The whoami route accepted rotated/old refresh tokens for cold-start
because it only checked session revocation status, not the token hash.
Now when token_type == "refresh", the route computes hash_token(token)
and compares it with the session's stored refresh_token_hash using
hmac.compare_digest (constant-time). Mismatch returns 401.
- Add SessionService.get_stored_refresh_hash(session_id) helper
- Add hash verification in whoami route (R9)
- Add TestWhoamiTokenHash with 5 integration tests
SkillService: enable/disable (persisted in skill_states table, schema
v4), import from YAML (with path traversal + name validation), reload
from file, update config. GET /skills now filters disabled skills.
KbService: list/upload/delete documents with department_id binding.
Added department_id field to KnowledgeSource + UploadedDocument.
Department visibility: (bound to user depts) ∪ (global = None).
10 new admin endpoints: skill enable/disable/import/reload/update,
KB documents CRUD, source sync/rebuild. All guarded by _require_admin.
Implemented reload stub in skill_management.py (was no-op).
54 new tests (26 unit + 28 integration). Fixed 4 pre-existing lint
errors. 357 admin tests pass, no regressions.
U1: Bump _SCHEMA_VERSION to 3, add 5 department tables (departments,
user_departments, department_skill_bindings, department_kb_bindings,
department_quotas) + 5 ORM models + helpers.
U2: DepartmentService (12 async methods: CRUD + bind/unbind skill/KB +
count_users). Mount admin_router in app.py. 36 unit + 28 integration tests.
U4: DepartmentContext FastAPI dependency (per-route, admin bypasses
filtering). filter_skills_by_department / filter_kb_sources_by_department
helpers. Applied to GET /skills and GET /kb-management/* routes.
15 integration tests for department isolation.
Also includes brainstorm + plan docs. 108 new tests, all pass.
Add create_user method to LocalAuthProvider (bcrypt hash + INSERT,
raises ValueError on duplicate username/email).
Add UserService with 9 async methods: create/list/get/update/delete
(soft)/reset_password/assign_department/remove_department/list_user_departments. reset_password revokes all sessions via SessionService.
delete_user is soft (is_active=0, row preserved).
Add 9 user endpoints to routes/admin.py: POST/GET/PATCH/DELETE users,
reset-password, assign/remove department, list departments. All
guarded by _require_admin.
Tests: 40 unit + 37 integration = 77 new tests. Full admin suite
170 tests pass, no regressions.
Adds the central business-logic layer for ``auth_sessions`` so routes,
the auth middleware, and the admin endpoints can call a single service
instead of touching the table directly.
Server
- session_service.SessionService: CRUD + lifecycle for auth_sessions.
- create() enforces the per-user cap (default 10): the oldest
active session is evicted with reason=session_cap_eviction.
- rotate() swaps a refresh token, adds the old hash to the
denylist, and raises SessionReuseDetected (revoking all sessions
for the user) when the old token is replayed.
- revoke() / revoke_by_refresh_token() / revoke_all_for_user()
with explicit reasons: user_terminated, admin_revoked,
password_changed, reuse_detected, session_cap_eviction.
- touch() bumps last_active_at (called on /auth/whoami).
- session_cache.SessionValidationCache: bounded LRU+TTL wrapper
(default 30s/1k entries) around SessionService.is_session_valid.
The middleware hits this on every request carrying a V2 sid claim;
one SQLite round-trip per 30s per session instead of per request.
- get_session_service() / get_validation_cache() module-level
singletons overridable in tests via set_session_service() /
set_validation_cache().
Tests
- tests/unit/auth/test_session_service.py: 15 cases covering
create/rotate/revoke/list/cap-eviction/reuse-detection/expired
sessions.
Refs: U3 in docs/plans/2026-06-20-002-feat-centralized-auth-token-persistence-plan.md
Adds V2 JWT claim schema that closes the kicked-out window and enables
refresh-token rotation with reuse detection.
Server
- jwt_utils.create_token_pair now takes ``session_id`` and ``remember_me``
kwargs. When ``session_id`` is provided, both tokens carry a ``sid``
claim and the access token also carries a ``jti`` claim; the refresh
token's jti is intentionally absent (rotation uses the token hash).
- New ``REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_REMEMBER_ME = 30d`` (default 7d) selected by
the ``remember_me`` flag.
- ``verify_token`` now supports an optional ``expected_type`` filter
(e.g. ``"access"`` / ``"refresh"``); when omitted, both types pass
(used by /auth/whoami's cold-start path).
- New ``auth.denylist`` module: ``InMemoryRecentlyRevoked`` (default for
the Tauri sidecar / dev mode) and ``RedisRecentlyRevoked`` (multi-
process server). Bounded LRU with auto-expiry via ``time.monotonic()``.
Backwards-compat
- Tokens issued before U2 (no ``sid``) are still accepted by
``verify_token``; validation falls through to the legacy
``user_sessions`` table via the U10 shim (next commit).
Tests
- tests/unit/auth/test_jwt_utils.py: 12 cases — V1/V2 claim presence,
default + remember-me TTL, expected_type filter, expiry, wrong secret.
- tests/unit/auth/test_denylist.py: 6 cases — add/contains, TTL expiry,
LRU eviction, re-add refresh, clear, hash stability.
Refs: U2 in docs/plans/2026-06-20-002-feat-centralized-auth-token-persistence-plan.md
Fischer
chiguyong