionRequest(BaseModel):
"""手动 deprovisioning 请求体。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
reason: str | None = None
break_glass: bool = False # 高权限账户 break-glass 标记
class DeprovisionResponse(BaseModel):
"""API-10: deprovision 响应体（让 OpenAPI schema 可文档化）。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
deprovisioned: bool
revoked_sessions: int
class RoleChangeResponse(BaseModel):
"""API-10: 角色变更响应体。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
role_changed: bool
role_before: str
role_after: str
revoked_sessions: int
@admin_router.post("/users/{user_id}/deprovision", response_model=DeprovisionResponse)
async def deprovision_user(
user_id: str,
payload: DeprovisionRequest,
request: Request,
admin: dict[str, Any] = Depends(_require_admin),
) -> DeprovisionResponse:
"""手动 deprovisioning (R1b) — operator/admin RBAC 强制。
1. 禁用本地用户 (is_active=0)
2. 撤销该用户所有活跃 session
3. 记录审计 (actor/target/reason/source/timestamp)，接入 OTel
4. break_glass=True 时记录 source=break_glass（高权限账户应急通道）
"""
db_path = await _ensure_db(request)
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
await db.execute(
"UPDATE users SET is_active = 0, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(_now_iso(), user_id),
)
await db.commit()
# 撤销所有 session
svc: SessionService = get_session_service()
revoked = await svc.revoke_all_for_user(user_id, reason="admin_revoked")
# 审计记录
from agentkit.server.auth.audit import (
SOURCE_BREAKGLASS,
SOURCE_MANUAL,
get_audit_service,
)
source = SOURCE_BREAKGLASS if payload.break_glass else SOURCE_MANUAL
await get_audit_service().record_deprovision(
actor_user_id=str(admin.get("user_id") or ""),
actor_username=str(admin.get("username") or ""),
target_user_id=user_id,
target_username=str(row["username"]),
reason=payload.reason,
source=source,
)
return DeprovisionResponse(deprovisioned=True, revoked_sessions=revoked)
class RoleChangeRequest(BaseModel):
"""RBAC 角色变更请求体。"""
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
role: Literal["member", "operator", "admin"]
reason: str | None = None
@admin_router.post("/users/{user_id}/role", response_model=RoleChangeResponse)
async def change_user_role(
user_id: str,
payload: RoleChangeRequest,
request: Request,
admin: dict[str, Any] = Depends(_require_admin),
) -> RoleChangeResponse:
"""RBAC 角色变更 (KTD-8) — admin only。
记录 actor/target/role_before/role_after/reason/source/timestamp，接入 OTel 审计。
变更后撤销该用户所有现有 session（强制重新登录以刷新 JWT role claim）。
"""
db_path = await _ensure_db(request)
from agentkit.server.auth.audit import SOURCE_MANUAL, get_audit_service
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(db_path)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
role_before = str(row["role"])
await db.execute(
"UPDATE users SET role = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(payload.role, _now_iso(), user_id),
)
await db.commit()
# 审计记录
await get_audit_service().record_role_change(
actor_user_id=str(admin.get("user_id") or ""),
actor_username=str(admin.get("username") or ""),
target_user_id=user_id,
target_username=str(row["username"]),
role_before=role_before,
role_after=payload.role,
reason=payload.reason,
source=SOURCE_MANUAL,
)
# 撤销所有 session（强制重新登录刷新 role claim）
svc: SessionService = get_session_service()
revoked = await svc.revoke_all_for_user(user_id, reason="role_changed")
return RoleChangeResponse(
role_changed=True,
role_before=role_before,
role_after=payload.role,
revoked_sessions=revoked,
)
# Backwards-compat /me endpoint (kept for the existing frontend)
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)
async def me(

63
src/agentkit/server/task_store.py
View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any
@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@dataclass
class TaskRecord:
"""Stored task record with full lifecycle data"""
task_id: str
agent_name: str
skill_name: str | None
@ -57,9 +59,15 @@ class TaskRecord:
status=TaskStatus(data.get("status", "pending")),
output_data=data.get("output_data"),
error_message=data.get("error_message"),
created_at=datetime.fromisoformat(data["created_at"]) if data.get("created_at") else datetime.now(timezone.utc),
started_at=datetime.fromisoformat(data["started_at"]) if data.get("started_at") else None,
completed_at=datetime.fromisoformat(data["completed_at"]) if data.get("completed_at") else None,
created_at=datetime.fromisoformat(data["created_at"])
if data.get("created_at")
else datetime.now(timezone.utc),
started_at=datetime.fromisoformat(data["started_at"])
if data.get("started_at")
else None,
completed_at=datetime.fromisoformat(data["completed_at"])
if data.get("completed_at")
else None,
progress=data.get("progress", 0.0),
progress_message=data.get("progress_message", ""),
metadata=data.get("metadata", {}),
@ -124,14 +132,19 @@ class InMemoryTaskStore:
if expired:
logger.info(f"TaskStore cleaned up {len(expired)} expired records")
def create(self, task_id: str, agent_name: str, input_data: dict, skill_name: str | None = None) -> TaskRecord:
def create(
self, task_id: str, agent_name: str, input_data: dict, skill_name: str | None = None
) -> TaskRecord:
"""Create a new task record"""
if len(self._tasks) >= self._max_records:
# Remove oldest completed task
oldest = None
for rec in self._tasks.values():
if rec.status in (TaskStatus.COMPLETED, TaskStatus.FAILED, TaskStatus.CANCELLED):
if oldest is None or (rec.completed_at and (oldest.completed_at is None or rec.completed_at < oldest.completed_at)):
if oldest is None or (
rec.completed_at
and (oldest.completed_at is None or rec.completed_at < oldest.completed_at)
):
oldest = rec
if oldest:
del self._tasks[oldest.task_id]
@ -223,9 +236,11 @@ class RedisTaskStore:
if self._redis is None:
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
# DEPLOY-2: 显式传入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var（Helm 注入但 redis-py 不自动读取）。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._redis
@ -245,7 +260,9 @@ class RedisTaskStore:
# ── CRUD ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def create(self, task_id: str, agent_name: str, input_data: dict, skill_name: str | None = None) -> TaskRecord:
async def create(
self, task_id: str, agent_name: str, input_data: dict, skill_name: str | None = None
) -> TaskRecord:
"""Create a new task record in Redis."""
redis = await self._get_redis()
@ -305,7 +322,9 @@ end
return encoded
"""
async def update_status(self, task_id: str, status: TaskStatus, reset_ttl: bool = False, **kwargs) -> TaskRecord:
async def update_status(
self, task_id: str, status: TaskStatus, reset_ttl: bool = False, **kwargs
) -> TaskRecord:
"""Update task status and optional fields atomically via Lua script.
Args:
@ -322,7 +341,15 @@ return encoded
# Build flat list of key-value pairs for the merge fields
merge_fields = {"status": status.value}
for k, value in kwargs.items():
if k in ("started_at", "completed_at", "output_data", "error_message", "progress", "progress_message", "metadata"):
if k in (
"started_at",
"completed_at",
"output_data",
"error_message",
"progress",
"progress_message",
"metadata",
):
if isinstance(value, datetime):
merge_fields[k] = value.isoformat()
else:
@ -340,7 +367,9 @@ return encoded
data = json.loads(result)
return TaskRecord.from_dict(data)
async def list_tasks(self, status: TaskStatus | None = None, limit: int = 100) -> list[TaskRecord]:
async def list_tasks(
self, status: TaskStatus | None = None, limit: int = 100
) -> list[TaskRecord]:
"""List tasks, optionally filtered by status, sorted by created_at desc."""
redis = await self._get_redis()
tasks: list[TaskRecord] = []
@ -433,7 +462,11 @@ return encoded
await redis.zrem(self.ZSET_KEY, tid)
continue
record = TaskRecord.from_dict(json.loads(raw))
if record.status in (TaskStatus.COMPLETED, TaskStatus.FAILED, TaskStatus.CANCELLED) and record.completed_at is not None:
if (
record.status
in (TaskStatus.COMPLETED, TaskStatus.FAILED, TaskStatus.CANCELLED)
and record.completed_at is not None
):
await redis.delete(self._key(tid))
await redis.zrem(self.ZSET_KEY, tid)
return True
@ -452,7 +485,11 @@ return encoded
if raw is None:
continue
record = TaskRecord.from_dict(json.loads(raw))
if record.status in (TaskStatus.COMPLETED, TaskStatus.FAILED, TaskStatus.CANCELLED):
if record.status in (
TaskStatus.COMPLETED,
TaskStatus.FAILED,
TaskStatus.CANCELLED,
):
tasks.append(record)
if cursor == 0:
break
@ -505,7 +542,9 @@ def create_task_store(
logger.info(f"TaskStore backend: redis ({_sanitize_redis_url(redis_url)})")
return store
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(f"Failed to initialise RedisTaskStore ({exc}), falling back to InMemoryTaskStore")
logger.warning(
f"Failed to initialise RedisTaskStore ({exc}), falling back to InMemoryTaskStore"
)
store = InMemoryTaskStore(ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds, max_records=max_records)
logger.info("TaskStore backend: memory")

38
src/agentkit/session/store.py
View File

@ -24,12 +24,18 @@ class SessionStore(Protocol):
async def save_session(self, session: Session) -> None: ...
async def get_session(self, session_id: str) -> Session | None: ...
async def update_session_status(self, session_id: str, status: SessionStatus) -> Session | None: ...
async def update_session_status(
self, session_id: str, status: SessionStatus
) -> Session | None: ...
async def delete_session(self, session_id: str) -> bool: ...
async def list_sessions(self, agent_name: str | None = None, limit: int = 100) -> list[Session]: ...
async def list_sessions(
self, agent_name: str | None = None, limit: int = 100
) -> list[Session]: ...
async def append_message(self, message: Message) -> None: ...
async def get_messages(self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0) -> list[Message]: ...
async def get_messages(
self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0
) -> list[Message]: ...
async def count_messages(self, session_id: str) -> int: ...
async def health_check(self) -> bool: ...
@ -91,7 +97,9 @@ class InMemorySessionStore:
del msgs[:excess]
msgs.append(message)
async def get_messages(self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0) -> list[Message]:
async def get_messages(
self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0
) -> list[Message]:
msgs = self._messages.get(session_id, [])
sliced = msgs[offset:]
if limit is not None:
@ -125,7 +133,13 @@ class RedisSessionStore:
if self._redis is None:
import redis.asyncio as aioredis
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(self._redis_url, decode_responses=True)
# DEPLOY-2: Helm 注入 REDIS_PASSWORD env var，redis-py from_url 不自动读取，
# 必须显式以 password= 传入。env var 未设置时 password=None 保持向后兼容。
self._redis = aioredis.from_url(
self._redis_url,
decode_responses=True,
password=os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD") or None,
)
return self._redis
def _session_key(self, session_id: str) -> str:
@ -192,7 +206,9 @@ class RedisSessionStore:
# Set TTL on message list to match session TTL
await redis.expire(key, self._ttl_seconds)
async def get_messages(self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0) -> list[Message]:
async def get_messages(
self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0
) -> list[Message]:
redis = await self._get_redis()
key = self._messages_key(session_id)
# Use LRANGE for offset-based pagination
@ -304,7 +320,9 @@ class FileSessionStore:
data["session"]["updated_at"] = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
self._write_session_file(message.session_id, data)
async def get_messages(self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0) -> list[Message]:
async def get_messages(
self, session_id: str, limit: int | None = None, offset: int = 0
) -> list[Message]:
data = self._read_session_file(session_id)
if data is None:
return []
@ -347,10 +365,12 @@ def create_session_store(
import redis.asyncio as aioredis # noqa: F401
store = RedisSessionStore(redis_url=redis_url, ttl_seconds=ttl_seconds)
logger.info(f"SessionStore backend: redis")
logger.info("SessionStore backend: redis")
return store
except (ImportError, OSError, _RedisError, ValueError, KeyError, RuntimeError) as exc:
logger.warning(f"Failed to initialise RedisSessionStore ({exc}), falling back to InMemorySessionStore")
logger.warning(
f"Failed to initialise RedisSessionStore ({exc}), falling back to InMemorySessionStore"
)
store = InMemorySessionStore()
logger.info("SessionStore backend: memory")

67
src/agentkit/telemetry/metrics.py
View File

@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
"""Metric definitions — no-op when OTel not installed"""
"""Metric definitions — OTel now required (U1).
try:
from opentelemetry import metrics
_OTEL_AVAILABLE kept as a constant True for backward compatibility with
existing call sites (react.py / rewoo.py / reflexion.py / gateway.py) that
guard span creation with `if _OTEL_AVAILABLE:`. The guard is now redundant
but kept to avoid churn; tests still patch it to False to exercise the
no-span path.
"""
_OTEL_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError:
_OTEL_AVAILABLE = False
from opentelemetry import metrics
_OTEL_AVAILABLE = True
class _NoOpCounter:
@ -42,6 +46,11 @@ _agent_duration_histogram = None
_llm_token_histogram = None
_tool_duration_histogram = None
_pipeline_step_histogram = None
_prompt_cache_hit_counter = None
_prompt_cache_miss_counter = None
# U2 — PII 脱敏覆盖率指标
_pii_filter_coverage_counter = None
_pii_filter_redacted_counter = None
def _get_counter(name: str, description: str, unit: str = "1"):
@ -92,9 +101,7 @@ def tool_duration_histogram():
"""Tool call duration."""
global _tool_duration_histogram
if _tool_duration_histogram is None:
_tool_duration_histogram = _get_histogram(
"tool.call.duration", "Tool call duration"
)
_tool_duration_histogram = _get_histogram("tool.call.duration", "Tool call duration")
return _tool_duration_histogram
@ -106,3 +113,45 @@ def pipeline_step_histogram():
"pipeline.step.duration", "Pipeline step duration"
)
return _pipeline_step_histogram
# U2 — Prompt cache hit/miss counters（Anthropic cache_read_input_tokens > 0 → hit）
def prompt_cache_hit_counter():
"""Prompt cache hit count（cache_read_input_tokens > 0）."""
global _prompt_cache_hit_counter
if _prompt_cache_hit_counter is None:
_prompt_cache_hit_counter = _get_counter("prompt_cache.hit", "Prompt cache hit count")
return _prompt_cache_hit_counter
def prompt_cache_miss_counter():
"""Prompt cache miss count（cache_read_input_tokens == 0）."""
global _prompt_cache_miss_counter
if _prompt_cache_miss_counter is None:
_prompt_cache_miss_counter = _get_counter("prompt_cache.miss", "Prompt cache miss count")
return _prompt_cache_miss_counter
# U2 — PII 脱敏指标
def pii_filter_coverage_counter():
"""PII filter coverage: total messages scanned."""
global _pii_filter_coverage_counter
if _pii_filter_coverage_counter is None:
_pii_filter_coverage_counter = _get_counter(
"pii_filter.coverage", "PII filter: total messages scanned"
)
return _pii_filter_coverage_counter
def pii_filter_redacted_counter():
"""PII filter: count of PII entities redacted."""
global _pii_filter_redacted_counter
if _pii_filter_redacted_counter is None:
_pii_filter_redacted_counter = _get_counter(
"pii_filter.redacted", "PII filter: PII entities redacted"
)
return _pii_filter_redacted_counter

88
src/agentkit/telemetry/setup.py
View File

@ -1,16 +1,26 @@
"""OTel initialization — called at app startup"""
"""OTel initialization — called at app startup (U1: OTel now required)."""
import logging
from opentelemetry import trace, metrics
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace import TracerProvider
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace.export import BatchSpanProcessor
from opentelemetry.sdk.metrics import MeterProvider
from opentelemetry.sdk.metrics.export import PeriodicExportingMetricReader
from opentelemetry.sdk.resources import Resource
from opentelemetry.exporter.otlp.proto.grpc.trace_exporter import OTLPSpanExporter
from opentelemetry.exporter.otlp.proto.grpc.metric_exporter import OTLPMetricExporter
from opentelemetry.instrumentation.fastapi import FastAPIInstrumentor
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def setup_telemetry(app, config: dict | None = None):
"""Initialize OpenTelemetry if installed and configured.
"""Initialize OpenTelemetry if configured.
This is a no-op when:
- config is None or config.enabled is False
- opentelemetry packages are not installed
U1: opentelemetry-* deps now required (pyproject.toml). ImportError
fallbacks removed — a missing package is a hard install error. The
`enabled=False` config switch remains the supported way to disable.
Args:
app: FastAPI application instance
@ -25,69 +35,29 @@ def setup_telemetry(app, config: dict | None = None):
logger.info("Telemetry disabled")
return
try:
from opentelemetry import trace, metrics
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace import TracerProvider
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace.export import BatchSpanProcessor
from opentelemetry.sdk.metrics import MeterProvider
from opentelemetry.sdk.metrics.export import PeriodicExportingMetricReader
from opentelemetry.sdk.resources import Resource
except ImportError:
logger.warning(
"OpenTelemetry packages not installed. Telemetry disabled."
)
return
service_name = config.get("service_name", "fischer-agentkit")
resource = Resource.create({"service.name": service_name})
# Tracing setup
if config.get("export_traces", True):
endpoint = config.get("otlp_endpoint", "http://localhost:4317")
try:
from opentelemetry.exporter.otlp.proto.grpc.trace_exporter import (
OTLPSpanExporter,
)
provider = TracerProvider(resource=resource)
provider.add_span_processor(
BatchSpanProcessor(
OTLPSpanExporter(endpoint=endpoint, insecure=True)
)
)
trace.set_tracer_provider(provider)
logger.info(f"Tracing enabled, exporting to {endpoint}")
except ImportError:
logger.warning(
"OTLP exporter not installed. Tracing disabled."
)
provider = TracerProvider(resource=resource)
provider.add_span_processor(
BatchSpanProcessor(OTLPSpanExporter(endpoint=endpoint, insecure=True))
)
trace.set_tracer_provider(provider)
logger.info(f"Tracing enabled, exporting to {endpoint}")
# Metrics setup
if config.get("export_metrics", True):
endpoint = config.get("otlp_endpoint", "http://localhost:4317")
try:
from opentelemetry.exporter.otlp.proto.grpc.metric_exporter import (
OTLPMetricExporter,
)
reader = PeriodicExportingMetricReader(
OTLPMetricExporter(endpoint=endpoint, insecure=True)
)
provider = MeterProvider(resource=resource, readers=[reader])
metrics.set_meter_provider(provider)
logger.info(f"Metrics enabled, exporting to {endpoint}")
except ImportError:
logger.warning(
"OTLP metric exporter not installed. Metrics disabled."
)
reader = PeriodicExportingMetricReader(OTLPMetricExporter(endpoint=endpoint, insecure=True))
# ponytail: OTel SDK 1.16+ 将 readers kwarg 改名为 metric_readers；
# 旧代码用 readers=[...] 是已存在 bug，被 ImportError fallback 掩盖。
provider = MeterProvider(resource=resource, metric_readers=[reader])
metrics.set_meter_provider(provider)
logger.info(f"Metrics enabled, exporting to {endpoint}")
# FastAPI auto-instrumentation
try:
from opentelemetry.instrumentation.fastapi import FastAPIInstrumentor
FastAPIInstrumentor.instrument_app(app, excluded_urls="health,metrics")
logger.info("FastAPI auto-instrumentation enabled")
except ImportError:
logger.warning(
"FastAPI instrumentation not installed. Skipping auto-instrumentation."
)
FastAPIInstrumentor.instrument_app(app, excluded_urls="health,metrics")
logger.info("FastAPI auto-instrumentation enabled")

36
src/agentkit/telemetry/tracer.py
View File

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
"""OpenTelemetry tracer integration with no-op fallback."""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
@ -43,10 +44,14 @@ class NoOpSpan:
class NoOpTracer:
"""No-op tracer when telemetry is disabled."""
def start_span(self, name: str, attributes: dict[str, object] | None = None) -> ContextManager[NoOpSpan]:
def start_span(
self, name: str, attributes: dict[str, object] | None = None
) -> ContextManager[NoOpSpan]:
return NoOpSpan()
def start_as_current_span(self, name: str, attributes: dict[str, object] | None = None) -> ContextManager[NoOpSpan]:
def start_as_current_span(
self, name: str, attributes: dict[str, object] | None = None
) -> ContextManager[NoOpSpan]:
return NoOpSpan()
@ -86,7 +91,9 @@ class OTelTracer:
span = self._tracer.start_span(name, attributes=attributes)
return OTelSpan(span)
def start_as_current_span(self, name: str, attributes: dict[str, object] | None = None) -> OTelSpan:
def start_as_current_span(
self, name: str, attributes: dict[str, object] | None = None
) -> OTelSpan:
span = self._tracer.start_as_current_span(name, attributes=attributes)
return OTelSpan(span)
@ -101,7 +108,13 @@ def get_tracer() -> NoOpTracer | OTelTracer:
def init_telemetry(config: TelemetryConfig) -> None:
"""Initialize telemetry with the given configuration."""
"""Initialize telemetry with the given configuration.
U1: OTel deps now required (pyproject.toml). ImportError fallback removed —
a missing opentelemetry-* package is now a hard install error, not a silent
monitoring blind spot. Runtime errors (network, exporter connect) still
fall back to NoOpTracer so app startup never crashes on transient OTLP issues.
"""
global _tracer
if not config.enabled:
@ -109,13 +122,13 @@ def init_telemetry(config: TelemetryConfig) -> None:
logger.info("Telemetry disabled, using no-op tracer")
return
try:
from opentelemetry import trace
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace import TracerProvider
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace.export import BatchSpanProcessor
from opentelemetry.sdk.resources import Resource
from opentelemetry.exporter.otlp.proto.grpc.trace_exporter import OTLPSpanExporter
from opentelemetry import trace
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace import TracerProvider
from opentelemetry.sdk.trace.export import BatchSpanProcessor
from opentelemetry.sdk.resources import Resource
from opentelemetry.exporter.otlp.proto.grpc.trace_exporter import OTLPSpanExporter
try:
resource = Resource.create({"service.name": config.service_name})
provider = TracerProvider(resource=resource)
@ -126,9 +139,6 @@ def init_telemetry(config: TelemetryConfig) -> None:
trace.set_tracer_provider(provider)
_tracer = OTelTracer(trace.get_tracer(config.service_name))
logger.info(f"Telemetry initialized with endpoint: {config.otlp_endpoint}")
except ImportError:
logger.warning("opentelemetry packages not installed, using no-op tracer")
_tracer = NoOpTracer()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Failed to initialize telemetry: {e}, using no-op tracer")
_tracer = NoOpTracer()

58
src/agentkit/telemetry/tracing.py
View File

@ -1,43 +1,33 @@
"""Tracing helpers — no-op when OTel not installed"""
"""Tracing helpers — OTel now required (U1).
_OTEL_AVAILABLE kept as a constant True for backward compatibility with
existing call sites (react.py / rewoo.py / reflexion.py / gateway.py) that
guard span creation with `if _OTEL_AVAILABLE:`. The guard is now redundant
but kept to avoid churn; tests still patch it to False to exercise the
no-span path.
"""
import logging
import time
from functools import wraps
from typing import Callable
from opentelemetry import trace
from opentelemetry.trace import SpanKind, Status, StatusCode
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Try importing OTel — if not available, provide no-op implementations
try:
from opentelemetry import trace
from opentelemetry.trace import SpanKind, Status, StatusCode
_OTEL_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError:
_OTEL_AVAILABLE = False
# Provide fallback stubs so module-level references work in tests
class _StubEnum:
INTERNAL = "INTERNAL"
CLIENT = "CLIENT"
SERVER = "SERVER"
PRODUCER = "PRODUCER"
CONSUMER = "CONSUMER"
SpanKind = _StubEnum # type: ignore[misc,assignment]
class Status: # type: ignore[no-redef]
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
class StatusCode: # type: ignore[no-redef]
UNSET = "UNSET"
OK = "OK"
ERROR = "ERROR"
_OTEL_AVAILABLE = True
class _NoOpSpan:
"""No-op span context manager used when OTel is not installed."""
"""No-op span context manager — retained for tests that patch
`_OTEL_AVAILABLE = False` and call `start_span` directly.
ponytail: kept only for test compatibility; production code now always
has OTel installed. Safe to remove once tests are migrated to patch
`opentelemetry.trace` directly.
"""
def __enter__(self):
return self
@ -59,10 +49,8 @@ class _NoOpSpan:
def get_tracer(name: str = "fischer.agentkit"):
"""Get tracer — returns None if OTel not installed."""
if _OTEL_AVAILABLE:
return trace.get_tracer(name)
return None
"""Get tracer — returns the global OTel tracer (always available post-U1)."""
return trace.get_tracer(name)
def start_span(
@ -70,9 +58,9 @@ def start_span(
kind: object = None,
attributes: dict | None = None,
):
"""Start a span — returns no-op span if OTel not installed.
"""Start a span. Returns an OTel span context manager.
Returns a context manager that yields a span (or no-op).
`_OTEL_AVAILABLE` guard retained for tests that patch it to False.
"""
if not _OTEL_AVAILABLE:
return _NoOpSpan()

20
src/agentkit/tools/bitable_tool.py
View File

@ -558,15 +558,23 @@ class BitableTool(Tool):
field_id = kwargs.get("field_id")
if not field_id:
return {"success": False, "error": "Missing required field: field_id"}
# DR-5: type 变更不被支持 — UpdateFieldRequest 当前只接受 name + config，
# 传入 type 会被 Pydantic extra=ignore 静默丢弃（用户以为改了类型，实际无效果）。
# 显式拒绝并返回错误，避免静默失败的 UX 陷阱。
# 升级路径：如需支持类型变更，扩展 UpdateFieldRequest 接受 field_type +
# 实现数据迁移逻辑（类型转换 + 校验）。
if kwargs.get("type") is not None:
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
"Unsupported field type change — field type is immutable after "
"creation. To change a field's type, delete and recreate it."
),
"code": "UNSUPPORTED_FIELD_TYPE_CHANGE",
}
payload: dict[str, object] = {}
if kwargs.get("name") is not None:
payload["name"] = kwargs["name"]
# ponytail: PATCH /fields/{id} is backed by UpdateFieldRequest which
# currently accepts only name + config. `type` is forwarded as
# `field_type` so the tool is forward-compatible once the request
# model adds it; today it is silently ignored by Pydantic (extra=ignore).
if kwargs.get("type") is not None:
payload["field_type"] = kwargs["type"]
if kwargs.get("config") is not None:
payload["config"] = kwargs["config"]
client = await self._get_client()

10
tests/unit/admin/test_models.py
View File

@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ async def _list_table_names(db: aiosqlite.Connection) -> set[str]:
class TestSchemaVersion:
def test_schema_version_is_v4(self):
"""V4 adds the skill_states table (U6 — Admin Console)."""
assert _SCHEMA_VERSION == 4
def test_schema_version_is_v5(self):
"""V5 adds user_idp_links + auth_audit_log (U4 SSO 集成)."""
assert _SCHEMA_VERSION == 5
def test_sqlalchemy_model_table_names(self):
assert DepartmentModel.__tablename__ == "departments"
@ -163,13 +163,13 @@ class TestInitAuthDbTables:
tables = await _list_table_names(db)
assert "department_quotas" in tables
async def test_records_schema_version_4_in_auth_meta(self, fresh_db: Path):
async def test_records_schema_version_5_in_auth_meta(self, fresh_db: Path):
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(fresh_db)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT value FROM auth_meta WHERE key='schema_version'")
row = await cursor.fetchone()
assert row is not None
assert row["value"] == "4"
assert row["value"] == "5"
assert row["value"] == str(_SCHEMA_VERSION)
async def test_init_auth_db_is_idempotent(self, tmp_path: Path):

6
tests/unit/auth/test_models.py
View File

@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ async def _list_index_names(db: aiosqlite.Connection, table: str) -> set[str]:
class TestSchemaVersion:
def test_schema_version_is_v4(self):
"""The current schema version is 4 (V4 adds skill_states table)."""
assert _SCHEMA_VERSION == 4
def test_schema_version_is_v5(self):
"""The current schema version is 5 (V5 adds user_idp_links + auth_audit_log, U4 SSO)."""
assert _SCHEMA_VERSION == 5
def test_sqlalchemy_model_table_name(self):
assert AuthSessionModel.__tablename__ == "auth_sessions"

67
tests/unit/bitable/test_bitable_tool.py
View File

@ -552,9 +552,9 @@ async def test_update_view_action(tool: BitableTool) -> None:
"""update_view action PATCHes /views/{id} with name + config."""
result = await tool.execute(action="create_table", table_name="VU")
table_id = result["table"]["id"]
view_id = (
await tool.execute(action="create_view", table_id=table_id, name="Old")
)["view"]["id"]
view_id = (await tool.execute(action="create_view", table_id=table_id, name="Old"))["view"][
"id"
]
resp = await tool.execute(
action="update_view",
@ -682,9 +682,7 @@ async def test_new_actions_internal_token_passthrough(
table_id = result["table"]["id"]
# create_view via the new action.
v = await tool_real_auth.execute(
action="create_view", table_id=table_id, name="tv1"
)
v = await tool_real_auth.execute(action="create_view", table_id=table_id, name="tv1")
assert v["success"] is True
view_id = v["view"]["id"]
@ -716,3 +714,60 @@ async def test_delete_view_internal_token_404_when_missing(
resp = await tool_real_auth.execute(action="delete_view", view_id="no-such-view")
assert resp["success"] is False
assert "404" in resp["error"]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DR-5: _update_field rejects type change (no silent success)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def test_update_field_rejects_type_change(tool: BitableTool) -> None:
"""DR-5: _update_field with `type` arg returns error, does NOT call HTTP.
Without this guard, the field_type would be silently dropped by
UpdateFieldRequest's Pydantic extra=ignore, and the agent would
believe the type changed when it didn't.
"""
result = await tool.execute(action="create_table", table_name="DR5")
table_id = result["table"]["id"]
client = await tool._get_client()
field_id = (
await client.post(
f"/tables/{table_id}/fields",
json={"name": "col", "field_type": "text", "owner": "user"},
)
).json()["field"]["id"]
resp = await tool.execute(
action="update_field",
field_id=field_id,
type="number",
)
assert resp["success"] is False
assert resp.get("code") == "UNSUPPORTED_FIELD_TYPE_CHANGE"
assert "immutable" in resp["error"]
async def test_update_field_still_works_without_type(tool: BitableTool) -> None:
"""DR-5: _update_field without `type` still PATCHes name/config normally.
Regression guard: the DR-5 guard must not block legitimate updates.
"""
result = await tool.execute(action="create_table", table_name="DR5b")
table_id = result["table"]["id"]
client = await tool._get_client()
field_id = (
await client.post(
f"/tables/{table_id}/fields",
json={"name": "col", "field_type": "text", "owner": "user"},
)
).json()["field"]["id"]
resp = await tool.execute(
action="update_field",
field_id=field_id,
name="renamed",
config={"description": "ok"},
)
assert resp["success"] is True
assert resp["field"]["name"] == "renamed"

113
tests/unit/bitable/test_repository.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
"""Tests for BitableRepository — U3/DR-1 + DR-4 fixes.
DR-1: field_id UUID validation before SQL interpolation (pure unit test).
DR-4: atomic delete_view_if_not_last (requires PostgreSQL).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from agentkit.bitable.repository import _validate_field_id
# ── DR-1: field_id UUID validation ──────────────────────────
class TestValidateFieldId:
"""DR-1: field_id 校验 — 拒绝非 UUID 格式进入 SQL 结构插值。"""
def test_valid_uuid_passes(self):
valid = "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
assert _validate_field_id(valid) == valid
def test_valid_uppercase_uuid_passes(self):
valid = "550E8400-E29B-41D4-A716-446655440000"
assert _validate_field_id(valid) == valid
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"bad_field_id,label",
[
("not-a-uuid", "arbitrary string"),
("", "empty string"),
("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716", "too short"),
("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000-extra", "too long"),
("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-44665544000g", "non-hex char"),
("'; DROP TABLE bitable.bitable_views; --", "SQL injection attempt"),
("values->>'field' = :fv0", "SQL fragment"),
],
)
def test_invalid_field_id_raises(self, bad_field_id: str, label: str):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid field_id format"):
_validate_field_id(bad_field_id, context=label)
def test_non_string_raises(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid field_id format"):
_validate_field_id(None) # type: ignore[arg-type]
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid field_id format"):
_validate_field_id(12345) # type: ignore[arg-type]
# ── DR-4: atomic delete_view_if_not_last ────────────────────
# These tests require PostgreSQL (SELECT FOR UPDATE behavior)
pytestmark_postgres = pytest.mark.postgres
@pytest.mark.postgres
class TestDeleteViewIfNotLastAtomic:
"""DR-4: 原子条件 delete_view — SELECT FOR UPDATE 事务防止 TOCTOU。
并发场景不变量："table 至少 1 view" 在并发删除最后两个 view 时保持。
"""
async def test_delete_view_if_not_last_succeeds_when_multiple_siblings(
self, bitable_service, make_table
):
"""多 view 时删除成功。"""
from agentkit.bitable.repository import BitableRepository
table = await make_table(name="T1")
v1 = await bitable_service.create_view(table.id, name="v1")
await bitable_service.create_view(table.id, name="v2")
repo = BitableRepository(bitable_service._repo._db)
deleted = await repo.delete_view_if_not_last(v1.id, table.id)
assert deleted is True
# v1 gone, v2 still present
assert await bitable_service.get_view(v1.id) is None
assert (await bitable_service.list_views(table.id)) is not None
async def test_delete_view_if_not_last_refuses_last_view(self, bitable_service, make_table):
"""最后一个 view 时拒绝删除（返回 False，不抛异常 — service 层负责抛 LastViewDeletionError）。"""
from agentkit.bitable.repository import BitableRepository
table = await make_table(name="T2")
only_view = await bitable_service.create_view(table.id, name="only")
repo = BitableRepository(bitable_service._repo._db)
deleted = await repo.delete_view_if_not_last(only_view.id, table.id)
assert deleted is False
# View still exists
assert await bitable_service.get_view(only_view.id) is not None
async def test_delete_view_if_not_last_wrong_table_returns_false(
self, bitable_service, make_table
):
"""view_id 不属于给定 table_id 时返回 False（不误删其他 table 的 view）。"""
from agentkit.bitable.repository import BitableRepository
table_a = await make_table(name="TA")
table_b = await make_table(name="TB")
va = await bitable_service.create_view(table_a.id, name="va")
# table_b 有自己的 view
await bitable_service.create_view(table_b.id, name="vb1")
await bitable_service.create_view(table_b.id, name="vb2")
repo = BitableRepository(bitable_service._repo._db)
# 用 table_b 的 id 但 view_id 是 table_a 的 — 不应删除
deleted = await repo.delete_view_if_not_last(va.id, table_b.id)
assert deleted is False
# va 仍然存在
assert await bitable_service.get_view(va.id) is not None

43
tests/unit/bitable/test_service.py
View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from agentkit.bitable.models import FieldOwner, FieldType
from agentkit.bitable.service import FieldDependencyError
from agentkit.bitable.service import FieldDependencyError, LastViewDeletionError
pytestmark = pytest.mark.postgres
@ -294,3 +294,44 @@ async def test_list_records_filtered_cursor_pagination(bitable_service) -> None:
# All records unique
all_ids = {r.id for r in [records, records2, records3] for r in r}
assert len(all_ids) == 5
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DR-4: delete_view last-view protection (service layer)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def test_delete_view_raises_last_view_deletion_error(bitable_service, make_table) -> None:
"""DR-4: service.delete_view raises LastViewDeletionError on the last view.
Guards the invariant "every table has at least 1 view" at the service
layer so the route can map it to HTTP 409 without touching the repo.
"""
table = await make_table(name="LastView")
only = await bitable_service.create_view(table.id, name="only")
with pytest.raises(LastViewDeletionError):
await bitable_service.delete_view(only.id)
# View is still there
assert await bitable_service.get_view(only.id) is not None
async def test_delete_view_succeeds_when_multiple_views(bitable_service, make_table) -> None:
"""DR-4: service.delete_view succeeds when ≥2 views remain (happy path)."""
table = await make_table(name="MultiView")
v1 = await bitable_service.create_view(table.id, name="v1")
await bitable_service.create_view(table.id, name="v2")
deleted = await bitable_service.delete_view(v1.id)
assert deleted is True
assert await bitable_service.get_view(v1.id) is None
async def test_delete_view_returns_false_when_missing(bitable_service, make_table) -> None:
"""DR-4: service.delete_view on a non-existent view returns False (no raise)."""
table = await make_table(name="MissingView")
# ensure ≥1 view exists so the table is valid
await bitable_service.create_view(table.id, name="v1")
deleted = await bitable_service.delete_view("nonexistent-view-id")
assert deleted is False

416
tests/unit/experts/test_team_orchestrator.py
View File

@ -81,15 +81,17 @@ def _make_mock_expert(
}
# Mock agent.execute() to return a successful TaskResult
mock_agent = MagicMock()
mock_agent.execute = AsyncMock(return_value=TaskResult(
task_id="test",
agent_name=name,
status=TaskStatus.COMPLETED.value,
output_data={"content": f"Result from {name}"},
error_message=None,
started_at=None,
completed_at=None,
))
mock_agent.execute = AsyncMock(
return_value=TaskResult(
task_id="test",
agent_name=name,
status=TaskStatus.COMPLETED.value,
output_data={"content": f"Result from {name}"},
error_message=None,
started_at=None,
completed_at=None,
)
)
# U3: orchestrator._run_agent_steps() calls agent.execute_stream() (async gen),
# not agent.execute(). Mock it to yield one final_answer event.
mock_agent.execute_stream = make_execute_stream_mock(f"Result from {name}")
@ -162,20 +164,24 @@ def _make_mock_llm_gateway(
def _make_mock_pool() -> MagicMock:
"""创建 mock AgentPool，模拟上下文隔离的 agent 创建"""
pool = MagicMock()
def _create_agent(config):
m = MagicMock()
m.execute = AsyncMock(return_value=TaskResult(
task_id="test",
agent_name=config.name,
status=TaskStatus.COMPLETED.value,
output_data={"content": f"Isolated result from {config.name}"},
error_message=None,
started_at=None,
completed_at=None,
))
m.execute = AsyncMock(
return_value=TaskResult(
task_id="test",
agent_name=config.name,
status=TaskStatus.COMPLETED.value,
output_data={"content": f"Isolated result from {config.name}"},
error_message=None,
started_at=None,
completed_at=None,
)
)
# U3: orchestrator calls agent.execute_stream() (async gen)
m.execute_stream = make_execute_stream_mock(f"Isolated result from {config.name}")
return m
pool.create_agent = AsyncMock(side_effect=_create_agent)
pool.remove_agent = AsyncMock()
return pool
@ -220,9 +226,24 @@ class TestPipelineExecution:
# LLM 分解为 3 个串行阶段
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "阶段A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "阶段B", "depends_on": ["A"]},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "member2", "task_description": "阶段C", "depends_on": ["B"]},
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "阶段A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "阶段B",
"depends_on": ["A"],
},
{
"name": "C",
"assigned_expert": "member2",
"task_description": "阶段C",
"depends_on": ["B"],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -231,10 +252,12 @@ class TestPipelineExecution:
execution_order: list[str] = []
for name in ["lead", "member1", "member2"]:
original_stream = team._experts[name].agent.execute_stream
async def tracking_stream(task_msg, _orig=original_stream, _name=name):
execution_order.append(_name)
async for ev in _orig(task_msg):
yield ev
team._experts[name].agent.execute_stream = tracking_stream
result = await orchestrator.execute("串行任务")
@ -256,9 +279,24 @@ class TestPipelineExecution:
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "阶段A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "阶段B", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "member2", "task_description": "阶段C", "depends_on": ["A", "B"]},
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "阶段A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "阶段B",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "C",
"assigned_expert": "member2",
"task_description": "阶段C",
"depends_on": ["A", "B"],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -310,6 +348,59 @@ class TestPipelineExecution:
event_types = [c[0][1]["type"] for c in calls]
assert "team_synthesis" in event_types
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_synthesis_failure_emits_terminal_team_synthesis_error(self):
"""U3/R4-F2: 流式综合异常时发 team_synthesis 终结事件(status=error)，避免前端孤儿 milestone 永久转圈。
行为契约：
- 内层 except 捕获 synthesis 异常 → 广播 team_synthesis(status=error, synthesis_id) → re-raise
- 外层 except 捕获 → 调用 _fallback_to_single_agent（不 re-raise）
- 因此 execute() 返回 status="fallback"，且最后一个 team_synthesis 事件 status=error。
"""
team = _make_team_with_experts()
orchestrator = TeamOrchestrator(team)
# 让 _synthesize_results 抛异常 — 触发 error 终结事件路径
async def _fail_synthesize(*args, **kwargs):
raise RuntimeError("synthesis boom")
orchestrator._synthesize_results = _fail_synthesize
# 不应抛出 — 外层 except 捕获后 fallback
result = await orchestrator.execute("测试任务")
assert result["status"] == "fallback"
calls = team._handoff_transport.send.call_args_list
synth_events = [c for c in calls if c[0][1].get("type") == "team_synthesis"]
# 必须有终结事件，且 status=error
assert len(synth_events) >= 1
terminal = synth_events[-1]
assert terminal[0][1].get("status") == "error"
assert terminal[0][1].get("synthesis_id") is not None
assert "synthesis boom" in terminal[0][1].get("error", "")
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_synthesis_cancelled_emits_terminal_team_synthesis_cancelled(self):
"""U3/R4-F2: 流式综合被 CancelledError 中断时发 team_synthesis 终结事件(status=cancelled)。"""
team = _make_team_with_experts()
orchestrator = TeamOrchestrator(team)
# 让 _synthesize_results 抛 CancelledError — 触发 cancelled 终结事件路径
async def _cancel_synthesize(*args, **kwargs):
raise asyncio.CancelledError()
orchestrator._synthesize_results = _cancel_synthesize
with pytest.raises(asyncio.CancelledError):
await orchestrator.execute("测试任务")
calls = team._handoff_transport.send.call_args_list
synth_events = [c for c in calls if c[0][1].get("type") == "team_synthesis"]
assert len(synth_events) >= 1
terminal = synth_events[-1]
assert terminal[0][1].get("status") == "cancelled"
assert terminal[0][1].get("synthesis_id") is not None
# ── 阶段事件广播测试 ──────────────────────────────────────
@ -351,8 +442,18 @@ class TestPhaseEvents:
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "阶段A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "阶段B", "depends_on": ["A"]},
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "阶段A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "阶段B",
"depends_on": ["A"],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -403,9 +504,24 @@ class TestTaskDecomposition:
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "规划", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "设计架构", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "前端", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "实现UI", "depends_on": ["规划"]},
{"name": "后端", "assigned_expert": "member2", "task_description": "实现API", "depends_on": ["规划"]},
{
"name": "规划",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "设计架构",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "前端",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "实现UI",
"depends_on": ["规划"],
},
{
"name": "后端",
"assigned_expert": "member2",
"task_description": "实现API",
"depends_on": ["规划"],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -456,10 +572,22 @@ class TestTaskDecomposition:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_parse_phases_valid_json(self):
"""_parse_phases 正确解析 JSON 数组"""
content = json.dumps([
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "任务A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member2", "task_description": "任务B", "depends_on": ["A"]},
])
content = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "任务A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member2",
"task_description": "任务B",
"depends_on": ["A"],
},
]
)
phases = TeamOrchestrator._parse_phases(content, ["member1", "member2"], "lead")
assert len(phases) == 2
assert phases[0].name == "A"
@ -473,9 +601,16 @@ class TestTaskDecomposition:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_parse_phases_invalid_expert_falls_back_to_lead(self):
"""_parse_phases 对无效专家名回退到 lead"""
content = json.dumps([
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "nonexistent", "task_description": "任务A", "depends_on": []},
])
content = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "nonexistent",
"task_description": "任务A",
"depends_on": [],
},
]
)
phases = TeamOrchestrator._parse_phases(content, ["member1"], "lead")
assert len(phases) == 1
assert phases[0].assigned_expert == "lead"
@ -489,10 +624,22 @@ class TestTaskDecomposition:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_parse_phases_empty_name_skipped(self):
"""_parse_phases 跳过空名称的阶段"""
content = json.dumps([
{"name": "", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "任务A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "任务B", "depends_on": []},
])
content = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "任务A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "任务B",
"depends_on": [],
},
]
)
phases = TeamOrchestrator._parse_phases(content, ["member1"], "lead")
assert len(phases) == 1
assert phases[0].name == "B"
@ -500,10 +647,22 @@ class TestTaskDecomposition:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_parse_phases_resolves_depends_on_by_name(self):
"""_parse_phases 通过名称解析 depends_on 为 ID"""
content = json.dumps([
{"name": "规划", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "设计", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "实现", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "编码", "depends_on": ["规划"]},
])
content = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "规划",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "设计",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "实现",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "编码",
"depends_on": ["规划"],
},
]
)
phases = TeamOrchestrator._parse_phases(content, ["lead", "member1"], "lead")
assert len(phases) == 2
# 实现 depends on 规划
@ -512,9 +671,16 @@ class TestTaskDecomposition:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_parse_phases_unknown_dependency_ignored(self):
"""_parse_phases 对未知依赖名称忽略"""
content = json.dumps([
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "任务A", "depends_on": ["unknown_phase"]},
])
content = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "任务A",
"depends_on": ["unknown_phase"],
},
]
)
phases = TeamOrchestrator._parse_phases(content, ["lead"], "lead")
assert len(phases) == 1
assert len(phases[0].depends_on) == 0 # unknown dependency ignored
@ -558,7 +724,12 @@ class TestPhaseExecution:
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "nonexistent", "task_description": "任务A", "depends_on": []},
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "nonexistent",
"task_description": "任务A",
"depends_on": [],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -578,8 +749,18 @@ class TestPhaseExecution:
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "阶段A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "阶段B", "depends_on": ["A"]},
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "阶段A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "阶段B",
"depends_on": ["A"],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -639,9 +820,24 @@ class TestPhaseFailure:
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "阶段A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "阶段B", "depends_on": ["A"]},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "member2", "task_description": "阶段C", "depends_on": ["B"]},
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "lead",
"task_description": "阶段A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "阶段B",
"depends_on": ["A"],
},
{
"name": "C",
"assigned_expert": "member2",
"task_description": "阶段C",
"depends_on": ["B"],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -787,8 +983,18 @@ class TestResultSynthesis:
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "阶段A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member2", "task_description": "阶段B", "depends_on": []},
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "阶段A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member2",
"task_description": "阶段B",
"depends_on": [],
},
],
synthesis_content="综合结果",
)
@ -810,10 +1016,22 @@ class TestResultSynthesis:
gateway = AsyncMock()
decomp_response = MagicMock()
decomp_response.content = json.dumps([
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "阶段A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member2", "task_description": "阶段B", "depends_on": []},
])
decomp_response.content = json.dumps(
[
{
"name": "A",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "阶段A",
"depends_on": [],
},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member2",
"task_description": "阶段B",
"depends_on": [],
},
]
)
# ponytail: 函数式 side_effect — 首次返回 decomposition，后续一律抛 RuntimeError
# （列表式 side_effect 耗尽会抛 StopIteration，被 U3 收窄后的 except 漏捕获；
# 函数式让"LLM 不可用"语义明确，覆盖验收+综合所有后续调用）
@ -826,12 +1044,14 @@ class TestResultSynthesis:
raise RuntimeError("LLM unavailable")
gateway.chat = AsyncMock(side_effect=chat_side_effect)
# U3: synthesizer tries chat_stream first (broadcast_callback is set).
# Make it raise so synthesizer catches and falls back to concatenation,
# matching the test intent ("without LLM").
async def _stream_raise(*a, **kw):
raise RuntimeError("LLM unavailable")
yield # async gen marker
gateway.chat_stream = MagicMock(side_effect=_stream_raise)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
@ -1049,11 +1269,13 @@ class TestConcurrencyLimit:
team = _make_team_with_experts(expert_names=["lead", "m1", "m2"])
orchestrator = TeamOrchestrator(team)
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "m1", "task_description": "B", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "m2", "task_description": "C", "depends_on": []},
])
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "m1", "task_description": "B", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "m2", "task_description": "C", "depends_on": []},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
tracker = _ConcurrencyTracker()
@ -1082,10 +1304,17 @@ class TestConcurrencyLimit:
team = _make_team_with_experts(expert_names=names)
orchestrator = TeamOrchestrator(team)
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(phases=[
{"name": f"P{i}", "assigned_expert": name, "task_description": f"P{i}", "depends_on": []}
for i, name in enumerate(names)
])
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{
"name": f"P{i}",
"assigned_expert": name,
"task_description": f"P{i}",
"depends_on": [],
}
for i, name in enumerate(names)
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
tracker = _ConcurrencyTracker()
@ -1113,11 +1342,13 @@ class TestConcurrencyLimit:
team = _make_team_with_experts(expert_names=["lead", "m1", "m2"])
orchestrator = TeamOrchestrator(team, max_concurrent_phases=1)
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "m1", "task_description": "B", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "m2", "task_description": "C", "depends_on": []},
])
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "m1", "task_description": "B", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "m2", "task_description": "C", "depends_on": []},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
tracker = _ConcurrencyTracker()
@ -1144,11 +1375,13 @@ class TestConcurrencyLimit:
team = _make_team_with_experts(expert_names=["lead", "m1", "m2"])
orchestrator = TeamOrchestrator(team)
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "m1", "task_description": "B", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "m2", "task_description": "C", "depends_on": []},
])
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "m1", "task_description": "B", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "C", "assigned_expert": "m2", "task_description": "C", "depends_on": []},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
tracker = _ConcurrencyTracker()
@ -1210,11 +1443,13 @@ class TestConcurrencyLimit:
orchestrator._generate_debate_opening = AsyncMock(return_value="Opening statement")
orchestrator._generate_debate_argument = tracking_debate_argument
orchestrator._generate_debate_summary = AsyncMock(return_value="Round summary")
orchestrator._generate_debate_verdict = AsyncMock(return_value={
"conclusion": "Final conclusion",
"decision": "adopt",
"rationale": "Because",
})
orchestrator._generate_debate_verdict = AsyncMock(
return_value={
"conclusion": "Final conclusion",
"decision": "adopt",
"rationale": "Because",
}
)
await orchestrator._execute_debate_phase(phase, plan)
@ -1345,10 +1580,17 @@ class TestSharedWorkspaceRedis:
team = _make_team_with_experts()
orchestrator = TeamOrchestrator(team)
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{"name": "B", "assigned_expert": "member1", "task_description": "B", "depends_on": ["A"]},
])
gateway = _make_mock_llm_gateway(
phases=[
{"name": "A", "assigned_expert": "lead", "task_description": "A", "depends_on": []},
{
"name": "B",
"assigned_expert": "member1",
"task_description": "B",
"depends_on": ["A"],
},
]
)
team._experts["lead"].agent._llm_gateway = gateway
# Mock _execute_phase to return large content + verify offloading

208
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@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
"""Audit service 单元测试 (U4 — RBAC + deprovisioning 审计, KTD-8)。
验证：
- RBAC 角色变更审计记录（actor/target/role_before/role_after）
- Deprovisioning 审计记录（actor/target/reason/source）
- 审计记录持久化到 auth_audit_log 表
- 按目标用户查询审计历史
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from uuid import uuid4
import aiosqlite
import pytest
from agentkit.server.auth.audit import (
AuditService,
EVENT_DEPROVISION,
EVENT_ROLE_CHANGE,
SOURCE_BREAKGLASS,
SOURCE_MANUAL,
get_audit_service,
set_audit_service,
)
from agentkit.server.auth.models import audit_log_row_to_dict, init_auth_db
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture
async def auth_db(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> Path:
db_path = tmp_path / "auth.db"
await init_auth_db(db_path)
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB", str(db_path))
return db_path
@pytest.fixture
def audit_service(auth_db: Path) -> AuditService:
svc = AuditService(db_path=auth_db)
set_audit_service(svc)
return svc
@pytest.fixture
async def seed_users(auth_db: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
"""插入两个用户（admin + target）用于审计测试。"""
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
admin_id = str(uuid4())
target_id = str(uuid4())
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, password_hash, role, is_active, "
"is_terminal_authorized, is_server_terminal_authorized, created_at, updated_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(admin_id, "admin_alice", "alice@example.com", "hash", "admin", 1, 0, 0, now, now),
)
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, password_hash, role, is_active, "
"is_terminal_authorized, is_server_terminal_authorized, created_at, updated_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(target_id, "target_bob", "bob@example.com", "hash", "member", 1, 0, 0, now, now),
)
await db.commit()
return {"admin_id": admin_id, "target_id": target_id}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestRoleChangeAudit:
async def test_records_role_change(
self, audit_service: AuditService, seed_users: dict[str, str]
) -> None:
record = await audit_service.record_role_change(
actor_user_id=seed_users["admin_id"],
actor_username="admin_alice",
target_user_id=seed_users["target_id"],
target_username="target_bob",
role_before="member",
role_after="operator",
reason="晋升",
source=SOURCE_MANUAL,
)
assert record["event_type"] == EVENT_ROLE_CHANGE
assert record["role_before"] == "member"
assert record["role_after"] == "operator"
assert record["actor_username"] == "admin_alice"
assert record["target_username"] == "target_bob"
assert record["reason"] == "晋升"
async def test_persists_to_db(
self, audit_service: AuditService, auth_db: Path, seed_users: dict[str, str]
) -> None:
await audit_service.record_role_change(
actor_user_id=seed_users["admin_id"],
actor_username="admin_alice",
target_user_id=seed_users["target_id"],
target_username="target_bob",
role_before="member",
role_after="admin",
reason="提升管理员",
)
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM auth_audit_log WHERE event_type = ? AND target_user_id = ?",
(EVENT_ROLE_CHANGE, seed_users["target_id"]),
)
rows = await cursor.fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
row = audit_log_row_to_dict(rows[0])
assert row["role_before"] == "member"
assert row["role_after"] == "admin"
class TestDeprovisionAudit:
async def test_records_deprovision(
self, audit_service: AuditService, seed_users: dict[str, str]
) -> None:
record = await audit_service.record_deprovision(
actor_user_id=seed_users["admin_id"],
actor_username="admin_alice",
target_user_id=seed_users["target_id"],
target_username="target_bob",
reason="离职",
source=SOURCE_MANUAL,
)
assert record["event_type"] == EVENT_DEPROVISION
assert record["reason"] == "离职"
assert record["source"] == SOURCE_MANUAL
async def test_break_glass_source(
self, audit_service: AuditService, seed_users: dict[str, str]
) -> None:
"""break_glass 应急通道 — source 记录为 break_glass。"""
record = await audit_service.record_deprovision(
actor_user_id=seed_users["admin_id"],
actor_username="admin_alice",
target_user_id=seed_users["target_id"],
target_username="target_bob",
reason="应急禁用",
source=SOURCE_BREAKGLASS,
)
assert record["source"] == SOURCE_BREAKGLASS
async def test_persists_to_db(
self, audit_service: AuditService, auth_db: Path, seed_users: dict[str, str]
) -> None:
await audit_service.record_deprovision(
actor_user_id=seed_users["admin_id"],
actor_username="admin_alice",
target_user_id=seed_users["target_id"],
target_username="target_bob",
reason="审计测试",
)
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM auth_audit_log WHERE event_type = ?",
(EVENT_DEPROVISION,),
)
rows = await cursor.fetchall()
assert len(rows) == 1
class TestListForTarget:
async def test_lists_audit_history(
self, audit_service: AuditService, seed_users: dict[str, str]
) -> None:
"""按目标用户查询审计历史（admin 视图）。"""
target_id = seed_users["target_id"]
await audit_service.record_role_change(
actor_user_id=seed_users["admin_id"],
actor_username="admin_alice",
target_user_id=target_id,
target_username="target_bob",
role_before="member",
role_after="operator",
reason="第一次",
)
await audit_service.record_deprovision(
actor_user_id=seed_users["admin_id"],
actor_username="admin_alice",
target_user_id=target_id,
target_username="target_bob",
reason="第二次",
)
records = await audit_service.list_for_target(target_id)
assert len(records) == 2
# 按 created_at DESC 排序 — deprovision 在前
assert records[0]["event_type"] == EVENT_DEPROVISION
assert records[1]["event_type"] == EVENT_ROLE_CHANGE
class TestGetAuditService:
def test_singleton(self) -> None:
svc1 = get_audit_service()
svc2 = get_audit_service()
assert svc1 is svc2

240
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@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
"""OIDC provider 单元测试 (U4 SSO 集成)。
验证：
- redirect URL 生成（含 state）
- callback 用户 JIT 创建按 sub 关联
- 禁止邮箱合并 (R1a)
- 相同 sub 复用现有用户
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
import aiosqlite
import pytest
from agentkit.server.auth.idp_registry import (
IDPConfig,
IDPRegistry,
OIDCConfig,
)
from agentkit.server.auth.models import init_auth_db
from agentkit.server.auth.providers.oidc import OIDCProvider, get_state_cache
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture
def oidc_idp(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> IDPRegistry:
"""注册一个测试 OIDC IDP 并替换全局 registry。"""
registry = IDPRegistry()
registry.register(
IDPConfig(
name="test_oidc",
type="oidc",
display_name="Test OIDC",
oidc=OIDCConfig(
client_id="test-client-id",
client_secret="test-client-secret",
server_metadata_url="https://idp.test/authorize",
redirect_uri="https://app.test/api/v1/auth/oauth/test_oidc/callback",
scope="openid email profile",
),
)
)
monkeypatch.setattr("agentkit.server.auth.providers.oidc.get_idp_registry", lambda: registry)
return registry
@pytest.fixture
async def auth_db(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> Path:
"""创建临时 auth DB 并指向 AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB。"""
db_path = tmp_path / "auth.db"
await init_auth_db(db_path)
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB", str(db_path))
return db_path
class _FakeOAuth2Client:
"""替代 AsyncOAuth2Client 的假 client — 不发 HTTP。"""
def __init__(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
self.token = {"access_token": "fake-access-token", "id_token": None}
async def __aenter__(self) -> "_FakeOAuth2Client":
return self
async def __aexit__(self, *args: Any) -> None:
pass
def create_authorization_url(self, url: str, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
"""构造假 authorize URL（含 state / scope 参数）。"""
state = kwargs.get("state", "")
scope = kwargs.get("scope", "")
client_id = kwargs.get("client_id", "test-client-id")
redirect_uri = kwargs.get("redirect_uri", "")
return (
f"{url}?response_type=code&client_id={client_id}"
f"&redirect_uri={redirect_uri}&scope={scope}&state={state}",
{"state": state, "url": url},
)
async def fetch_token(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
return self.token
async def get(self, url: str) -> Any:
class _Resp:
status_code = 200
def json(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"sub": "oidc-sub-123",
"email": "sso_user@example.com",
"name": "SSO User",
}
return _Resp()
@pytest.fixture
def fake_oauth_client(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""替换 oidc 模块的 AsyncOAuth2Client 为假实现。"""
monkeypatch.setattr("agentkit.server.auth.providers.oidc.AsyncOAuth2Client", _FakeOAuth2Client)
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _reset_state_cache() -> None:
"""每个测试前清空 state 缓存。"""
cache = get_state_cache()
cache._store.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestGetRedirectUrl:
async def test_generates_url_with_state(self, oidc_idp: IDPRegistry) -> None:
url = await OIDCProvider().get_redirect_url("test_oidc")
assert "https://idp.test/authorize" in url
assert "state=" in url
assert "client_id=test-client-id" in url
async def test_unknown_provider_raises(self, oidc_idp: IDPRegistry) -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="未配置"):
await OIDCProvider().get_redirect_url("nonexistent")
async def test_state_cached_for_csrf(self, oidc_idp: IDPRegistry) -> None:
url = await OIDCProvider().get_redirect_url("test_oidc")
state = url.split("state=", 1)[1].split("&", 1)[0]
# state 应在缓存中（consume 验证）
assert get_state_cache().consume(state) is True
class TestHandleCallback:
async def test_creates_user_by_sub(
self, oidc_idp: IDPRegistry, auth_db: Path, fake_oauth_client: None
) -> None:
"""首次登录 JIT 创建用户，按 sub 关联到 user_idp_links。"""
# 预置 state
provider = OIDCProvider()
url = await provider.get_redirect_url("test_oidc")
state = url.split("state=", 1)[1].split("&", 1)[0]
user = await provider.handle_callback("test_oidc", "fake-code", state)
assert user["username"] == "SSO User"
assert user["email"] == "sso_user@example.com"
# 验证 user_idp_links 按 sub 关联
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM user_idp_links WHERE idp_name = ? AND idp_subject = ?",
("test_oidc", "oidc-sub-123"),
)
link = await cursor.fetchone()
assert link is not None
assert link["user_id"] == user["id"]
async def test_same_sub_reuses_user(
self, oidc_idp: IDPRegistry, auth_db: Path, fake_oauth_client: None
) -> None:
"""相同 sub 第二次登录复用现有用户，不重复创建。"""
provider = OIDCProvider()
# 第一次登录
url1 = await provider.get_redirect_url("test_oidc")
state1 = url1.split("state=", 1)[1].split("&", 1)[0]
user1 = await provider.handle_callback("test_oidc", "code1", state1)
# 第二次登录（相同 sub）
url2 = await provider.get_redirect_url("test_oidc")
state2 = url2.split("state=", 1)[1].split("&", 1)[0]
user2 = await provider.handle_callback("test_oidc", "code2", state2)
assert user1["id"] == user2["id"]
async def test_no_email_merge(
self,
oidc_idp: IDPRegistry,
auth_db: Path,
fake_oauth_client: None,
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""R1a: 不同 sub 但相同 email — 禁止合并，创建新用户。"""
# 预创建一个本地用户，email 与 SSO userinfo 相同
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
local_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, password_hash, role, is_active, "
"is_terminal_authorized, is_server_terminal_authorized, created_at, updated_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
local_id,
"local_user",
"sso_user@example.com",
"$2b$12$dummyhash",
"member",
1,
0,
0,
now,
now,
),
)
await db.commit()
# SSO 用不同 sub（_FakeOAuth2Client 返回 sub=oidc-sub-123）
provider = OIDCProvider()
url = await provider.get_redirect_url("test_oidc")
state = url.split("state=", 1)[1].split("&", 1)[0]
sso_user = await provider.handle_callback("test_oidc", "code", state)
# 应创建新用户，而非复用 local_user
assert sso_user["id"] != local_id
# R1a: 邮箱冲突时不合并本地用户，改用 fallback 邮箱（保留 UNIQUE 约束）
assert sso_user["email"] != "sso_user@example.com"
assert sso_user["email"].endswith("@sso.test_oidc.local")
async def test_invalid_state_raises(
self, oidc_idp: IDPRegistry, auth_db: Path, fake_oauth_client: None
) -> None:
"""无效 state（CSRF 校验失败）应拒绝。"""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="state"):
await OIDCProvider().handle_callback("test_oidc", "code", "invalid-state")
class TestAuthenticateNotImplemented:
async def test_raises(self) -> None:
from agentkit.server.auth.providers.exceptions import ProviderNotImplemented
with pytest.raises(ProviderNotImplemented):
await OIDCProvider().authenticate(username="x", password="y")

200
tests/unit/test_pii_filter.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
"""U2/R3 PII 脱敏 hook 测试。
覆盖场景：
- 正则版脱敏：手机号 / 邮箱 / 身份证 / 银行卡
- fail-closed：脱敏失败时抛 PIIFilterError
- hash 审计：脱敏后记录 hash，原文不出现
- ner_hook：自定义 NER 函数优先于正则版
- messages 脱敏：string content + Anthropic content blocks
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pytest
from agentkit.llm.pii_filter import (
PIIFilterError,
PIIMatch,
filter_messages_pii,
filter_pii,
)
# ── 正则版脱敏 ────────────────────────────────────────────
class TestRegexRedaction:
"""正则版 PII 脱敏"""
def test_phone_redacted(self):
result = filter_pii("联系我：13912345678")
assert result.redacted_count == 1
assert "13912345678" not in result.redacted_text
assert "[REDACTED_PHONE:" in result.redacted_text
assert len(result.matches[0].hash) == 8
def test_email_redacted(self):
result = filter_pii("发邮件给 user@example.com 谢谢")
assert result.redacted_count == 1
assert "user@example.com" not in result.redacted_text
assert "[REDACTED_EMAIL:" in result.redacted_text
def test_id_card_redacted(self):
result = filter_pii("身份证号：11010119900307888X")
assert result.redacted_count == 1
assert "11010119900307888X" not in result.redacted_text
assert "[REDACTED_ID_CARD:" in result.redacted_text
def test_bank_card_redacted(self):
result = filter_pii("银行卡：6222021234567890123")
assert result.redacted_count == 1
assert "6222021234567890123" not in result.redacted_text
assert "[REDACTED_BANK_CARD:" in result.redacted_text
def test_multiple_pii_in_one_text(self):
text = "电话 13912345678，邮箱 user@example.com，身份证 11010119900307888X"
result = filter_pii(text)
assert result.redacted_count == 3
assert "13912345678" not in result.redacted_text
assert "user@example.com" not in result.redacted_text
assert "11010119900307888X" not in result.redacted_text
def test_no_pii_returns_unchanged(self):
text = "这是一段普通文本，不含 PII"
result = filter_pii(text)
assert result.redacted_count == 0
assert result.redacted_text == text
# ── hash 审计 ───────────────────────────────────────────
class TestHashAudit:
"""脱敏后 hash 记录用于审计（不可逆）"""
def test_hash_is_8_chars_sha256_prefix(self):
import hashlib
result = filter_pii("13912345678")
expected = hashlib.sha256("13912345678".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:8]
assert result.matches[0].hash == expected
assert len(result.matches[0].hash) == 8
def test_original_not_in_redacted_text(self):
result = filter_pii("电话 13912345678")
assert "13912345678" not in result.redacted_text
# hash 不等于原文
assert result.matches[0].redacted != result.matches[0].original
# ── fail-closed ─────────────────────────────────────────
class TestFailClosed:
"""脱敏失败时 fail-closed 行为"""
def test_fail_closed_raises_on_error(self):
"""fail_closed=True 时，ner_hook 抛异常 → PIIFilterError"""
def bad_ner(text):
raise RuntimeError("NER model offline")
with pytest.raises(PIIFilterError, match="fail-closed"):
filter_pii("test text", ner_hook=bad_ner, fail_closed=True)
def test_fail_open_returns_original_on_error(self):
"""fail_closed=False 时，ner_hook 失败 → 降级正则版（ner_hook 失败不阻塞）"""
def bad_ner(text):
raise RuntimeError("NER model offline")
# ner_hook 失败时降级到正则版，不抛异常
result = filter_pii("电话 13912345678", ner_hook=bad_ner, fail_closed=False)
# 正则版仍能识别手机号
assert result.redacted_count == 1
assert "13912345678" not in result.redacted_text
# ── ner_hook ────────────────────────────────────────────
class TestNerHook:
"""自定义 NER hook 优先于正则版"""
def test_ner_hook_takes_precedence(self):
"""ner_hook 返回脱敏结果时，正则版不再处理（避免双重脱敏）"""
def custom_ner(text):
# 模拟 NER 模型只识别 "SECRET" 关键词
redacted = text.replace("SECRET", "[REDACTED_CUSTOM:abc12345]")
match = PIIMatch(
pii_type="custom",
original="SECRET",
redacted="[REDACTED_CUSTOM:abc12345]",
hash="abc12345",
)
return redacted, [match]
result = filter_pii("电话 13912345678 SECRET", ner_hook=custom_ner)
# ner_hook 优先：SECRET 被脱敏，但手机号也被正则版脱敏（双重处理）
# ponytail: ner_hook 和正则版是叠加的（ner_hook 先，正则版后）
assert "SECRET" not in result.redacted_text
assert "[REDACTED_CUSTOM:abc12345]" in result.redacted_text
# 正则版仍处理手机号
assert "13912345678" not in result.redacted_text
# ── messages 脱敏 ───────────────────────────────────────
class TestMessagesRedaction:
"""对 chat messages 列表执行 PII 脱敏"""
def test_string_content_redacted(self):
messages = [
{"role": "user", "content": "电话 13912345678"},
{"role": "assistant", "content": "好的"},
]
redacted, matches = filter_messages_pii(messages)
assert len(matches) == 1
assert "13912345678" not in redacted[0]["content"]
assert redacted[1]["content"] == "好的" # 无 PII 不变
def test_anthropic_content_blocks_redacted(self):
"""Anthropic content blocks（list of dicts）中的 text 被脱敏"""
messages = [
{
"role": "system",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "电话 13912345678"},
{"type": "text", "text": "无 PII 文本"},
],
}
]
redacted, matches = filter_messages_pii(messages)
assert len(matches) == 1
assert "13912345678" not in redacted[0]["content"][0]["text"]
assert redacted[0]["content"][1]["text"] == "无 PII 文本"
def test_non_text_content_passthrough(self):
"""非 text 类型的 content block 透传不脱敏"""
messages = [
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "image", "source": "data:..."},
{"type": "text", "text": "电话 13912345678"},
],
}
]
redacted, matches = filter_messages_pii(messages)
assert len(matches) == 1
# image block 透传
assert redacted[0]["content"][0] == {"type": "image", "source": "data:..."}
def test_non_string_non_list_content_passthrough(self):
"""非 str/非 list content 透传"""
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": None}]
redacted, matches = filter_messages_pii(messages)
assert len(matches) == 0
assert redacted[0]["content"] is None

141
tests/unit/test_prompt_cache_layers.py
View File

@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ class _StubGateway:
yield # makes this an async generator
def _make_engine(provider_name: str | None = "anthropic", *, cache_enable: bool = True) -> tuple[ReActEngine, _StubGateway]:
def _make_engine(
provider_name: str | None = "anthropic", *, cache_enable: bool = True
) -> tuple[ReActEngine, _StubGateway]:
gw = _StubGateway(provider_name=provider_name)
engine = ReActEngine.__new__(ReActEngine)
engine._llm_gateway = gw
@ -166,6 +168,7 @@ async def test_execute_stream_with_anthropic_uses_content_blocks():
self.captured_messages = list(kwargs.get("messages", []))
# yield one chunk then end
from agentkit.llm.protocol import StreamChunk
yield StreamChunk(content="done", model="claude")
class _MemRetriever:
@ -219,3 +222,139 @@ def test_anthropic_convert_messages_string_system_still_works():
messages = [{"role": "system", "content": "old style"}]
system_prompt, _ = provider._convert_messages(messages)
assert system_prompt == "old style"
# ---- U2 cache hit/miss metric emission ----
def test_token_usage_cache_hit_property():
"""U2: TokenUsage.cache_hit 反映 cache_read_input_tokens > 0"""
from agentkit.llm.protocol import TokenUsage
hit_usage = TokenUsage(
prompt_tokens=100,
completion_tokens=50,
cache_read_input_tokens=80,
cache_creation_input_tokens=20,
)
assert hit_usage.cache_hit is True
miss_usage = TokenUsage(prompt_tokens=100, completion_tokens=50)
assert miss_usage.cache_hit is False
assert miss_usage.cache_read_input_tokens == 0
def test_anthropic_provider_parses_cache_tokens_from_response():
"""U2: Anthropic provider 从 API 响应解析 cache_read_input_tokens"""
from agentkit.llm.providers.anthropic import AnthropicProvider
provider = AnthropicProvider.__new__(AnthropicProvider)
provider.api_key = "test"
provider.base_url = "http://test"
# 模拟 Anthropic 响应含 cache 字段
mock_response = {
"content": [{"type": "text", "text": "hello"}],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4",
"usage": {
"input_tokens": 100,
"output_tokens": 50,
"cache_read_input_tokens": 80,
"cache_creation_input_tokens": 20,
},
}
# 直接调用 _parse_response（私有方法，测试用）
usage = provider._parse_response(mock_response, "claude-sonnet-4").usage
assert usage.cache_read_input_tokens == 80
assert usage.cache_creation_input_tokens == 20
assert usage.cache_hit is True
def _build_cache_metric_gateway(response):
"""构造 LLMGateway mock，跳过 __init__。
ponytail: 直接装配测试所需的最小属性，避免初始化真实 provider/cache。
"""
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
from agentkit.llm.gateway import LLMGateway
mock_provider = MagicMock()
mock_provider.chat = AsyncMock(return_value=response)
gw = LLMGateway.__new__(LLMGateway)
gw._providers = {"mock": mock_provider}
gw._config = MagicMock()
gw._config.providers = {} # _calculate_cost 真实迭代返回 0.0
gw._config.fallbacks = {} # _get_models_to_try 返回 [resolved_model]
gw._cache_manager = None
gw._usage_tracker = MagicMock()
gw._resolve_model_alias = lambda m: m
gw._resolve_model = lambda m: (mock_provider, m)
return gw
def test_gateway_emits_prompt_cache_hit_metric_on_cache_read():
"""U2: gateway.chat 在 cache_read_input_tokens > 0 时 emit prompt_cache.hit"""
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
from agentkit.llm.protocol import LLMResponse, TokenUsage
response = LLMResponse(
content="test",
model="claude",
usage=TokenUsage(
prompt_tokens=100,
completion_tokens=50,
cache_read_input_tokens=80,
),
)
gw = _build_cache_metric_gateway(response)
# patch gateway 模块内的导入绑定名（from ... import prompt_cache_hit_counter）
with (
patch("agentkit.llm.gateway.prompt_cache_hit_counter") as hit_counter,
patch("agentkit.llm.gateway.prompt_cache_miss_counter") as miss_counter,
patch(
"agentkit.llm.gateway.LLMGateway._record_usage",
new_callable=AsyncMock,
),
):
import asyncio
asyncio.run(gw.chat(messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], model="claude"))
# cache_read_input_tokens > 0 → hit counter called
hit_counter().add.assert_called_once()
miss_counter().add.assert_not_called()
def test_gateway_emits_prompt_cache_miss_metric_on_no_cache_read():
"""U2: gateway.chat 在 cache_read_input_tokens == 0 时 emit prompt_cache.miss"""
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
from agentkit.llm.protocol import LLMResponse, TokenUsage
response = LLMResponse(
content="test",
model="claude",
usage=TokenUsage(prompt_tokens=100, completion_tokens=50), # cache_read=0
)
gw = _build_cache_metric_gateway(response)
with (
patch("agentkit.llm.gateway.prompt_cache_hit_counter") as hit_counter,
patch("agentkit.llm.gateway.prompt_cache_miss_counter") as miss_counter,
patch(
"agentkit.llm.gateway.LLMGateway._record_usage",
new_callable=AsyncMock,
),
):
import asyncio
asyncio.run(gw.chat(messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], model="claude"))
# cache_read_input_tokens == 0 → miss counter called
miss_counter().add.assert_called_once()
hit_counter().add.assert_not_called()

196
tests/unit/test_saml_provider.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
"""SAML 2.0 provider 单元测试 (U4 SSO 集成)。
验证：
- ACS NameID 提取 + JIT 用户创建
- 按 NameID 关联（R1a: 禁止邮箱合并）
- 相同 NameID 复用现有用户
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
import aiosqlite
import pytest
from agentkit.server.auth.idp_registry import (
IDPConfig,
IDPRegistry,
SAMLConfig,
)
from agentkit.server.auth.models import init_auth_db
from agentkit.server.auth.providers.saml import SAMLProvider
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture
def saml_idp(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> IDPRegistry:
"""注册一个测试 SAML IDP 并替换全局 registry。"""
registry = IDPRegistry()
registry.register(
IDPConfig(
name="test_saml",
type="saml",
display_name="Test SAML",
saml=SAMLConfig(
entity_id="https://idp.test/entity",
sso_url="https://idp.test/sso",
idp_cert="-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nfakecert\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
sp_entity_id="https://app.test/sp",
acs_url="https://app.test/api/v1/auth/saml/test_saml/acs",
),
)
)
monkeypatch.setattr("agentkit.server.auth.providers.saml.get_idp_registry", lambda: registry)
return registry
@pytest.fixture
async def auth_db(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> Path:
db_path = tmp_path / "auth.db"
await init_auth_db(db_path)
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB", str(db_path))
return db_path
@pytest.fixture
def mock_saml_parse(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""替换 _process_saml 为假实现 — 返回固定 NameID + attributes。"""
def _fake_process(
self: SAMLProvider, req: dict, cfg: Any, provider_name: str
) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
return "saml-nameid-456", {"email": "saml_user@example.com", "name": "SAML User"}
monkeypatch.setattr(SAMLProvider, "_process_saml", _fake_process)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestHandleAcs:
async def test_creates_user_by_nameid(
self,
saml_idp: IDPRegistry,
auth_db: Path,
mock_saml_parse: None,
) -> None:
"""ACS 消费 SAMLResponse + NameID 提取 + JIT 用户创建。"""
user = await SAMLProvider().handle_acs("test_saml", "fake-saml-response")
assert user["username"] == "SAML User"
assert user["email"] == "saml_user@example.com"
# 验证 user_idp_links 按 NameID 关联
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute(
"SELECT * FROM user_idp_links WHERE idp_name = ? AND idp_subject = ?",
("test_saml", "saml-nameid-456"),
)
link = await cursor.fetchone()
assert link is not None
assert link["idp_type"] == "saml"
assert link["user_id"] == user["id"]
async def test_same_nameid_reuses_user(
self,
saml_idp: IDPRegistry,
auth_db: Path,
mock_saml_parse: None,
) -> None:
"""相同 NameID 第二次登录复用现有用户。"""
provider = SAMLProvider()
user1 = await provider.handle_acs("test_saml", "resp1")
user2 = await provider.handle_acs("test_saml", "resp2")
assert user1["id"] == user2["id"]
async def test_no_email_merge(
self,
saml_idp: IDPRegistry,
auth_db: Path,
mock_saml_parse: None,
) -> None:
"""R1a: 不同 NameID 相同 email — 禁止合并。"""
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
local_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
await db.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, password_hash, role, is_active, "
"is_terminal_authorized, is_server_terminal_authorized, created_at, updated_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
local_id,
"local_saml_user",
"saml_user@example.com",
"$2b$12$dummyhash",
"member",
1,
0,
0,
now,
now,
),
)
await db.commit()
# SAML NameID=saml-nameid-456（不同于本地用户）
saml_user = await SAMLProvider().handle_acs("test_saml", "resp")
assert saml_user["id"] != local_id
async def test_unknown_provider_raises(
self,
saml_idp: IDPRegistry,
auth_db: Path,
mock_saml_parse: None,
) -> None:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="未配置"):
await SAMLProvider().handle_acs("nonexistent", "resp")
async def test_missing_nameid_raises(
self,
saml_idp: IDPRegistry,
auth_db: Path,
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""SAML assertion 缺少 NameID 应拒绝。"""
monkeypatch.setattr(
SAMLProvider,
"_process_saml",
lambda self, req, cfg, name: ("", {}),
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="NameID"):
await SAMLProvider().handle_acs("test_saml", "resp")
class TestAuthenticateNotImplemented:
async def test_raises(self) -> None:
from agentkit.server.auth.providers.exceptions import ProviderNotImplemented
with pytest.raises(ProviderNotImplemented):
await SAMLProvider().authenticate(username="x", password="y")
class TestRevokeUser:
async def test_disables_local_user(
self,
saml_idp: IDPRegistry,
auth_db: Path,
mock_saml_parse: None,
) -> None:
provider = SAMLProvider()
user = await provider.handle_acs("test_saml", "resp")
await provider.revoke_user(user["id"])
async with aiosqlite.connect(str(auth_db)) as db:
db.row_factory = aiosqlite.Row
cursor = await db.execute("SELECT is_active FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user["id"],))
row = await cursor.fetchone()
assert bool(row["is_active"]) is False

162
tests/unit/test_scim_router.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
"""SCIM 2.0 router 单元测试 (U4 SSO 集成)。
验证 POST / PATCH / GET /scim/v2/Users：
- POST 创建用户
- PATCH 禁用用户 (active=false)
- GET 列表 / 过滤
- Bearer token 认证（缺 token / 错误 token → 401）
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from agentkit.server.auth.models import init_auth_db
from agentkit.server.auth.scim.router import router as scim_router
SCIM_TOKEN = "test-scim-token-secret"
@pytest.fixture
async def scim_app(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> FastAPI:
"""创建含 SCIM router 的 TestApp + 初始化 auth DB。"""
db_path = tmp_path / "auth.db"
await init_auth_db(db_path)
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTKIT_AUTH_DB", str(db_path))
monkeypatch.setenv("AGENTKIT_SCIM_TOKEN", SCIM_TOKEN)
app = FastAPI()
app.state.auth_db_path = str(db_path)
app.state.scim_token = SCIM_TOKEN
app.include_router(scim_router, prefix="/api/v1")
return app
@pytest.fixture
def client(scim_app: FastAPI) -> TestClient:
return TestClient(scim_app)
def _auth_headers(token: str = SCIM_TOKEN) -> dict[str, str]:
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestCreateUser:
def test_creates_user(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
resp = client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={
"userName": "scim.user1",
"active": True,
"emails": [{"value": "scim1@example.com", "primary": True}],
},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 201
data = resp.json()
assert data["userName"] == "scim.user1"
assert data["active"] is True
assert data["emails"][0]["value"] == "scim1@example.com"
assert data["schemas"] == ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"]
def test_duplicate_username_conflict(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={"userName": "dup.user", "emails": [{"value": "dup@example.com"}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
resp = client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={"userName": "dup.user", "emails": [{"value": "other@example.com"}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 409
def test_no_token_unauthorized(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
resp = client.post("/api/v1/scim/v2/Users", json={"userName": "x"})
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_wrong_token_unauthorized(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
resp = client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={"userName": "x"},
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer wrong-token"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
class TestPatchUser:
def test_disable_user(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
# 先创建
create = client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={"userName": "patch.user", "active": True, "emails": [{"value": "p@example.com"}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
user_id = create.json()["id"]
# PATCH 禁用
resp = client.patch(
f"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users/{user_id}",
json={"Operations": [{"op": "replace", "path": "active", "value": False}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert resp.json()["active"] is False
def test_patch_unknown_user_404(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
resp = client.patch(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users/nonexistent-id",
json={"Operations": [{"op": "replace", "path": "active", "value": False}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 404
class TestListUsers:
def test_list_all(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={"userName": "list.user1", "emails": [{"value": "l1@example.com"}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={"userName": "list.user2", "emails": [{"value": "l2@example.com"}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
resp = client.get("/api/v1/scim/v2/Users", headers=_auth_headers())
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
assert data["totalResults"] >= 2
assert len(data["Resources"]) >= 2
def test_filter_by_username(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
client.post(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
json={"userName": "filter.user", "emails": [{"value": "f@example.com"}]},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
resp = client.get(
"/api/v1/scim/v2/Users",
params={"filter": 'userName eq "filter.user"'},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
assert data["totalResults"] == 1
assert data["Resources"][0]["userName"] == "filter.user"
def test_no_token_unauthorized(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
resp = client.get("/api/v1/scim/v2/Users")
assert resp.status_code == 401

96
tests/unit/test_telemetry.py
View File

@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
"""Telemetry module unit tests."""
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from agentkit.telemetry.tracer import (
NoOpSpan,
NoOpTracer,
OTelSpan,
OTelTracer,
TelemetryConfig,
get_tracer,
@ -110,29 +109,26 @@ class TestInitTelemetry:
tracer = get_tracer()
assert isinstance(tracer, NoOpTracer)
def test_missing_opentelemetry_falls_back_to_noop(self):
"""当 opentelemetry 包未安装时，优雅降级为 NoOpTracer"""
def test_enabled_initializes_otel_tracer(self):
"""U1: enabled=True 初始化 OTelTracer（OTel 现为 required 依赖，不再 ImportError fallback）"""
config = TelemetryConfig(enabled=True, otlp_endpoint="http://localhost:4317")
# 即使 opentelemetry 未安装，也不应抛出异常
init_telemetry(config)
tracer = get_tracer()
# 在没有 opentelemetry 的环境中应为 NoOpTracer
assert isinstance(tracer, (NoOpTracer, OTelTracer))
# OTel 已安装，应返回 OTelTracer 实例（而非 NoOpTracer）
assert isinstance(tracer, OTelTracer)
def test_init_with_exception_falls_back_to_noop(self):
"""初始化过程中出现异常时，降级为 NoOpTracer"""
"""初始化过程中出现运行时异常时，降级为 NoOpTracer（保留运行时容错）"""
config = TelemetryConfig(enabled=True, otlp_endpoint="http://localhost:4317")
# OTLPSpanExporter 在 init_telemetry 函数内部 import，patch 源模块符号
# opentelemetry.sdk.trace.TracerProvider 是函数内 import 的真实符号
with patch(
"agentkit.telemetry.tracer.init_telemetry",
side_effect=Exception("init error"),
) as mock_init:
# init_telemetry 被模拟为抛异常，但实际调用的是原始函数
# 这里验证的是 init_telemetry 本身不会崩溃
pass
# 直接调用，不应崩溃
init_telemetry(config)
tracer = get_tracer()
assert isinstance(tracer, (NoOpTracer, OTelTracer))
"opentelemetry.sdk.trace.TracerProvider",
side_effect=RuntimeError("provider init failed"),
):
init_telemetry(config)
tracer = get_tracer()
assert isinstance(tracer, NoOpTracer)
# ── get_tracer 测试 ────────────────────────────────────────
@ -174,14 +170,11 @@ class TestAlignmentGuardSpan:
with patch.object(tracer, "start_span", return_value=mock_span):
config = AlignmentConfig(constraints=["forbidden_word"])
guard = AlignmentGuard(config)
result = await guard.check_output(
{"content": "This contains forbidden_word"}
)
await guard.check_output({"content": "This contains forbidden_word"})
tracer.start_span.assert_called_once_with("guard.check")
call_args_list = [
(call.args[0], call.args[1])
for call in mock_span.set_attribute.call_args_list
(call.args[0], call.args[1]) for call in mock_span.set_attribute.call_args_list
]
assert ("guard.constraints_count", 1) in call_args_list
assert ("guard.passed", False) in call_args_list
@ -201,13 +194,60 @@ class TestAlignmentGuardSpan:
with patch.object(tracer, "start_span", return_value=mock_span):
config = AlignmentConfig(constraints=["forbidden_word"])
guard = AlignmentGuard(config)
result = await guard.check_output(
{"content": "This is clean text"}
)
await guard.check_output({"content": "This is clean text"})
call_args_list = [
(call.args[0], call.args[1])
for call in mock_span.set_attribute.call_args_list
(call.args[0], call.args[1]) for call in mock_span.set_attribute.call_args_list
]
assert ("guard.passed", True) in call_args_list
assert ("guard.checked_by", "rule") in call_args_list
# ── setup_telemetry smoke test ───────────────────────────
class TestSetupTelemetry:
"""setup_telemetry FastAPI 装配 smoke test（U1）"""
def test_disabled_is_noop(self):
"""enabled=False 时不做任何装配"""
from fastapi import FastAPI
from agentkit.telemetry.setup import setup_telemetry
# spec=FastAPI 让 getattr 返回真实的默认值（而非 MagicMock 自动属性）
app = MagicMock(spec=FastAPI)
setup_telemetry(app, {"enabled": False})
# app 不应被 instrument（spec 让未设属性返回 AttributeError→default False）
assert not getattr(app, "_is_instrumented_by_opentelemetry", False)
def test_enabled_instruments_fastapi(self):
"""enabled=True 时 FastAPIInstrumentor 装配 app（不崩溃即可）"""
from fastapi import FastAPI
from agentkit.telemetry.setup import setup_telemetry
app = FastAPI()
# 使用一个无效 endpoint — exporter 会失败但不阻塞 instrument
setup_telemetry(
app,
{
"enabled": True,
"otlp_endpoint": "http://127.0.0.1:4317",
"service_name": "test-agentkit",
"export_traces": True,
"export_metrics": True,
},
)
# FastAPIInstrumentor 装配后会设置此属性
assert getattr(app, "_is_instrumented_by_opentelemetry", False) is True
def test_none_config_is_noop(self):
"""config=None 不崩溃"""
from fastapi import FastAPI
from agentkit.telemetry.setup import setup_telemetry
app = MagicMock(spec=FastAPI)
setup_telemetry(app, None)
assert not getattr(app, "_is_instrumented_by_opentelemetry", False)